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ABSTRACT
STUMBLING TOWARD THE UP ESCALATOR:
HOW TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND FINANCE
HAVE COMPLICATED LATIN AMERICA’S QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE,
DIVERSIFIED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
SEPTEMBER 2018
MARY ELIZA REBECCA RAY
B.A., GUILFORD COLLEGE
M.A., THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Ph.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: James K. Boyce

This dissertation explores economic, environmental, and social aspects of Latin
America and the Caribbean’s (LAC’s) halting steps away from commodity dependence
(the “down escalator” envisioned by Hans Singer). It focuses on the most recent
commodity boom (2003-2013), during which the region shifted back toward primary
commodity production under a new policy framework aimed at limiting the
environmental and social costs of this production while more broadly sharing its benefits
through infrastructure, social spending, and closer oversight of foreign investors. This
dissertation’s three essays focus on three international flows: trade, development finance,
and investment.
The first essay weighs the environmental impact of LAC’s recent “China boom”
in commodity exports. It finds that LAC primary commodity production is more
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environmentally intensive – in net greenhouse gas emissions and water use and
contamination – than manufacturing. Applying these findings to the “China boom,” it
finds that LAC-China exports are associated with significantly more carbon emissions
and water use and contamination than other exports.
The second essay evaluates environmental and social protections covering
development lending for infrastructure in the Andean nations of Columbia, Ecuador,
Peru, and Bolivia, which have experienced an infrastructure boom concurrent with the
end of the commodity boom. This essay measures the environmental impact (using
geospatial imaging of tree cover change) associated with the 84 infrastructure projects
financed by international development institutions between 2000 and 2015 in these four
countries. It finds that projects undertaken under policy regimes including guarantees of
prior consultation with affected indigenous communities were associated with
significantly less tree cover loss, showing the importance of social protections for
environmental outcomes in the Andean region.
The third essay examines recent environmental and social reforms in Ecuador’s
oil sector. It uses a mixed-methods approach to evaluate the extent to which new
partnerships with Chinese state-owned oil investors gave Ecuador the needed policy
space to implement this regulatory framework. It finds that while Chinese oil firms
operating in Ecuador have avoided the environmental and social misconduct that typified
some past oil FDI, the state has struggled to carry out its own social and environmental
protections, endangering its new “high-road” approach to extraction.
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INTRODUCTION

I.1 Introduction
Over the last 50 years, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has made several
attempts to diversify its production base away from relying on exports of raw materials,
with mixed results. Over the last business cycle, these perennial efforts were further
complicated by 21st-century trends in current and capital account flows. As a result,
rather than diversification, the region has experienced a period of re-primarization. This
time was different from previous commodity booms, however, at least regarding the
regulatory frameworks in place. Across Latin America and the Caribbean – and
especially in South America – governments during the commodity boom enacted
sweeping protections for workers, indigenous groups, and the environment, as well as
instituting greater redistribution of rents through social and infrastructure spending. This
dissertation attempts to examine this recent re-orientation toward “high-road” primary
production in light of longstanding structural problems with reliance on primary
commodity production and exports.
The present work is divided among three essays to cover three forms of
international flows – trade, finance, and investment – at the regional, sub-regional, and
national levels. Essay 1 explores the rise of China as a major trading partner for LAC,
how China’s demand for raw materials has contributed to LAC’s re-primarization, and
the environmental impacts of this “China boom.” Essay 2 explores the infrastructure
boom financed by international development finance institutions (DFIs) in the Andean
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nations of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia in light of new social and environmental
standards, to measure whether the environmental profiles of these projects has improved
concurrently with the enactment of these new protections. Finally, essay 3 focuses on
Ecuador, a small country highly dependent on oil exports and foreign investment in its oil
sector, to evaluate governmental attempts at re-defining the terms of investor-state
relationships with new investors: Chinese oil SOEs.
I.2 The Resource Curse Globally and in Latin America and the Caribbean
Hans Singer famously stated that developing nations’ attempts at reaching
“sustained development and industrialization” are akin to “trying to run up a downwardmoving escalator” (1949; 7). Structural transformation requires such a dramatic
dedication of capital that it is all but impossible for countries to do so using domestic
resources, which are already occupied addressing their immediate needs. (In other words,
their efforts are currently being used to avoid going down the downward-moving
escalator on which they find themselves).
Prebisch (1950; 5) elaborates further on this point by positing that Latin
America’s development challenge was to avoid “restrict[ing] the individual consumption
of the bulk of the population, which, on the whole, is too low, [while] accumulat[ing] the
capital required for industrialization and for the technical improvement of agriculture.” In
his view, the region faced two perennial obstacles in meeting this goal: countering shortterm fluctuations in export prices (due to global business cycles) and finding long-term
financing for investment. Thus, commodity-producing countries – and especially those
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in Latin America – needed to mobilize international resources for industrial
development.
Ironically, though, attracting that international capital can be particularly difficult
for commodity-producing countries, because of the unfavorable impacts of commodity
exports on the stability of terms of trade and exchange rates. In perhaps their most
famous legacy, Prebisch and Singer are both credited with developing the “PrebischSinger hypothesis” that raw materials will display a secular price decline relative to
manufactured goods in the long term, leaving commodity-exporting countries with
inevitably declining terms of trade. Tests of this hypothesis have largely validated it over
varying commodity baskets and time periods (see for example Arezki et al., 2013;
Cuddington, 1992; Grilli and Yang, 1988; and Harvey et al., 2010). Furthermore,
Blattman et al (2007) finds a significant association between commodity exports and
terms of trade volatility, which in turn is linked to exchange rate volatility, diminished
FDI inflows, and lower long-term GDP growth (Aiyar et al., 2013; Eichengreen, 2008).
Prebisch expressed concern over “acute social antagonism” arising from the labor
market fluctuations and, when monetary policy alone is used to address them, inflation,
that are intrinsic in the boom-and-bust cycle of commodity exports (1950, 41). Indeed,
one of the major areas in which scholars have studied the so-called “resource curse” is its
relationship to labor markets, discussed in more detail in the LAC case below. Even
during booms, export-oriented agricultural and extractive production tend to use capitalintensive methods and support few employees. For example, Lódola, Brigo, and Morra
(2010) calculate the employment intensity of 31 common agricultural products in
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Argentina for the year 2007 and find that soy –which grew precipitously in price and
production in the latest commodity cycle and drove Argentina’s export agriculture boom
– is among the crops that supports the fewest employees for a given value of output. Soy
is tied with rice at 7 jobs per million pesos; only barley supported fewer (with 6 jobs per
million pesos). For its part, the extractive sector is famously capital-intensive, as is
further discussed below in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) case. Thus, the
benefits of commodity booms do not automatically spread throughout local communities
by way of labor markets. Furthermore, commodity booms can lead to currency overvaluation (the so-called “Dutch disease”), hurting the competitiveness of other, importcompeting industries, which can itself have significant employment impacts (Buiter and
Purvis, 1980; Ismail, 2010; Palma, 2014).
For all of these reasons (and many more that go beyond the scope of the present
research), LAC has spent decades in halting steps toward diversifying away from reliance
on exports of raw materials, with mixed results. The most recent commodity boom, from
2003 to 2013, represented a step backward toward re-primarization but under a new
context of higher social and environmental protections to address the “acute social
antagonism” flagged by Prebisch. This regional turn – and the reforms applied to it – are
discussed in more detail below.
I.3 LAC: Commodities, Re-Primarization, and the Resource Curse
Latin America has famously struggled to diversify away from reliance on raw
materials for decades. As Figure I.1 shows, real manufacturing growth has lagged behind
overall real GDP growth in LAC since the mid-1990s. The two began to diverge further
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in the mid-2000s during the years of the most recent commodity boom, 2003-2013. In
fact, of all goods-producing sectors (shown in black in Figure I.1), only agriculture has
kept pace with total value added. Latin Americanists refer to this phenomenon as “reprimarization” (see for example Baumann, 2010; Burchardt and Dietz, 2014). As Figure
I.1 also shows, the most recent downturn of 2015 brought slowdowns to all sectors, but
extraction was particularly hard-hit and declined further in 2016. It is no exaggeration to
say that the end of the commodity boom set extractive production back decades, as the
last time it was at its 2016 level was roughly 20 years previously. Thus, though the bulk
of this dissertation deals with the commodity price boom from 2003 to 2013, it is
important to bear in mind that economic activity in these sectors is subject to rising and
falling with prices and profitability.
Figure I.1: Real GDP growth by sector, 1990-2016.
Cumulative Change from 1990 (log difference)

80%

60%

Commerce, logistics

Agriculture

Construct ion, utilities

Extraction

Finance, ins., real est.

Manufacturing

Total value added

40%

20%

0%
1990

1995
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2010

Note: Commerce and logistics includes trade, hospitality, storage, and transportation.
Source: Author’s calculation from ECLAC (n.d.) data.
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2015

The lagging of manufactured goods compared to non-manufactured goods is also
visible in LAC exports. As Sinnot, Nash, and de la Torre (2010) note, LAC is
disproportionately represented among world commodity exports – especially petroleum
exports – relative to its share in world GDP. Table I.1 shows the LAC goods exports as a
share of regional GDP, disaggregated by technology level, following the technology
classification matrix of Lall (2000).1 Raw materials and their refined derivatives occupied
a place of prominence in the LAC export basket – close to or above 10 percent of
regional GDP – from 2003 to 2013, shown in darker shades of grey. In contrast,
manufactured goods hit their peak of importance in 2004 and began to decline thereafter.

1

Here, “resource-based” exports are primary commodities that have undergone minimal transformation,
such as refined metals, gasoline, and soybean oil.
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Table I.1: LAC exports as a share of GDP, by technology level, 1990-2016
Non-manufactured
Manufactured, by tech. level
GRAND
TOTAL
Primary Resource-based Total
Low
Medium
High
Total
1990
3.9%
1.4%
5.3%
0.7%
1.4%
0.2%
2.3%
7.6%
1991
3.3%
1.9%
5.2%
0.9%
1.5%
0.3%
2.6%
7.8%
1992
3.6%
2.2%
5.8%
1.3%
2.2%
0.8%
4.2%
10.0%
1993
3.3%
2.1%
5.4%
1.4%
2.3%
0.8%
4.4%
9.8%
1994
3.4%
2.1%
5.5%
1.3%
2.3%
0.9%
4.6%
10.1%
1995
3.7%
2.5%
6.3%
1.4%
2.7%
1.0%
5.1%
11.4%
1996
4.0%
2.4%
6.4%
1.5%
2.8%
1.2%
5.5%
11.9%
1997
3.9%
2.3%
6.3%
1.6%
3.0%
1.4%
6.0%
12.2%
1998
3.2%
2.2%
5.5%
1.6%
3.2%
1.7%
6.5%
11.9%
1999
3.8%
2.6%
6.4%
1.8%
3.7%
2.3%
7.9%
14.3%
2000
4.4%
2.8%
7.1%
1.9%
4.0%
2.7%
8.6%
15.7%
2001
4.1%
2.8%
6.9%
1.9%
4.1%
2.7%
8.7%
15.6%
2002
4.9%
2.9%
7.9%
2.3%
4.7%
2.8%
9.9%
17.7%
2003
5.7%
3.4%
9.1%
2.4%
4.8%
2.8% 10.0%
19.1%
2004
6.1%
4.4%
10.4%
2.4%
5.1%
2.8% 10.2%
20.6%
2005
6.3%
4.6%
10.9%
2.3%
4.8%
2.5%
9.6%
20.6%
2006
7.2%
4.1%
11.4%
2.1%
4.8%
2.6%
9.4%
20.8%
2007
5.3%
4.1%
9.4%
1.8%
4.4%
2.2%
8.5%
17.8%
2008
6.9%
4.5%
11.3%
1.7%
4.2%
2.2%
8.2%
19.5%
2009
5.6%
3.9%
9.5%
1.4%
3.3%
2.1%
6.9%
16.4%
2010
5.7%
4.2%
9.8%
1.3%
3.6%
2.0%
6.9%
16.7%
2011
6.4%
4.1%
10.5%
1.2%
3.7%
1.8%
6.7%
17.2%
2012
6.5%
4.3%
10.8%
1.3%
4.0%
1.8%
7.1%
17.8%
2013
6.4%
4.0%
10.4%
1.3%
4.2%
1.8%
7.2%
17.6%
2014
5.1%
3.5%
8.6%
1.4%
4.3%
1.8%
7.5%
16.1%
2015
4.6%
3.4%
7.9%
1.5%
4.9%
2.0%
8.4%
16.3%
2016
4.4%
3.4%
7.8%
1.4%
5.0%
2.0%
8.4%
16.2%
Source: Author’s calculations based on UN COMTRADE (n.d.) and IMF (2017) data.
Note: The commodity boom years of 2003-2013 are shown in darker shades of grey. Technology levels are
defined using Lall (2000). “Resource-based” exports are primary commodities that have gone minimal
transformation, including goods such as refined metals, gasoline, and soybean oil.

Within the primary and resource-based commodity categories, the most important
exports for LAC were petroleum, copper, iron, and soybeans (in their refined and
unrefined forms), as Table I.2 shows. Each of these products increased their share of total
exports sharply during the commodity boom compared to the previous 11 years. Other
major LAC export commodities – including animal feed, other fruits and nuts,
sweeteners, and coffee – remained constant or fell as a share of total exports.
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Table I.2: Top LAC export commodities during the boom: share of exports, 19922002
1992-2002
Crude petroleum oil

2003-2013

10.3%

14.8%

Refined petroleum products

4.0%

4.3%

Copper

2.2%

3.1%

Unrefined iron

1.2%

2.5%

Unrefined copper

0.8%

2.3%

Soybeans and other oilseeds

1.2%

2.1%

Animal feed

2.1%

1.9%

Fruit and nuts (excluding oilseeds)

2.2%

1.6%

Sugars, honey, and molasses

1.4%

1.4%

Coffee and coffee substitutes

2.3%

1.2%

Source: Author’s calculations from UN COMTRADE (n.d.) data.

Figure I.2 shows average world prices for these four categories of regionallydominant commodity exports: petroleum, copper, iron, and soybeans. Each of these four
categories saw explosive growth in prices – in both nominal and real terms – between the
years of 2003 and 2013, before declining again after 2013. For this reason, this collection
of essays defines the commodity boom – as LAC experienced it – as occurring from 2003
to 2013.
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Figure I.2: Average world prices, major LAC export commodities
A. Nominal prices
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B. Real prices
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Source: Author’s calculations using World Bank (n.d.) data.

Despite the growing share of primary and resource-based products in LAC
exports during the commodity boom, these sectors did not directly contribute much to
real GDP. Table I.3 shows sectorial contribution to real GDP growth in the decade of the
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commodity boom compared to the prior decade. While all other segments grew in their
contribution, agriculture and extraction each shrank in their contribution to just 0.1
percent annually each.
Table I.3: Contributions to average annual GDP growth in 5-year periods, LAC,
1990-2015
1993-2003

2003-2013

Agriculture, hunting, fishing, forestry

0.2%

0.1%

Extraction

0.3%

0.1%

Manufacturing

0.3%

0.4%

Construction, utilities

0.1%

0.4%

Transport, storage, commerce, hospitality

0.5%

0.9%

Public administration

0.5%

0.7%

Finance, insurance, real estate

0.3%

0.5%

Total Value Added

2.1%

3.1%

Source: Author’s calculations from ECLAC (n.d.) and IMF (2017) data.

Furthermore, the commodity boom did not help LAC’s terms of trade, shown in
Figure I.3. The export and import price indices both rose by about the same amount
during the boom and in 2013 LAC’s terms of trade index was 2.3 percent below its 2003
level. This lack of terms of trade benefit can be traced to one simple factor: a lack of
diversification. When commodity prices rose, LAC countries, in general, had to import
products that relied heavily on those commodities as inputs, including refined and
manufactured goods using large shares of iron (such as steel products), copper (such as
electronics), or petroleum (such as plastics). This is especially true for small commodity
exporters such as Ecuador, whose exports are not only mostly limited to raw materials,
but to a small number of raw materials.
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Figure I.3: LAC import, export, and terms of trade indices, 1990-2014
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Note: Regional price indices are calculated as the weighted average of country indices, with weights
defined as each country’s share of regional exports or imports in a given year. Where UN COMTRADE
data are missing for a given country’s exports/imports in a given year, they are imputed from rest-of-world
imports to/exports from that country and year. Source: Author’s calculation using Penn World Table 9.0
(Feenstra, Inkaar, and Timmer, 2015) and UN COMTRADE (n.d.) data.

I.4 Social and Environmental Impacts of LAC’s Resource Curse
Any examination of the social and environmental aspects of the resource curse in
LAC suffers from a paucity of existing literature measuring this subject, partly due to a
widespread absence of official data collection among regional governments. All three
essays in this dissertation aim to help address this gap, by more closely examining – and
where possible, measuring – the environmental and social aspects of LAC’s halting steps
away from raw material dependence. In place of region-wide, quantitative work on the
social and environmental costs and benefits of natural resource production in LAC, a
deep literature of location-specific and sector-specific case studies has emerged from the
fields of ecology, political ecology, and geography.
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Ecological research, for example, shows that Brazilian Amazonian deforestation
is significantly linked to beef and soy price trends. During commodity booms, the
expansion of beef and soy production frontiers has driven deforestation in the Brazilian
Amazon, showing that the responsiveness of agroindustry to world commodity demand
trends has outstripped conservation attempts by the Brazilian government, resulting in a
“boom and bust” cycle tying deforestation trends to world commodity price trends
(Barbier 2004; Fearnside, Figueriedo, and Bonjour, 2013; Verburg et al., 2014). Dammert
Bello (2015) shows similar findings for the expansion of the palm oil productive frontier
in the Peruvian Amazon, with related impacts including both deforestation and
community displacement.
Research from the fields of political ecology and geography shows that
environmental and social problems arising from commodity production are inextricably
intertwined. Bunker (1985) shows that extractive production in the Amazon not only
suffers from the “enclave economy” characteristics of low employment intensity
described above but also amplifies these problems by competing with local communities
for the natural resources (including land, water, and sinks) necessary for traditional
livelihoods such as fishing, hunting, gathering, and smallholder agriculture. Thus, these
new sectors endanger traditional livelihoods without creating a substitute employment
boom.
Employment estimates bear out these claims, especially for extractive activities of
mining and drilling. Table I.4 uses household survey data to estimate direct employment
per million USD of economic activity, by sector and country. These figures undoubtedly
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overstate employment in agriculture, because they include peasant agriculture, which is
famously labor-intensive. Plantation-style agriculture for exports has a very different
labor profile, but one that is impossible to differentiate with existing survey data.
Nonetheless, Table I.4 clearly shows that extraction requires very little labor input. This
lackluster employment impact, combined with competition for the resources necessary
for traditional livelihoods, creates conditions in which conflict can proliferate.
Table I.4: Direct employment per millions USD of economic activity, by sector
Sector
Extraction
4.8

All Economic
Activity
45.7

Agriculture
Manufacturing
LAC Overall
159.5
50.1
Countries:
Argentina
7.1
3.4
27.8
31.6
Bolivia
472.4
24.9
167.2
151.7
Brazil
134.4
0.0
52.1
42.4
Chile
89.0
7.3
30.4
29.2
Colombia
158.6
6.9
60.8
57.7
Costa Rica
84.2
13.2
39.3
42.4
Dominican Rep.
173.4
6.3
41.8
61.3
Ecuador
194.9
5.2
58.9
72.1
El Salvador
190.5
36.2
81.7
103.1
Guatemala
348.5
0.0
81.8
113.0
Honduras
487.5
52.1
128.5
172.3
Mexico
187.0
3.0
38.4
40.8
Panama
186.7
3.3
45.2
35.7
Paraguay
118.0
0.0
104.0
99.0
Peru
309.6
11.1
55.1
80.9
Source: Author’s calculations using World Bank WDI and UN ECLAC CEPALSTAT data.

Data
Year
2014
2014
2013
2014
2013
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2013
2014
2014
2014
2014

Leff (2001) notes that this dual nature of environmental and economic concerns
makes the US-based framework of environmental justice an apt one for analyzing
conflicts that arise in this context. Bebbington and Bury (2013) show how these concerns
unite – further complicated by a context of long-standing ethnic and economic inequality
– in conflicts surrounding extractive sectors in Latin America, particularly in the sectors
of mining, gas and oil in the Andean region. Sinnot, Nash, and de la Torre (2010)
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explore the differing conflict triggers for various commodity sectors: mining (water
contamination, noise, and particulate air pollution), oil (water and land contamination),
agriculture (chemical runoff and land tenure disputes), and fisheries (over-exploitation).
One way to estimate the social and environmental costs of commodity production
in LAC is through the records of the Environmental Justice Atlas, or EJAtlas (Temper,
del Bene, and Martinez-Alier, 2015). The EJAtlas complies information about
environmental conflicts worldwide for the last several decades. This resource warrants a
note of caution: it would be impossible for it to successfully capture and catalog every
conflict with equal detail, though it is a remarkably rich source, with over 700 such
conflicts reported for LAC. Furthermore, reporting is not perfectly comparable across
geographic areas, as conflicts may be submitted to the database by civil society
organizations, who do not all operate in similar political contexts – or with similar
internet access – across nations or regions. Finally, it includes occasional duplicate
reports of the same conflict or related conflicts. However, it still has value as a tool for
overall estimates if used with caution. For example, even though it cannot capture
differences across regions, it can still have value for illustrating the relative distribution
of conflicts among sectors within particular geographic areas. Table I.5 shows the results
of this comparison. It includes only those conflicts based on allegations of specific
misconduct, and it attempts to exclude all instances of duplicate reporting. It shows
conflicts listed by the sector accused of misconduct.
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Table I.5: Distribution of environmental conflicts by triggering sector
Caribbean

Mexico, Cent. Amer.

South Amer.

Total

Agriculture, food processing

12%

15%

15%

15%

Extraction and refining

42%

36%

56%

52%

Manufacturing

8%

2%

2%

3%

Tourism

8%

3%

1%

2%

Commerce

0%

1%

0%

0%

23%

36%

21%

24%

Public land management

8%

7%

3%

4%

Multiple sectors

0%

0%

1%

1%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Infrastructure

TOTAL

Note: “Public land management” includes public administration of land tenure and conservation projects.
Source: Author’s calculations using EJAtlas (Temper, del Bene, and Martinez-Alier, 2015) data.

As Table I.5 shows, the sector most closely associated with environmental
conflict across LAC is extraction and refining, followed by infrastructure projects. In
Mexico and Central America, notably, these two sectors tie for the dubious honor of
triggering the greatest number of environmental conflicts. Taken together, primary
sectors account for over half of all conflicts in every sub-region in LAC. It is clear that
these sectors are disproportionately represented in social conflict; even at their height
during the commodity boom, primary activities reached a peak of just 12.3 percent of
GDP, in 2008 (ECLAC, n.d.). In contrast, manufacturing accounts for less than 10
percent of environmental conflicts in each sub-region and only three percent for LAC as a
whole, though it is a larger share of LAC GDP. The lowest level manufacturing reached
as a share of GDP during the commodity boom was 12.6 percent, in 2014 – still quite a
bit higher than its share of environmental conflicts. Thus, in LAC, primary production is
much more environmentally conflict-intensive than manufacturing.
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I.5 LAC’s Halting Progress Toward Diversification
Both Prebisch and Singer wrote that some level of industrialization – to
complement developing countries’ current comparative advantage in raw materials – was
a necessary step toward development. Singer referred to industrial capital accumulation
as one of the “seeds” of development (with human development goals such as reduced
malnutrition and poverty as the “fruits” thereof), while Prebisch saw industrial capital
accumulation as a necessary precursor for improvements in productivity – and ultimately,
in living standards. Notably, neither called for the elimination of commodity production
(despite later characterizations of their work by others) but rather sought what would
today be called “diversification” or “moving up the value chain” to include higher valueadded production. Thus, the present work focuses on efforts to diversify production,
rather than to shift entirely to industrial production.
Another reason for choosing diversification rather than industrialization as the
framework for this work is the region’s experience with import substitution
industrialization (ISI), which failed to catapult LAC into the realm of developed
countries. Reasons for the LAC’s incomplete transition during ISI are myriad and go
beyond the scope of the present work. However, a few points merit mentioning. Amsden
(2001) shows that Latin American governments – particularly Argentina and Brazil –
failed to implement “reciprocal control mechanisms” to discipline firms that did not meet
state-directed goals such as innovation or employment. This problem touches on longstanding aspects of the political economy of Latin America, distinguished as the world’s
most unequal region in which well-connected executives are notoriously difficult to
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regulate (see for example Campos and Nugent, 1999; O’Donnell, 1998; and Schneider
and Soskice, 2009).
Concurrent with, and partly due to, these institutional struggles with
industrialization, Bértolo and Ocampo (2012) demonstrate that, counter to Prebisch’s and
Singer’s urging to attract and mobilize international capital for development, most
economic growth in LAC during the ISI era stemmed from increased domestic
consumption rather than investment or exports. Furthermore, they explain that ISI
policies largely relied upon the importation of capital goods for industrialization, which
required more foreign exchange than these nascent sectors generated through exports.
The resulting debts could not withstand the interest rate shock of 1980s, contributing to
the Latin American debt crisis and the end of ISI (for more, see Thorp and Whitehead,
1987).
After the ISI period, LAC shifted back toward commodity production and exports
in a process of “re-primarization.” This shift began in the 1990s through a globalizationled shift back toward LAC’s traditional sectors of comparative advantage. A second
phase of re-primarization, beginning in the 2000s, can be attributed to the rise of China as
a major trading partner (discussed further in Essay 1). This period of neo-extractivism is
not exactly like the previous period, however. Groundswells of civil society organization
(discussed more thoroughly in Essay 2 and 3) ushered in left-of-center governments
across the region, most notably in South America, on promises of more broadly
distributing the benefits – and limiting the costs – of mining, oil, gas, and agricultural
production. These new governments – dubbed the “pink tide” by political scientists and
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commentators – brought a long series of reforms, varying among locations, including
environmental regulation, labor protections, indigenous rights guarantees, and the use of
natural resource rents (either through nationalization or taxation) from the most recent
commodity boom to fund increases in infrastructure and social spending. It should be
noted that this increase in social spending has not completely offset the impacts of reprimarization, which has resulted in weaker and less stable labor markets. As Bértolo and
Ocampo (2012) note, “As a whole, social trends can … be summarized as involving
increased social spending and coverage of social services accompanied by rising job
precariousness and economic insecurity (248).” For more on the “pink tide,” these
reforms, and their limits, see Ballón et al (2017); Fritz and Lavinas (2015); Lavinas and
Simões (2017); Lustig (2014); and Vakis, Rigolini, and Lucchetti (2016).
I.6 Structure of the Remainder of This Work
It is this last period – the “pink tide” concurrent with the most recent commodity
boom – that this collection of essays examines through the framework of social,
environmental, and economic sustainability. It explores how LAC reforms have
interacted with trends in international flows – trade, development finance, and investment
– to impact the region’s long-standing goals of establishing a more diversified and
sustainable economic paradigm. In two out of the three essays, it also considers the
introduction of new or strengthened partnerships with China. As mentioned above, the reprimarization that has characterized the most recent commodity boom has been driven by
demand for raw materials from China. However, Chinese investors and lenders have also
shown themselves to be willing to adapt to local regulatory environments (Buckley et al.;
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2007; Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet, 2012; Gallagher, Irwin, and Koleski, 2012).
Between these two factors, then, the entrance of China as a major partner for the region
has reinforced the region’s re-primarization with social and environmental protections –
referred to here as “high-road re-primarization” or “high-road extractivism.”
In doing so, the present research attempts to update Prebisch and Singer’s
diagnosis. Rather than focusing on Singer’s goal of “sustained development and
industrialization,” it broadens its view to include the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) framework, which
encompasses economic, social, and environmental sustainability (UNDP, 2016).
Underlying Prebisch and Singer’s analyses was a deep concern for avoiding crises. The
UNDP SDGs address crisis avoidance on the economic and social levels envisioned by
Prebisch and Singer, complemented with avoidance of environmental crises, which can
no longer be isolated from social and economic stability, especially considering the
confluence of social and environmental conflicts in LAC discussed above. Addressing
each of the 17 SDGs independently would be beyond the scope of this work. Instead, it
takes the “three pillars” approach to sustainability (encompassing economic, social, and
environmental realms, as discussed by Littig and Griessler, 2005 and reflected in the
UNDP SDGs) as an updated version of Prebisch and Singer’s view.
This work applies the “three pillars” framework to LAC’s interaction with each of
the three global flows, at three different levels of detail:
•

Essay 1 examines trends in trade for the entire LAC region.
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•

Essay 2 examines development finance for infrastructure for the western Andean
nations of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.

•

Essay 3 examines foreign direct investment in the oil sector in Ecuador.
The first essay weighs the environmental (and indirectly, due to the links

discussed above, social) impacts of LAC re-primarization in its most recent, China-driven
phase. It finds that, regardless of the region’s attempts to improve the distribution of costs
and benefits of with re-primarization, LAC natural resource production is intrinsically
crisis-prone environmentally and socially. It generates more net carbon emissions, and
uses or contaminates more water, per million dollars of exports than manufacturing does.
Applying these findings to the so-called “China boom” of re-primarization from 2003 to
2013, it finds that LAC exports to China are associated with significantly more carbon
emissions and over twice as much water use and contamination as other exports.
The second essay explores ways in which new environmental and social
protections have altered the profile of development lending for infrastructure in the
Andean nations of Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, which have experienced an
infrastructure boom concurrent with the commodity boom and which are home not only
to the most biodiverse sections of the Amazon rainforest but also the highest
concentration of uncontacted and voluntarily isolated indigenous communities on Earth.
During this time, these countries – and some of the international development finance
institutions (DFIs) that lend to them – developed regulatory protections to limit potential
social and environmental costs, including environmental impact assessments (EIAs);
prior consultations with affected indigenous communities and in some cases, free, prior,
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and informed consent (FPIC) of those communities; and grievance mechanisms (GM).
This essay measures the environmental impact (using geospatial imaging of tree cover
change) associated with the 84 infrastructure projects financed by international DFIs
between 2000 and 2015 in these countries. It finds that those projects undertaken under
policy regimes including prior consultation provisions were associated with significantly
less tree cover loss. This finding reinforces the intertwined nature of environmental and
social concerns in LAC and reinforces other scholars’ work on the “environmentalism of
the poor,” that environmental impacts can be mitigated by empowering those most likely
to be affected by them (see for example Martinez-Alier, 2002).
The third essay more closely examines the mechanisms of “high-road
extractivism,” characterized by ambitious environmental and social protections. It traces
the development of a new regulatory regime overseeing oil production in Ecuador, the
severing of relationships with oil investors with unsatisfactory environmental and social
performance records, and the welcoming of new partners in the form of Chinese SOEs. It
explores the extent to which these new partnerships gave Ecuador policy space to
implement its new regulatory framework. It finds that the Chinese oil SOEs in Ecuador
have avoided the environmental degradation and social conflicts that characterized USbased MNC oil investment in past commodity booms. However, Ecuador’s model of
“high-road extractivism” cannot be labelled a success. Legal research and key
stakeholder interviews show that Ecuador is falling back into a pattern of conflict-ridden
oil extraction, due in large part to the Ecuadorian government’s inability to implement its
own prior consultation protections before auctioning new oil concessions.
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CHAPTER 1
1. THE PANDA’S PAWPRINT:
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE CHINA-LED
RE-PRIMARIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
1.1 Introduction
In the last 10 years, China has grown into a major trade and investment partner for
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). It is now South America’s top export
destination and the second-largest source of FDI inflows for the LAC region. However, it
has also come to symbolize the trend of “re-primarization” in LAC: the shift away from
state-led industrialization back toward LAC’s traditionally competitive production of raw
commodities. While much has been written about how this new relationship fits into the
history of industrial policy in LAC, less has been written about its environmental impacts
in LAC, one of the world’s most biodiverse regions and home to most of the world’s
annual tropical deforestation. Several prominent scholars have hypothesized that primary
production should be less environmentally intensive than manufacturing in middleincome countries like those in LAC. This chapter sets out to test that hypothesis against
evidence from the last decade in LAC. It finds that primary production is more
environmentally intensive than manufacturing in LAC (measured through net greenhouse
gas emissions and water use), and LAC exports to China are significantly more
environmentally intense than other LAC exports.
1.2 Context: LAC’s China-Led Re-Primarization and its Environmental Impacts
Many scholars have discussed re-primarization in LAC and the importance of
China in driving it. Other scholars have posited that LAC has a comparative advantage in
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inexpensive production of environmentally-intensive goods and serves as a “pollution
haven,” attracting investment in these sectors from countries with stronger environmental
safeguards. Finally, the work of a third group of scholars, grounded in the environmental
Kuznets curve, predicts that primary production should be environmentally less intensive
than industrial production in middle-income countries such as those in LAC. This chapter
aims to complement the existing literature by testing the differences in the environmental
impact of production in LAC by the level of technology involved, and whether the Chinadriven trend of re-primarization in Latin America has, in fact, driven production into
environmentally “cleaner” or “dirtier” sectors.
1.2.1 Re-primarization in LAC
Scholars and policy makers alike have noted the tendency of LAC production to
shift back toward primary commodity production over the last few business cycles,
dubbed “re-primarization.” The seminal works by Amsden (2001) and Bértolo and
Ocampo (2012) both draw a direct link between this trend and the broader switch in Latin
American development strategy from one based on state-led industrialization through
import substitution (ISI) toward one based on neoliberal macroeconomic policy and
export orientation. Bértolo and Ocampo point out that the late ISI period was
characterized by trade deficits, counter to its stated goals. Amsden resolves this seeming
paradox by explaining that LAC continued to rely foreign capital goods in order to
support domestic manufacturing. Bértolo and Ocampo show that only in the last decade,
since 2004, has Latin America regained positive trade balances. However, these trade
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surpluses came at the cost of an erosion of the gross fixed capital formation, and a shift
back toward the primary production that characterized the period before ISI.
It is important to resist overstating the extent of re-primarization. As Bértolo and
Ocampo (226) note, much of this apparent shift is an artifact of rising commodity prices.
Thus, to more accurately assess the timeline of re-primarization, it is important to
measure it in real terms. Figure 1.1 shows real growth by sector over the last 20 years.
As Figure 1.1 shows, goods production of all types has slowed relative to overall
GDP growth in the last decade, but this is especially true for manufacturing. In fact, of
the three merchandise-producing sectors (agriculture, extraction, and manufacturing),
only agriculture has largely kept up with overall value added in the LAC economy. (In
the 2015 recession, all sectors suffered, but none so much as extraction, which was set
back by decades. Its growth appears to be the most volatile of any sector shown here, but
it is too early to tell when it will recuperate.) The manufacturing slowdown relative to
overall real GDP growth began in the early 2000s, so the remainder of this chapter will
look more closely at the last decade.
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Figure 1.1: Real GDP growth for the LAC region, selected sectors, 1990-2016
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Source: ECLAC CEPALStat database.

1.2.2 China’s Role in LAC’s Re-Primarization
Scholars attribute LAC’s re-primarization over the last decade to the rise of China
as the world’s largest economy and as a major trading partner for the LAC region. China
has contributed to LAC’s re-primarization in two ways: by raising global demand (and
prices) for raw commodities and by intensifying competition in the production of
inexpensive manufactured goods. The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2015) and Myers and Jie (2015) expand on the former point,
showing that Chinese investment and import demand have spurred LAC primary
production. Gallagher and Porzecanski (2010) and Mesquita Moreira (2007) expand on
the latter point, showing that China has out-competed LAC for market share in world
manufacturing exports.
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All of the authors listed above agree on one important point: China’s demand for
LAC exports has been overwhelmingly concentrated in low-technology goods. Figure 1.2
shows China’s rising share of LAC merchandise exports during the 2003-2013
commodity boom, according to the Lall (2000) technology scale. Overall, China’s share
of LAC exports more than doubled, from 3.4 to 7.8 percent of the total. China is now the
largest market for South American goods, and the second-largest market for goods
exports from LAC overall. The fastest growth was seen among primary goods, in which
China more than tripled its market share, growing from just 4.2 to 13.1 percent of the
region’s exports in a decade. However, this growth has left manufacturing behind at just
two percent of the total.
Figure 1.2: China’s share of LAC exports, by technology level
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China’s importance as an LAC export market jumped in 2009 because of the
global downturn, which China survived relatively unscathed. Instead of falling back to its
pre-recession levels, however, China’s importance continued to grow. By 2013 its market
share was about twice its level from a decade before for total exports and for resourcebased goods, and over four times as large for primary exports.
As Table 1.1 shows, China drove the growth in non-manufactured exports from
Latin America. China accounted for about 40 percent of the growth in the LAC region’s
primary and resource-based exports, compared to about 20 percent of total export growth
and just four percent of the growth in manufactured exports, in real terms.2
Table 1.1: China’s contribution to the re-primarization of LAC exports
LAC Exports to China (billions of real USD)
2003
2013
Growth

Primary

Sectors
Res.-based

3.6
20.4
466.7%

7.9
19.2
143.0%

3.3
7.0
112.1%

14.8
46.6
214.9%

111.8
154.0
37.7%

104.0
132.0
26.9%

217.4
305.1
40.4%

437.7
600.2
37.1%

3.2%
13.3%
314.9%

7.6%
14.5%
91.3%

1.5%
2.3%
51.2%

3.4%
7.8%
129.4%

Total LAC Exports (billions of real USD)
2003
2013
Growth
China’s share of LAC exports
2003
2013
Growth

Total
Manuf.

China's contribution to LAC export growth
40.0%
40.3%
4.2%
19.6%
Source: Author’s calculations using CEPALStat, FAO World Food Price Index, Lall (2000), UN Comtrade,
and the World Bank GEM Commodity Database. Detailed information can be found in Appendices A.1 and
A.2.

2

See Appendix A.2 for details on the deflation methods used in this essay.
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Interestingly, Table 1.1 also shows that LAC exports overall did not tilt
dramatically away from manufactured goods: primary and manufactured goods both grew
by about the same amount, and significantly more than resource-based goods. This
implies that the re-primarization shown in Figure 1.1 may be due to switching from
consuming domestically-produced to imported manufactured goods. Nonetheless, it
remains clear from Table 1.1 that the effect of China’s demand has been one of spurring
primary production much more than it would be otherwise. Based on the information
presented above, it is safe to conclude that China has pushed LAC exports toward
primary and resource-based products. The sections below estimate the environmental
impact of this re-primarizing pressure.
1.2.3 LAC as a “Pollution Haven:” an Imperfect Fit for the China Boom
Given LAC’s new surge in investment and exports, the “pollution haven”
framework is an intuitive fit for predicting the expected effect on of the China boom on
the environmental intensity of LAC exports. This approach posits that developing
countries attract pollution-intensive investment and specialize in those sectors under
conditions of free trade. Stern (1998) expresses this as an extension of the Heckscher–
Ohlin trade theory, in which developing countries have a comparative advantage in
pollution-intensive production because of a dearth of costly regulation. In this line,
Levinson and Taylor (2004) find a significant, positive impact of US environmental
regulations on imports within that industry, implying that environmental protections
discourage investment at home but encourage investment abroad instead. In contrast,
Birdsall and Wheeler (1993) find that openness to trade among Latin American countries
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(with relatively weak environmental protection) was associated with less pollutionintensive growth in the 1960s through 1980s, and hypothesize that market forces such as
the introduction of newer technology and shareholder pressure can account for the
seeming paradox, in line with the “pollution halo” hypothesis. However, neither of these
approaches can adequately address LAC’s “China boom,” because each of them assumes
a North-South trade and investment relationship, where the importing country has higher
environmental standards than the exporting country. So, LAC’s “China boom” is fertile
territory for new explorations of the environmental impact of South-South relationships.
1.2.4 Environmental Effects of Re-Primarization in Middle-Income Countries
A more apt framework must incorporate the relative environmental intensities of
different sectors within developing countries. Grossman and Krueger (1995) and
Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) both allow for further exploration in this area.
Grossman and Krueger describe a mechanism behind the observed “environmental
Kuznets curve,” in which in which middle-income countries have more environmentallydamaging production than either poor or rich countries. In their framework, developing
countries’ pollution intensity rises as those countries industrialize, and then falls again, in
part due to an “induced policy response” demanded by the citizenry to curtail the
environmental damages caused by industry. Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001)
develop a model to measure the impact of trade liberalization on emissions in poorer and
richer countries. Their model anticipates that under free trade, poor and middle-income
countries will switch from industrial to primary production, following the Heckscher–
Ohlin theory that countries will gravitate toward specialization in either capital- or labor-
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intensive production depending on the relative strengths of their endowments.3 Primary
commodity production is treated as intrinsically environmentally cleaner than
manufacturing, as Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor incorporate Grossman and Krueger’s
“induced policy response” by modeling an environmentally beneficial scenario of free
trade in which rich countries (with more stringent environmental safeguards) specialize in
capital-intensive industry, satisfying both their comparative advantage in capitalintensive industry and their ability to mitigate its pollution.
Both of these models suffer from limitations associated with data availability on
emissions at the time of their publication. To operationalize their models, both studies
rely on estimates of SO2 emissions, which are strongly associated with industrial
production. Thus, both of these papers assume that technology level and emissions are
directly related, absent policy interventions controlling industrial emissions. The
Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor model assumes two kinds of production: one with low
technology inputs and no emissions, and one with high technology inputs and high
emissions. Grossman and Krueger envision three levels of production: clean primary
production; emissions-intensive industrial production in middle-income, recently
industrialized countries; and clean industrial production in wealthy countries with
intensive environmental regulations. It is now possible to revisit their original approaches
as they apply to the more politically pressing environmental impacts of the early 21st

3

While both sides of the China-LAC trade relationship are middle-income countries, Antweiler,
Copeland and Taylor’s approach is still applicable here. As Gallagher and Porzecanski (2010) show
in great detail, China’s greater capital intensity (and relatedly, higher labor productivity) has
allowed Chinese manufactured goods to displace Latin American manufactured goods not only
within the LAC region but also in traditional LAC export markets such as the United States. Thus,
China has taken the role of the richer trading partner in Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor’s model.
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century: greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and water use and contamination. The former
is now the subject of global negotiations, with active debates surrounding the proper role
for developing countries in limiting global carbon emissions. The latter is the most
frequent cause of environmentally-based social conflict in LAC, according to the case
studies of Ray et al (2017). More recently published estimates of GHG intensity,
technology levels, and trade data that have been published since those studies allow for
such an exercise, detailed below.
1.3. Testing the Models: Should Middle-Income Countries Specialize in Primary
Production?
Thanks to recently published, detailed estimates of the environmental impacts of
specific commodities for most countries in the world, it is now possible to test the
expectation that specializing in primary production is environmentally beneficial for
developing countries, and for Latin America in particular. Specifically, this is possible
for two forms of environmental impacts, one global (greenhouse gas emissions, GHG)
and one local (water use). Each of these analyses is conducted separately in the sections
below, drawing on the various methodologies to measure the embodied carbon and water
in exports used by Peters (2011), Biewald et al (2014), and Sato (2014). They focus on
exports rather than overall production, because export data is available disaggregated into
highly specific categories through the UN Comtrade database.
For both GHG emissions and water use, environmental science literature has
estimated the environmental footprints of most exports, disaggregated by the traded items
and countries of origin. These disaggregated trade line items can be further classified into
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technology levels using the method developed by Sanjaya Lall (2000).4 Lall’s
classification system has five main categories: primary products (unrefined agricultural
and extractive products), resource-based products (processed agricultural and extractive
products such as soybean oil and refined petroleum), low-technology manufactured
goods (such as apparel and basic metal products), medium-technology manufactured
goods (such as vehicles and chemical products), and high-technology manufactured
goods (such as electronic and medicinal products). The resulting technology-based
environmental footprints are explained in detail below.
1.3.1 Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Contrary to the expectation suggested by the environmental economics literature
cited above, the most GHG-intensive products in poor and middle-income countries are
not high-technology manufactured goods but primary goods, resource-based goods (such
as soybean oil and refined petroleum), and lower-technology manufactured goods. Figure
1.3 shows the average carbon intensity (measured in kilograms of CO2 equivalent per
dollar) for exports in each of Lall’s technology categories and each income level of
countries.

4

Details for these calculations can be found in Appendix A.1.
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Average GHG Intensity (kg CO2 equiv/USD)

Figure 1.3: Net GHG emissions of exports by technology level and country income
level, 2007
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These emissions calculations use GHG intensity data from a model developed by
Peters (2011), which establish the net GHG embedded in each dollar of exports, by
country of origin and GTAP category.5 By applying these intensities to UN Comtrade
export data for each country in the world and classifying that data into Lall’s (2000)
technology categories, it is possible to calculate average net GHG intensities of globally
traded merchandise by technology level. Figure 1.3 shows the result for the year 2007,
the most recent year of Peters’ data.6

5

The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) classifies trade into 57 categories of goods and services, with
heavy disaggregation among agricultural products. Because they are much broader categories than the
SITC categories used by the UN Comtrade database, it is simple to establish a corresponding GTAP
category for each SITC category. More information on GTAP is available at
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/.
6
For a detailed explanation of the calculations behind Figure 1.3, see Appendix A.1.
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Figure 1.3 shows GHG intensity on a net basis, including the destruction of
natural carbon sinks through deforestation and the clearing of grasslands. It also includes
non-CO2 sources of carbon emission, such as methane from agricultural production.
Finally, it includes emissions from upstream inputs. For example, for electronic goods,
these intensity estimates include emissions embedded in the entire supply chain, from the
mining the metals involved through the manufacturing process itself.
According to Figure 1.3, for middle-income countries, net GHG emissions peak in
resource-based goods before falling again as technology levels continue to rise. These
falling emissions associated with higher-technology goods indicate that as technology
levels increase, the value of these exports is rising more quickly than the emissions. For
goods whose emissions are associated with the upstream inputs (for example, leather
goods whose emissions are associated with cattle ranching), this means that the value of
the primary inputs is falling as a share of the final value of the exports.
A prima facie analysis would support the hypothesis, associated with the
environmental Kuznets curve, that if middle-income countries have more
environmentally-intensive production, it is because they traditionally specialize in natural
resource processing and lower-technology manufacturing. However, this inverted-U
relationship between technology level of merchandise exports and net GHG emissions
does not appear to hold for Latin America and the Caribbean, as Figure 1.4 shows. While
in other regions, emissions are higher for natural resource refining and low-technology
manufacturing, LAC shows the highest net GHG emissions from primary productions
and falling emissions with each increase in technology.
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LAC is unique among world regions in the fact that the GHG emission intensity
of exports falls with every increase in technology. Every other region shown in Figure 1.4
exhibits an inverted-U relationship between technology level of merchandise exports and
their net GHG emissions.7 This outsized GHG intensity for primary products in LAC is
likely related to the importance of land-use change as a driver of GHG emissions in Latin
America and the Caribbean. However, LAC is not totally unique among regions in the

7

A seeming paradox emerges between Figure 1.3, which shows a downward-sloping relationship for lowincome countries (LIC), and Figure 1.4, which shows and inverted-U relationship for Sub-Saharan
African (SSA). That paradox is resolved because of the importance of Nigeria and the Southern African
Customs Union countries, which are not LIC but collectively accounted for over half of SSA exports in
2007. The technology-GHG relationship for these countries resembles that shown for SSA in Figure 1.4:
an inverted U. In contrast, LAC is a mix of lower-middle, upper-middle, and high-income countries. The
largest exporters in the region (Mexico and Brazil) comprise over half of all LAC exports and are both
upper-middle income countries, but they are outliers for that income level, with a downward-slowing
relationship between technology and GHG intensity. More country-specific disaggregation of LAC
results can be found in Figure 1.10 and Appendix A.3.
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importance of land use change as a contribution to total net GHG emissions. WRI (2014)
shows that in 2007 (the year shown in Figure 1.4), land use change and forestry
accounted for 31 percent of net GHG emissions in LAC, a rate much higher than the
world average (seven percent) but surpassed by the rate of Sub-Saharan Africa (47
percent). Thus, the results shown in Figure 1.4 should be interpreted as the total GHG
impact of various sectors of economic activity for export, with the understanding that
LAC is among the highest – but not the highest overall – among regions for the
importance of land use change among drivers of GHG emissions. The use of net, rather
than gross, emissions in this analysis is intentional, as the inclusion of land use change
incorporates the social impacts of environmental damages (for more on this relationship
in Latin America, see Chapter 2). Across the Amazon basin as a whole, ecologists have
shown that agriculture, extraction, and most importantly, the access roads necessary to
get those products to cities and ports, have been the major drivers of deforestation (see
for example Cattaneo 2001, Fearnside 2006, and Swing 2011).
In sum, from a GHG perspective, it is unambiguously better for the LAC region to
produce high-technology goods. This is especially true in an era of export-oriented
growth, in which planners depend on export revenue for boosting GDP.
1.3.2 Water Footprints
Regarding water footprints (which incorporate both water use and water
contamination), the trend is clearer: primary products are overwhelmingly more water
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intense. Figure 1.5 shows that this relationship holds globally, regardless of country
income level.8
Figure 1.5: Water intensity of exports by tech. level in 2005, by country income level
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All regions share this same basic profile, as Figure 1.6 shows. There is a stark
difference between the primary and manufactured goods worldwide, and the LAC region
is no different.

8

The water footprints incorporated into this analysis include green, blue, and grey water footprints,
defined as (respectively) the use of water by plant root uptake; surface/ground water uptake for
domestic, industrial or irrigation uses; and the use of water to assimilate pollutants (ie, the creation
of greywater). These three types of water footprints are collectively called “water use and
contamination” in this chapter, though it is worth pointing out that the impacts of each are not
interchangeable. Groundwater used for irrigation, for example, may in some circumstances be
reused for other purposes. Nonetheless, this chapter aggregates the three types of water footprints
both for the sake of simplicity and in order to take into account the various sources of water-based
social conflict, as competition for clean water can arise from either the use or contamination of
water sources.
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Figure 1.6: Water intensity of exports by region and technology level in 2005
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The water footprint calculations included here rely on the Water Footprint
Network’s WaterStat database, developed by Mekonnen and Hoekstra (2011 a, b; 2012).
Mekonnen and Hoekstra identify the water footprints (expressed as cubic meters of water
per thousand USD) for each six-digit Harmonized System (HS) code of exports, averaged
across the period 1996-2005. Figure 1.6 applies those average intensities to UN Comtrade
export data for every country in the sample for the year 2005, the most recent year of
Mekonnen and Hoekstra’s calculations. (See Appendix A.1 for a full explanation of the
calculations used here.)
In sum, it seems that from an environmental standpoint LAC would be wise to
concentrate on manufacturing. In fact, the greater the technology used in production, the
better the environmental impact of each dollar of exports will be.
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1.4. The China Effect on GHG and Water Intensities of LAC Exports
The previous sections have established two key points. First, LAC market
deregulation coincided with Chinese demand for raw materials to drive re-primarization
of LAC exports. Second, primary commodity production is much more environmentally
intensive than manufacturing in Latin America, as measured by GHG and water
intensities. From these two points, it is reasonable to expect that LAC exports to China
have been more environmentally intensive than other LAC exports. It is possible to test
that expectation by repeating the analysis behind figures 1.3 through 1.6, dividing the
LAC export basket by destination market.9 The sections below do so, and find that LAC
exports to China have indeed produced more net GHG emissions and used more water
than other LAC exports.
1.4.1 Greenhouse Gas Intensity of LAC Exports to China and Elsewhere
The same method used to calculate relative GHG intensities of exports based on
technology levels in Figures 1.3 through 1.6, above, can be used to compare the GHG
intensities of LAC exports to China and other LAC exports. The results appear in Figure
1.7.10

9

These differences over time and between export market are due entirely to export basket composition.
Differences in production technology are impossible to trace, because of opaque value chains from
factory or farm to final destination country. Moreover, even if such granularity were available for one
year, supply chains would be unlikely to remain constant between years, especially for highlysubstitutable primary products.
10
In order to trace the relative GHG intensities of exports over time, this section uses the same deflation
technique as Table 1.1, above, described in Appendix A.2.
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Figure 1.7: Average GHG intensity, LAC exports by destination
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From 2004 through 2013, LAC exports to China were about 16 percent higher in
net greenhouse gas emissions per dollar than other exports. Regression analysis shows
that this difference was highly statistically significant (t=6.1), as shown in Appendix A.3.
However, it should be noted that among individual countries, the “China effect”
ranges widely. In Guatemala, for example, exports to China are only 81 percent as GHGintensive as other exports, whereas in neighboring Honduras and El Salvador, exports to
China are over twice as GHG-intensive as other exports (201 and 254 percent,
respectively). Figure 1.8 compares the average GHG intensity of exports to China and
other exports for each LAC country and sub-region in this study, as well as for the LAC
region as a whole, from 2004-2013.
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Figure 1.8: Average GHG intensity, exports to China and the R.o.W., by country
and region

Note: GHG intensity is measured as kg of CO2 equivalent in net emissions per real (2004) US dollar.
Regions shown here include the Caribbean, Mexico and Central America, and South America.
Source: Author’s calculations using CEPALStat, FAO World Food Price Index, Peters (2013), UN
Comtrade, and the World Bank GEM Commodity database.

1.4.2 Water Intensity of LAC Exports to China and Elsewhere
By focusing the water analysis in Figures 1.5 and 1.6 on LAC exports and
comparing the results by export basket, it is possible to determine how much LAC
exports to China differ from other exports in their water footprint. As Figure 1.9 shows,
LAC exports to China have used or contaminated two to three times as much water as
other exports, per real dollar over the years of the most recent commodity boom.11

11

As in the GHG analysis above, these differences over time and between export markets are due entirely
to basket composition.
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Figure 1.9: Average water intensity, LAC exports by destination
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Source: Author’s calculation using CEPALStat, FAO World Food Price Index, UN Comtrade, WaterStat,
and the World Bank GEM Commodity database. Detailed information can be found in Appendices A.1
and A.2.

Regression analysis (detailed in Appendix A.4) shows that on average over the
last decade, LAC exports to China used or contaminated 2.75 times as much water per
dollar than other exports, and that this relationship is highly statistically significant
(t=22.0). These differences are due entirely to basket composition differences, as LAC’s
exports to China are much more heavily concentrated in agricultural commodities than is
the remainder of LAC exports. As with GHG emissions, LAC countries have had a wide
variety of experiences, but in this case the largest exporters (Mexico, Brazil, and
Argentina) all have much higher water footprints in their exports to China than in other
exports. Figure 1.10 shows the average water intensities of LAC exports to China and to
the rest of the world, for each country, sub-region, and for LAC overall, from 2004-2013.
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Figure 1.10: Average water intensity, exports to China and the R.o.W., by country
and region
Water intensity higher in exports to China than other
exports

Water intensity lower in exports to China than other
exports
Note: Water intensity is measured as cubic meters of water per real (2004) US dollar. Source: Author’s
calculation using CEPALStat, FAO World Food Price Index, UN Comtrade, WaterStat, and the World
Bank GEM Commodity database.

1.4.3. Considering GHG and Water Together: Scale and Composition Effects
From 2003 to 2013, the real value of LAC exports rose by 37 percent, while the
net GHG emissions from exports rose by 40 percent and the water used in exports rose by
59 percent. From this information alone, it is clear that the composition of LAC exports is
shifting toward more environmentally intensive production.
How much of the rise in export-based GHG emissions and water use is due to the
simple growth of exports, and how much is due to the shift in basket composition toward
more environmentally-sensitive sectors? Following the example of Grossman and
Krueger, it is possible to disaggregate the effect by scale and by composition. (It is not
possible to distinguish an effect for technology changes, Grossman and Krueger’s third
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category, because this analysis applies Peters’ GHG intensity estimates for 2007 and
WaterStat’s estimates for 1996-2005 to the entire decade of trade data.)
From 2003 to 2013, net GHG emissions from LAC exports rose by 40 percent,
from 709 to 996 megatons. If the carbon intensity of those exports had remained stable
and only their volume changed, the emissions would have risen 37 percent, or 92 percent
of the actual rise. So, between scale and composition effects, scale accounted for 92
percent of the increase in export-based GHG emissions and composition accounts for the
remainder. Thus, if the total amount of LAC exports had remained at its 2003 level, but
had still shifted toward China, net GHG emissions from exports would have risen by
about eight percent.
Regarding water use, the total water footprint of LAC exports rose by 59 percent,
from 383 to 608 billion cubic meters from 2003 to 2013. If the water intensity of exports
had remained at its 2003 levels, the water used by those exports would have risen by just
37 percent, or about 62 percent of the actual rise in export-related water use. So, the
basket composition of exports accounted for the other 38 percent of the rise in the water
use associated with exports.
Of course, in reality, scale and composition interact. The growth in exports to
China represents not only a shift in the trade basket toward China, but also an overall
growth in exports, concentrated in primary sectors. Table 1.2 explores the share of
growth in emissions and water use resulting from the rise of China’s importance and the
rise of exports in each technology level. It shows that China had an outsized influence on
this increase. China accounted for 7.8 percent of the real volume of LAC exports in 2013
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(using 2004 USD), but accounted for 19.6 percent of LAC’s export growth over the
previous decade, 22.7 percent of the increase in export-based GHG emissions, and 33.4
percent of the increase in export-based water usage.
The majority of LAC’s growth in both export-based net GHG emissions and
water use was due to a rise in primary goods. As Table 1.1 shows, above, China was
responsible for about 40 percent of the growth in both primary and resource-based goods.
Table 1.2: China’s role in the growth of LAC’s export-based GHG emissions and
water use
Share of real
exports
2003

2013

Share of total growth, 2003-2013
Volume of exports
(real 2004 USD)

Export-based net
GHG emissions

Export-based
water use

By destination
China
3.4%
7.8%
19.6%
22.7%
33.4%
Rest of World
96.6%
92.2%
80.4%
77.3%
66.6%
Total
100.0% 100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
By technology level
Primary
25.5%
25.7%
30.3%
51.0%
96.6%
Resource-based
23.8%
22.0%
21.7%
26.3%
4.4%
Low-tech manuf.
9.9%
7.4%
-1.1%
0.4%
-1.6%
Med.-tech manuf.
28.7%
33.4%
39.2%
19.9%
0.4%
High-tech manuf.
11.0%
10.0%
7.7%
1.4%
0.1%
Other
1.0%
1.5%
2.2%
1.0%
0.0%
Total
100.0% 100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Source: Author’s calculation using CEPALStat, FAO World Food Price Index, Peters (2013), UN
Comtrade, WaterStat, and the World Bank GEM Commodity database. For detailed information, see
Appendices A.1 and A.2.

1.4.4 LAC-China Environmental Balance of Payments: Importing Carbon,
Exporting Water
The analysis above accounts only for one side of the LAC-China relationship:
exports from Latin America to China. But LAC imports from China are not without their
own environmental impact. For example, Peters (2011) shows that measuring the carbon
emissions associated with a country’s consumption – rather than production – changes
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the global emissions profile dramatically. For most countries, including trade with China
(including the carbon in imports from China and excluding the carbon in exports to
China) results in much higher carbon emissions than simply calculating the amount of
emissions produced domestically. This effect is due to the high concentration of Chinese
exports in light manufacturing, and the relatively weaker environmental standards in the
country.
While Peters does not specifically address Latin America, the trend he notes
appears to hold for the LAC region as a whole. Even though the region’s exports to China
are more GHG intensive than other exports, the region’s imports from China are even
more GHG intensive, in part due to differences in the energy matrix and differences in
the composition of the trade basket. The GHG intensity of LAC imports from China
ranged from 2.5 to 2.7 kg CO2 equivalent per USD between 2004 and 2013 – much
higher than the intensities of 1.8 to 2.0 for LAC exports to China. As a result, LAC is a
net importer of greenhouse gas emissions from China, of 289 kilotons in 2013. For
reference, the World Resources Institute estimates that the LAC region produced a total
of 4.6 gigatons of CO2 equivalent in net GHG emissions in 2012.
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Figure 1.11: LAC-China “balance of payments” in net greenhouse gas emissions
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This relationship is reversed when it comes to water use, as Figure 1.12 shows. In
2013, LAC exported nearly 120 billion cubic meters of embedded water to China, or
nearly eight times as much water as the amount embedded in its imports from China. For
reference, Lake Nicaragua holds 108 billion cubic meters.
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Figure 1.12: LAC-China “balance of payments” in water
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Figures 1.11 and 1.12 show that LAC is, in effect, exporting water and importing
carbon. Overall, LAC’s boom in exports to China has driven the region’s production into
carbon- and water-intensive sectors. At the same time, LAC’s boom in imports from
China has indirectly increased the region’s carbon footprint.
1.5 Discussion
The results shown here suggest a need for continued research in this area, on both
theoretical and empirical fronts. Theoretically, there is room to bring together threads
from environmental and structuralist economic literature in relation to the LAC region.
Literature on structural transformation in developing economies, from Prebisch and
Singer to Mazzucati (2013)’s theory of the “entrepreneurial state” is ripe for expansion to
consider not only the impact of structural transformation on capital accumulation, terms
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of trade, and living standards, but also on environmental aspects of quality of life such as
climate and natural resource management. For example, a relevant new theoretical
framework might incorporate these aspects into the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (that
commodity exporters face secular, long-term declines in their terms of trade) or Bhagwati
(1958)’s theory of immiserizing growth (in which economic growth associated with
primary commodity booms can lead to deteriorating terms of trade and ultimately
declining incomes). Likewise, the area of trade and the environment is ripe for expansion
to include the impacts of commodity booms on countries’ ability to meet their Paris
Agreement commitments and the likelihood of natural resource-based social conflict.
Empirically, this line of research could benefit from an examination of
technological differences in LAC’s export basket to different markets. The analysis here
relies on publicly-available trade data, and the changes in the scale and composition of
trade baskets reflected therein. However, Grossman and Krueger (1995) famously
disaggregate trade changes into three types: scale, composition, and technology. It may
be possible to test for differences in technology between similar LAC merchandise
exports to China and elsewhere. To do so, future research might benefit from identifying
representative firms in LAC that exclusively or overwhelmingly produce for export to
China and similar firms that produce for export elsewhere. If significant differences
emerge in the labor or capital intensity of those firms’ production methods, those findings
may indicate that the environmental and social impacts of LAC’s “China boom” go
beyond the scale and composition changes examined here and include technology
changes as well.
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1.6 Conclusion
China’s importance to the LAC economies is well established, as the largest
export market for South American goods and the second-largest export market for LAC
overall. But it is also well established that Chinese demand for raw materials and the
competition from cheap Chinese manufactured goods have driven LAC away from
manufacturing and back toward primary commodity production. Contrary to the
hypothesis of the environmental Kuznets curve, primary production is more
environmentally sensitive than manufacturing in LAC: it creates more net greenhouse gas
emissions and uses or contaminates more water per million dollars. Thus, it is not
surprising that LAC exports to China are more environmentally sensitive than other LAC
exports. Given these risks associated with this important new economic relationship,
LAC governments would be wise to approach it with reinforced emphasis on setting
environmental safeguards that meet the needs of their development strategies.
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CHAPTER 2
2. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT FOR PEOPLE OR WITH PEOPLE?
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SAFEGUARDS,
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT, AND DEFORESTATION IN THE
ANDEAN AMAZON, 2000-2015
2.1 Introduction
Since the turn of the 21st century, South America’s Andean nations have adopted
some of the world’s most ambitious environmental and social protections surrounding
infrastructure investment, including most notably the right to prior consultation for
affected indigenous communities. These reforms have been matched by the adoption of
equally ambitious environmental and social safeguards (ESS) by the international
development finance institutions (DFIs) who provide the projects’ financing, including
not only prior consultation but also the establishment of formal grievance mechanisms for
affected communities.
These reforms could hardly have arisen at a more crucial time. Since the end of
the recent commodities boom, Andean nations have undergone an infrastructure boom to
take its place. For example, between 2008 and 2015, infrastructure investment rose from
3.6 to 8.4 percent of GDP in Bolivia, from 3.4 to 6.5 percent of GDP in Colombia, and
from 3.3 to 6.9 percent of GDP in Peru (INFRALATAM, 2017). Given the extreme
biodiversity of the Andean Amazon and the high concentration of indigenous territories
there, appropriate regulatory frameworks may help prevent damage to marginalized
communities and the forests where they live.
This essay specifically examines the role of these ESS in limiting the
environmental impact of infrastructure projects in the Andean Amazonian countries of
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Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, since 2000. It finds that prior consultation, though
it is often considered a social rather than environmental safeguard,12 has a significant role
in limiting infrastructure-related deforestation. Formal grievance mechanisms, however,
are not found to have a significant deforestation impact, though they may prove crucial in
limiting other risks such as social conflict or reputational damage for the development
finance institution (DFI) involved.
2.2 Background
This section reviews the established connection between infrastructure projects
and environmental degradation, and the history of DFIs’ and nations’ reforms to lessen
that degradation. While infrastructure projects – especially roads and dams with
reservoirs – have a long history of association with environmental problems, Andean
nations and the international DFIs have established an ambitious array of protections to
buffer these impacts.
2.2.1 Infrastructure and Deforestation
Scholars have long noted the connection between Amazonian deforestation and
new infrastructure projects. Most of the resulting literature focuses on two types of
infrastructure projects specifically: roads (especially paved roads) and dams (especially
those with reservoirs).
The use of satellite imagery to trace deforestation around roads is a decades-old
practice with an established track record. For example, Malingreau and Tucker (1988)
use satellite imagery to trace deforestation in three states of the Brazilian Amazon, and

12

For example, CAF (2016) lists prior consultation under “Consultation and Community Relations” in its
2016 ESS framework, and the IADB (2006b) lists it as a crucial part of “support for indigenous peoples
governance.”
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find strong visual evidence linking new roads in this area with nearby deforestation.
Pfaff (1997), also using satellite imagery, develops a statistical model and finds that
paved roads – and the arrival of the first settlers to use those roads to establish new
settlements – are both strong predictors of Amazonian deforestation. Furthermore, Pfaff
also finds that this impact can be observed not only in the same county were the roads
occurred, but in nearby counties as well. Laurance, Goosem, and Laurance (2009)
perform a meta-analysis to compile additional mechanisms for the connection between
roads and deforestation, and find causes including the “edge effect” of drastic changes in
temperature and sunlight from within the forest canopy to the roadside, which impacts
animal and plant life near new roads, periodic flooding of nearby forests due to poorlymaintained culverts, and disrupted paths for animal migration and plant pollination.
The environmental impact of dams is somewhat more complex than that of roads.
While it is true that the electricity produced by hydroelectric dams can be considered
“renewable,” it is not necessarily ecologically sound. Beyond initial forest clearing for
reservoir installation, they can also become what Fearnside (2004) calls “virtual methane
factories,” converting biodegrading organic material on the reservoir floor to methane
instead of the much less greenhouse-potent carbon dioxide (which would be the product
of such biodegradation on a forest floor). The International Development Finance Club,
a global umbrella organization which includes all of the DFIs studied here, considers
hydroelectric dams to be “sustainable” only when they can demonstrate a net reduction in
carbon emissions (IDFC 2015). The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism
considers dams to have net reductions in carbon emissions only when they have a power
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density ratio (the ratio of the dam’s potential output in megawatts divided by the surface
area of its reservoir, measured in square kilometers) of no less than four.
While the present analysis focuses solely on deforestation and not carbon
emissions, abundant evidence links new dams – especially those with reservoirs – to
forest loss. Finer and Jenkins (2012) find that dams contribute to deforestation both
directly, at the site of their construction or by the flooding necessary for reservoirs, and
indirectly, along the paths of the power transmissions lines and roads that connect the
dams to nearby cities and power markets.
2.2.2 A Brief History of International DFIs’ and Countries’ Environmental and
Social Safeguards
This chapter focuses on projects financed by international DFIs – which includes
multilateral development banks (MDBs) as well as national development banks (NDBs)
and national export credit agencies (ECAs) operating abroad – because of their unique
governance structure. For MDBs as well as NDBs and ECAs operating abroad, project
governance and responsibility is shared between national governments and external DFIs.
This dual structure may lead to mutually reinforcing networks of governance: affected
communities may be able to look to one institution for recourse when the other does not
adequately mitigate their risks.
Major ESS reforms have taken place in DFIs and among Latin American
governments since 2000. This section reviews the development of ESS among those
DFIs that have seen major reforms since 2000 (the World Bank, the Inter-American
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Development Bank, the Development Bank of Latin America, and the Export-Import
Bank of China) and the nations of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.13
2.2.2.1 ESS Reform Among International DFIs: Not from Within but from Without
Of the international DFIs studied here, four institutions have undergone major
ESS reform: The World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the
Development Bank of Latin America (CAF, for its original Spanish acronym), and the
Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM). In each case, ESS reform arose not simply out
of enlightened management or even far-sighted risk mitigation on the parts of
international DFIs. Rather, ESS arose in large part thanks to external pressure from a
variety of sources. Mikesell and Williams (1992) cite three main external avenues for
pressure on international DFIs’ environmental performance: public opinion in the country
where the DFI is based, NGOs in affected countries, and international organizations such
as arms of the United Nations. In the cases of Washington, DC-based World Bank Group
(WBG) and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), civil society in both affected
and headquarter countries cooperated to improve lending governance. In the case of CAF,
reform has come through changing incentives thanks to action on the part of international
organizations.
Plater (1998), examining the reform process within the World Bank, points to
alliances between organizations of affected people in developing countries and partners

13

The World Bank Group (WBG) and the Inter-American Development Bank each have multiple lending
arms, which financed different types of projects. The statistical analysis below considers four of these
windows separately: the World Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (which
provides sovereign loans to middle-income countries) and International Finance Corporation (which
lends to private sector projects), and the Inter-American Development Bank’s main IADB (sovereign)
lending window as well as its private-sector lending arm, the International Investment Corporation (IIC).
Where the phrase “World Bank” occurs, the intention is to indicate the WBG institution rather than a
particular lending arm. For the IADB, context should be sufficient to distinguish institution from lender.
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in wealthy countries, coalescing around so-called “glocal” conflicts, in which global civil
society organized around local environmental problems caused in turn by global capital
flows. Anguelovski and Martinez (2014) highlight the importance of organizing that
continued after Plater published his work, including the gathering of 200 NGOs in Kyoto
in 1997.
This history is especially important here, given the catalytic function that
(Brazilian) Amazonian deforestation played in spurring international DFI ESS reform, as
Rich (1994) and Blanton (2007) explain. Between 1981 and 1983, the World Bank lent
$443.4 million to Brazil for projects related to Polonoroeste, Brazil’s Amazonian
highway and agricultural expansion program. Showing the importance of this case in
catalyzing future reforms, Blanton (2007, 254) refers to it as the “paradigm case of
controversial World Bank projects and effective NGO opposition.” Unfortunately,
although World Bank involvement was conditioned on government commitments to
respect established indigenous territories and nature reserves, the ensuing rapid migration
of a half-million settlers into the newly-accessible forest outpaced legal protections,
leading to widespread deforestation and displacement of traditional communities. In
1984, US Congressional Rep. James Sheuer invited Brazilian ecologist and future
Minister of the Environment José Lutzenberger to testify before the House Committee on
Science and Technology’s Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agricultural Research
and Environment (Eckholm 1984). Sheuer later wrote to the U.S. Treasury Secretary,
urging Treasury to pressure the World Bank to tighten its oversight of Polonoroeste
loans, while 32 NGOs from 11 countries jointly wrote their own letter to the World Bank
itself with similar demands (Rich 1994, 122). In May 1985, the World Bank announced
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in a meeting with environmental groups that it had halted all Polonoroeste disbursements
two months earlier.
Also in 1985, the US abstained when a Polonoroeste-related project came up for a
vote in front of the IADB, prompting a moratorium on disbursement until Brazil
established a project plan to limit environmental degradation and impacts on indigenous
lands. In October of that same year, 120 Amazonian rubber-tappers met with
representative of the Environmental Defense Fund, Brazil’s Institute for Amazonian
Studies, and Oxfam. These organizations lobbied the U.S. Treasury Department, who in
turn forwarded a report by them to the World Bank and the IADB. In the face of the
public perception of moral authority of international environmental groups – and the
dominant political power of the U.S. Treasury Department on these MDB boards – the
World Bank and the IADB both began to reformulate their approaches to projects in
sensitive social and environmental territories.
Within a few years, these efforts bore fruit in significant reforms to loan
governance at the World Bank and the IADB. In 1989, U.S. Congressional Rep. Nancy
Pelosi sponsored an amendment (later known simply as the “Pelosi Amendment”) to the
Oil Pollution Act (which would be passed in 1990 as H.R. 1465), requiring US
representative to MDB boards to abstain or oppose MDB project proposals that did not
give board members adequate environmental impact assessments (EIAs) at least 120 days
before the board vote (Sanford, 1998). That same year, the World Bank formalized its
commitment to conducting EIAs with Operational Directive 4.00, Annex A on
Environmental Assessment (reprinted in WB 1999). In 1991 it expanded this oversight to
including prior consultation with affected indigenous communities, with Operational
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Directive 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples (WB 1991). In 1990, the IADB followed suit and
published its “Strategies and Procedures on Sociocultural Issues as Related to the
Environment,” enshrining “the principle of community consultation and participation
throughout project design and implementation” (IADB 1990, 6). This principle was
codified in 1996, with a requirement that all IADB proposals “contain a chapter and/or
annex approved by the CESI [Committee on Environment and Social Impact]” (IADB
1996, 9).
While Brazilian civil society was mobilizing around issues of deforestation and
community displacement due to the Polonoroeste highway program, NGOs in India were
mobilizing over the similarly-problematic Narmada Dam in Gujarat, India, which
resulted in the displacement of approximately 120,000 people. The World Bank
responded with the establishment of a panel of outside experts (headed by Bradford
Morse, United Nations Development Programme officer) to review Bank policy and
performance in the Narmada case. The resulting “Morse Commission” report, published
in 1992, called for a greater role for civil society in monitoring project outcomes and
envisioned the establishment a formal grievance mechanism (“Accountability,” 2009).
Meanwhile, during the 1994 IDA replenishment, the US pressured the World Bank to
create such a mechanism. Within months, the World Bank established their Inspection
Panel and the IADB established their Independent Investigation Mechanism, the
predecessor to today’s ICIM (Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism).
As mentioned above, CAF’s history of ESS reform came after its financial
incentives changed, thanks to trends among international organizations. In 1992, the
Global Environment Facility was established in the preparations for the Rio Summit, to

58

support qualifying “green” development projects. In 2009, the Green Climate Fund was
established at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, with a
similar mission. In order to quality for accreditation by these two organizations, CAF had
to establish its own formal ESS out of the general principles that had guided its lending
beforehand (CAF 2010). In 2015, CAF published formal safeguards to govern its joint
projects with GEF (CAF 2015) and received GEF accreditation (GEF 2015). In 2016,
CAF published overall ESS and received accreditation with the GCF (CAF 2016, GCF
2016).
Unlike the MDBs listed above, the Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM)
introduced reforms after pressure from its own national government rather than from civil
society or international organizations. The China Banking Regulatory Commission
(CBRC), together with China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection, published a new
“Green Credit Policy” in 2007, calling on banks to take responsibility over the
environmental impact of their lending projects (Aizawa and Yang 2010). Five years
thereafter, the CBRC issued another decree, the “Green Credit Guidelines,” encouraging
banks to create their own criteria for environmentally-responsible lending (CBRC 2012).
In 2016, CHEXIM complied by publishing its “White Paper on Green Finance,” which
makes specific commitments to “foreground” and mitigate social and environmental risks
in its loans.
2.2.2.2 ESS Reform among Andean Nations: Not from Above but from Below
For the most part, the nations studied here adopted ESS related to new
development projects more recently than did the DFIs discussed above. These ESS arose
mostly out of ongoing struggles between indigenous communities and foreign extractive
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(oil, gas, and mining) investors. These struggles have been well-documented elsewhere
(see for example Bebbington and Bury, 2013; Fontaine, 2003; and Ray et al, 2017).
Because of the ethnic and economic nature of these conflicts, the primary outcome has
been the right of indigenous communities to be consulted in conjunction with
development projects that affect them.
All four countries studied here signed on to the International Labour
Organisation’s Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples within a decade of its
introduction (ILO 1989). Furthermore, all four have enshrined ILO 169 in their national
legal standards, as Table 2.1 shows. As Baluarte (2004) and Larsen (2016) note, the
ratification of ILO 169 brought a seismic shift in how governments and communities
approached resource disputes.14
Table 2.1: Adoption of ILO 169 and incorporation into national law, by country
ILO 169
National Legislation
Ratification Year
Year
Mechanism
Bolivia
1991
2009
Nueva Constitución Política del Estado
Colombia
1991
1997
Supreme Court Decision SU039/1997
Ecuador
1998
2010
Ley Orgánica de Participación Ciudadana
Peru
1994
2011
Ley de Consulta Previa
Sources: Asamblea Constituyente de Bolivia (2009), Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador (2010a), Congreso de
la República (2011), ILO (1989), Ocampo and Agudelo (2014).
Country

The mechanism by which ILO 169 is reflected in national legal protections varies
widely across these four countries, discussed below. Colombia was the first country in
which national legal protections were established. These emerged out of conflict, similar

14

ILO 169 is a revision and replacement of the 1957 ILO Convention 107, which protected indigenous
peoples from labor exploitation in European overseas colonies. In 1986, an ILO Committee of Experts
concluded that ILO 107 was written for the benefit of indigenous peoples but without sufficient
allowances for self-determination for the indigenous communities themselves. ILO 169 explicitly
addresses the rights of indigenous communities to decide if, when, and how they are to integrate with
surrounding cultures. In effect, the transition from ILO 107 to ILO 169 represents a concerted effort to
move from a model of development for people to one of development with people (ILO, n.d.)
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to the World Bank and IADB ESS discussed above. Colombia’s 1991 constitution
dictates that indigenous territories are to be governed by indigenous councils, including
in matters of resource use and distribution and the preservation of natural resources
(“Constitución Política de Colombia”, 1991, Art. 330). Nonetheless, in 1992, Occidental
Petroleum signed a contract with the Colombian oil company Ecopetrol for seismic
exploration of the Samoré Block in the territory of the U’wa indigenous community. The
U’wa sued Occidental in 1995 and won in court, only to have the Supreme Court
overturn the decision. However, in 1997, the national ombudsman’s office (Defensoría
del Pueblo) challenged this ruling to the Constitutional Court on behalf of the U’Wa
people, and won. This ruling, SU039/1997, set the stage for future rulings, as Haller, et al
(2007) note. For example, Decree 1320 of 1998 was established to provide a framework
for indigenous consultation but was struck down itself for having been enacted without
the indigenous consultation required by SU039/1997 (Ocampo and Agudelo, 2014).
The other countries shown here (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru) enacted legal
protection to codify ILO 169 in a less combative context. In each of these three countries,
leftist (in the cases of Bolivia and Ecuador) and center-left (in the case of Peru)
governments were elected in the early-to-mid 2000s thanks to coalitions built among
indigenous, labor, and environmentalist organizations. Intrinsic to these victories were
promises to enact major legal reforms to enshrine the causes dear to these groups.
Both Bolivia (2009) and Ecuador (2008) established new constitutions as part of
this process. Bolivia’s constitution was the stronger in this regard, guaranteeing that rural
indigenous communities should have the right to prior and informed consultation over
any use of natural resources found in their territories (Asamblea Constituyente de Bolivia
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2009, Article 403). Ecuador’s new constitution did not explicitly enshrine the right to
indigenous consultation but did give Mother Nature (Pachamama) her own legal rights,
specifying that anyone would be legally allowed to sue public authorities to force them to
defend these rights. In practice, this meant that communities need not prove that their
private property is damaged in order to use the courts to stop and mitigate the damage
(Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador 2008, Art. 71), a move especially favorable to NGOs,
indigenous communities with uncertain land tenure, and the poor. Tanasescu (2013) notes
that in its first enforcement, a municipal was made to pay for restoration of a river whose
path it had modified to make room for a new road, thanks to a lawsuit on behalf of nature
by local citizens.
Both Ecuador and Peru have enacted laws to directly address the right to prior
consultation for indigenous communities. Ecuador’s 2010 Citizen Participation Law
states that the national government must consult with indigenous, Afro-Ecuadorian, and
coastal Montubio communities regarding all decisions that might affect their environment
(Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador 2010a, Art. 83). Peru’s 2011 “Law of Prior
Consultation” codifies these rights in much more detail, recognizing the rights of
communities’ elected officials to negotiate on their behalf and laying out a seven-step
process for the consultations (Congreso de la República 2011). For more on these
electoral changes and the resulting legal protections in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, see
Ray and Chimienti (2017), Sanborn and Chonn (2017), and Saravia López and Rua
Quiroga (2017).
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2.3 Model of Analysis
This chapter aims to further the literature on infrastructure, development banks,
and the environment, by testing the association between major ESS reforms and the
environmental performance of infrastructure projects financed thereafter. This section
explains the choices of environmental impact studied (deforestation), method (tree cover
change as measured by satellite imagery) and location (the nations of Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru, and Bolivia).
2.3.1 Choice of Impact Studied: Deforestation
The analysis below examines only one of many possible environmental impacts:
deforestation. Many other important social and environmental aspects of infrastructure
expansion exist, of course, including water quality, air quality, access to ancestral lands,
and the cultural politics surrounding the popular conceptualizations of natural resources
as spiritual, community, or economic entities are all important aspects of the social and
environmental impacts of the expansion of infrastructure projects in Latin America (see
for example Carruthers 2008, Wickstrom 2008).
Nonetheless, as the history section above mentions, NGO mobilization regarding
DFI-backed projects in these countries centered on the preservation of forests for the sake
of communities therein. Thus, this chapter chooses deforestation as its primary impact
variable in order to measure whether civil society participation requirements improved an
outcome demonstrated to be highly important to civil society. Furthermore, deforestation
is an attractive choice of environmental impact to study, as the preservation of the
Amazon rainforest unites the concerns of international DFIs concerned with their climate
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impacts and the local concerns embodied in what Martinez-Alier (2014) calls “the
environmentalism of the poor.”
2.3.2 Choice of Method: Satellite Imagery
As mentioned above, the use of satellite data to measure tree cover change is
well-established. This chapter uses the “Global Forest Change” database managed by the
University of Maryland in conjunction with Hansen et al (2013). At the time of this
writing, the Hansen et al data included data for tree cover change between 2000 and
2015. It is compiled based on USGS LANDSAT imagery with 30m resolution. As Chen
et al (2015) note, this resolution is fine enough to show deforestation, though it is too
coarse to show forest degradation. However, it cannot distinguish between forest cover
and plantation-based tree cover. For that reason, this analysis mostly uses the term “tree
cover loss” instead of “deforestation,” unless it clear from the satellite images that no
plantations are involved.
Methodologically, this chapter expands on the work of Buchanan et al (2013) at
William and Mary’s AidData Research Lab. These authors use the Hansen database to
investigate the relative tree cover change rates within 10km of World Bank projects
globally. Instead of seeking differences among lenders, the present analysis investigates
the impacts of ESS reforms, regardless of DFI or national government involved. It also
relaxes the traditional use of 10km radii around projects, and instead uses site-specific
radii established using a common set of rules across projects, discussed in more detail
below.
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2.3.3 Choice of Location: Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia
This chapter takes as its geographic focus the western Amazon, home to some of
the most sensitive territory, both socially and environmentally, in the Western
Hemisphere. Figure 2.1 shows all of the international DFI-financed infrastructure projects
in Amazonian countries from 2000 to 2015, together with indigenous territory and
varying levels of biodiversity. The richest biodiversity in South America is found along
the western periphery of the Amazon basin, especially in eastern Ecuador and northern
Peru. Among the indigenous territories shown here, arguably the most sensitive are those
in the “Uncontacted Frontier” of the border region between Peru, Brazil, and
northwestern Bolivia: home to the highest concentration of uncontacted and voluntarily
isolated indigenous communities in the world (Survival international, n.d.).
Of the 100 projects shown in Figure 2.1, 84 are in the western Andean countries
of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. Nearly all of the projects shown to be in areas
that are both highly-biodiverse and home to indigenous communities are in a few sections
of these four countries: The Pacific coast of Colombia, central Ecuador, inland Peru, and
western Bolivia. Venezuela is home to just three projects, Suriname has one, and Brazil
has 17 – but none in areas that are both highly biodiverse and indigenous territory.
Because of this geographic distribution of international DFI-financed infrastructure
projects, this chapter specifically focuses on the history and performance of projects in
the four countries of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.
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Figure 2.1: Completed international DFI-financed infrastructure projects in
Amazon-basin countries, 2000-2015

Note: Individual projects considered here are listed in Appendix B.1. Source: DFI annual reports, Bass et
al. (2010), LandMark (n.d.), Red Amazónica de Información Socioambiental Georreferencial (n.d.).

2.3.4 Choice of Projects
For the purposes of this analysis, infrastructure projects are defined as all “hard”
infrastructure projects (energy and transportation) that contribute to an increase in a
country’s fixed capital stock. Thus, while roads form a crucial element of this dataset, not
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all roads are included. Specifically, roads are included when they entail paving
previously-unpaved roads or rehabilitating paved roads, but they are excluded in the
following cases:
•

Repairing roads after natural disasters,

•

Re-grading of unpaved roads, which must occur repeatedly in order to maintain
usability,

•

Periodic maintenance of paved roads

•

All work regarding neighborhood (as opposed to inter-municipal) roads

However, major rehabilitations of paved roads, which make the difference between a
road being passable by truck year-round or otherwise, are included.
2.4. Data Description
As mentioned, this chapter examines the tree cover change surrounding 84
infrastructure projects financed by international DFIs from 2000 to 2015. The following
sections describe the characteristics of these projects, tree cover change around them, and
the ESS that applied to them, either from DFI or national authorities.
2.4.1 Tree Cover Change Near international DFI-Financed Infrastructure Projects
Between 2000 and 2015, the 84 projects studied here were associated with the
loss of 5,663 km2 in tree cover within 10km of the projects, or 14.2 percent of the total
nearby tree cover. As Table 2.2 shows, this rate of tree cover loss is much higher than the
overall rate of deforestation in those four countries over this time period, which was just
3.9 percent. This level of tree cover loss is equivalent to 25.4 kilotons of new CO2
emissions, or about seven percent of the total loss in carbon sequestration from
deforestation in these countries over this time period.
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Table 2.2: Tree Cover loss within 10km of international DFI-financed infrastructure
projects, 2000-2015
Bolivia
Within 10km of projects:
Total tree cover change (km2)
Total initial tree cover (km2)
Tree cover change (%)
Emissions equiv. (MMT CO2)

-2,937.9
14,730.8
-19.9%
97.0

Country
Colombia
Ecuador
-156.7
4,219.2
-3.7%
7.9

-45.0
2,570.7
-1.7%
2.5

Total
Peru
-2,523.5
18,400.0
-13.7%
146.2

-5,663.1
39,920.7
-14.2%
253.5

Remaining territory:
Total tree cover change (km2)
-35,138.1
-21,917.2
-3,631.6
-18,487.8
-79,174.6
Total initial tree cover (km2)
503,812.0 675,512.3 147,430.1
711,338.2
2,038,092.6
Tree cover change (%)
-7.0%
-3.2%
-2.5%
-2.6%
-3.9%
Emissions equiv. (MMT CO2)
1,159.6
1,109.0
198.4
1,071.1
3,538.0
Note: Emissions are calculated using the average carbon intensity per km2 of forest in each country, using
median estimates in Saatchi et al (2011): 9.0 kT/km2 in Bolivia, 13.8 in Colombia, 14.9 in Ecuador, and
15.8 in Peru.

However, as Table 2.2 also shows, the rate of tree cover loss associated with DFI
projects varied widely among the four countries studied here. The highest rate was seen
in Bolivia, where nearly 20 percent of tree cover within 10km of DFI projects was lost
between 2000 and 2015. On the other extreme, the projects in Ecuador were associated
with a loss of just 1.7 percent of tree cover within 10km, a lower rate than in the rest of
the country.
Figure 2.2 explores this variation across individual projects, by country.
“Relative tree cover change” is defined here as the log difference between tree cover
change within 10km of the project and tree cover change in parts of the country not
within 10km of an international DFI-financed infrastructure project, in order to take into
account different national contexts. As the figure clearly shows, great variation exists,
with some projects exhibiting much less tree cover loss than the rest of the countries
where they occurred (shown as positive relative tree cover change), and others exhibiting
much more, especially among projects in Peru.
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Figure 2.2: Relative tree cover change within 10km of international DFI-financed
infrastructure projects, 2000-2015

Bolivia

N
Mean
Median
St. Dev.

18
+0.4%
+7.2%
11.2pp

Colombia

Ecuador

20
-5.8%
-0.2%
15.1pp

Peru

14
+0.2%
+1.8%
3.9pp

29
-5.4%
+2.6%
29.2pp

Bolivia
Overall
81
-3.3%
+1.5%
19.8pp

Note: The total number of projects is only 81 instead of 84, because this model results in three
observations’ elimination from the dataset. This problem is resolved in the following section. Relative tree
cover change is measured as the log difference between local and national treed cover change percent rates:
ln(1+D local TC) – ln(1+D nation TC excluding areas near projects).

The areas within 10km of international DFI-financed infrastructure projects had a
median tree cover loss that was 1.5 percent better than the remainder of the nations where
they were built. They had a mean level of 3.3 percent worse tree cover loss, but that was
driven primarily by a few extreme outliers, so that level is not statistically significantly
different from zero, as Figure 2.2 shows.
2.4.2 Safeguards
The high variance shown in Figure 2.2 raises the question of what DFIs and
governments can do, in the face of such divergent outcomes, to limit the possibility of
their projects experiencing the tree cover loss of the highly-negative outliers. This
chapter attempts to answer this question by seeking relationships between DFIs’ ESS
processes and the tree cover change in the areas surrounding their infrastructure projects.
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Colombia

Table 2.2 shows the most common ESS among the DFIs most active in financing
infrastructure projects in the Western Andean countries studied here.
CAF’s approach to safeguards has been unique and bears explanation. CAF
established formal ESS in 2016, after the time period studied here. Before that point, its
lending was governed by its 2010 “Environmental Strategy,” which states that CAF
“makes sure operations have complied with the participation process demanded by the
country’s legal system and, where it sees a need, calls for additional step of public
consultation” (CAF 2010, 18). This principle is certainly laudable in its intent, but its
ambiguity makes it impossible to label as having across-the-board requirements beyond
respect for national laws. Thus, for the sake of accuracy, Table 2.3 shows CAF requiring
prior consultation (as it currently does), but the case-by-case analysis below recognizes
that it did not have a formal prior consultation requirement from 2000-2015.
All eight of the DFIs shown in Table 2.3 require the completion of EIAs and
compliance with host-country environmental standards. Six require consultation with
affected communities, while only four MDBs – the World Bank, and IADB, and their
private-sector lending arms – have (or require the establishment of) formal grievance
mechanisms to address problems that arise. Due to DFIs’ unanimity regarding EIAs and
host-country standards, this chapter examines the association between the other
commonly-accepted safeguards – prior consultation and formal grievance mechanisms –
and tree cover loss near project sites. The recent enactment of stronger versions of these
policies – free, prior, informed consent of affected communities (known as FPIC) and
project-level grievance mechanisms – are crucial developments, but unfortunately too
few projects in this dataset have those protections for this chapter to analyze the impacts
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of these reforms. Finally, it is important to note that Table 2.3 shows only prior
consultation provisions that have incorporated formal processes of engagement, using the
approach of Kvam (2017). While many more DFIs have statements broadly supporting
the principle of public information or consultation, only the World Bank and IADB had
standardized processes with space for affected communities to impact project design.
Table 2.3: Required safeguard processes for infrastructure project planning
IBRD

IFC

MDBs
IADB

IIC

CAF

NDBs Operating Abroad
CDB CHEXIM BNDES

Environmental impact
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
assessments (EIAs)
Compliance with hostX
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
country env. standards
Assistance with hostX
country standards
Consultation with affected
X
X
X
X
X
X
communities
Consent of affected
X
X
communities (FPIC)
Formal grievance
X
X
X
X
mechanisms
Project-level grievance
X
X
mechanisms
Note: CAF and CHEXIM established their community consultation safeguards in 2016, after the time
period studied here. Thus, while those slots are marked here, the analysis below takes into account the
absence of those protections before 2016. The IADB requires consent of affected communities only in
cases of involuntary resettlement.
Sources: Baker (2013), CAF (2016), CHEXIM (2016), Goodland (2004), Himberg (2015), IADB (1990,
2006a, 2006b), IFC (1998, 2006a, 2006b), IIC (2013), ILO (1989), IR (2007), Kennedy (1999), Ocampo
and Agudelo (2014), Rivasplata et al (2014), WB (no date), Yuan and Gallagher (2017).

The distribution of which institutions guarantee prior consultation and access to
grievance mechanisms is more complicated than Table 2.3 suggests, because
international DFIs have gradually adopted these ESS over the last few years. Prior to the
adoption of formal prior consultation processes, many DFIs had principles or guidelines
related to consultation, but most have adopted standardized prior consultation more
recently. Thus, for example, not every CAF project examined here required prior
consultation, and not every IFC project had a formal grievance process.
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Countries also have their own history of the adopting safeguards that apply to the
projects studied here, as mentioned in the previous section. All four countries examined
here are signatories to the International Labour Organisation’s Convention 169 (ILO
1989) and have enacted their own legislation recognizing the right to prior consultation
for indigenous communities affected by new development projects.
Combining the evolution of DFI prior consultation safeguards and national
legislation yields the matrix of DFI and country consultation standards shown in Table
2.4. Projects in a given country, financed by a given DFI, have prior consultation
guarantees if they were approved after the prior consultation enactment date shown in the
table.
Table 2.4: Prior consultation adoption for infrastructure projects, by country and
DFI
Bolivia
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
MDBs
IBRD
1992
1992
1992
1992
IFC
2006
1998
2006
2006
IADB
1996
1996
1996
1996
IIC
1990
1990
1990
1990
CAF
2009
1998
2010
2011
NDBs Operating Abroad
BNDES
2009
1998
2010
2011
CDB
2009
1998
2010
2011
CHEXIM
2008
1998
2008
2008
Sources: Asamblea Constituyente de Bolivia (2009), Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador (2010a), Baker
(2013), CAF (2016), CHEXIM (2016), Congreso de la República (2011), Deruyttere (2004), Goodland
(2004), Himberg (2015), IADB (1990, 2006a, 2006b), IFC (1998, 2006a, 2006b), IIC (2013), ILO (1989),
IR (2007), MacKay (2005), Ocampo and Agudelo (2014), WB (no date), WB (1992), WB (2003).

The adoption of formal grievance mechanisms by WBG and IADB lending
offices evolved over time in a similar way to prior consultation safeguards, with the
IBRD and IADB adopting them in 1994 (with the IADB further reforming theirs in
2010), followed by the IIC in 2002 and the IFC in 2006 (Bradlow, 2005; Brown et al,
2013; Cordonier Segger and Weramantry, 2017; Himberg 2015; IADB, 2009; IFC, 2009;
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IIC, 2009). There is no equivalent evolution in grievance mechanisms in national
legislation, because such complaints are handled through national judicial systems.
2.5. Results
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of relative tree cover change among projects that
do and do not have prior consultation and formal grievance mechanisms. The presence
of prior consultation mechanisms appears to be associated with a sizeable reduction in
tree cover loss. Having a prior consultation mechanism appears to raise the average
relative tree cover change from a median level of -0.8 percent +1.8 percent and from a
mean of -12.3 percent to -0.5 percent, compared to the remainder of the territory in the
nations where the projects occurred. However, these differences are not conclusive, as the
extremely high standard deviations mean that the means are not statistically significantly
different from zero. However, the results seem more ambiguous for formal grievance
mechanisms. Projects with these mechanisms in place had a higher mean relative tree
cover change, but a lower median than the surrounding territory.
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FPIC
FPIC
NotRequired
Required
Prior
Cons.
Not
Required

N
Mean
Median
St. Dev.

19
-12.3%
-0.8%
32.9pp

FPIC
Not
Required
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Required
Prior
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Required
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-.5
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Figure 2.3: Relative tree cover change near international DFI-financed
infrastructure with and without ESS
Prior Consultation
Grievance Mechanism

GM
Present
Prior FPIC
Cons.Required
NotNot
Required

62
-0.5%
+1.8%
12.6pp

N
Mean
Median
St. Dev.

GM Present

38
-5.3%
+1.7%
24.4pp

43
-1.4%
+1.4%
14.6pp

Note: Relative tree cover change is measured as the log difference between local and national treed cover
change percent rates: ln(1+D local TC) – ln(1+D nation TC excluding areas near projects).

2.5.1 Regression Analysis of ESS on Tree Cover Change
To more closely examine the impacts of the two safeguards requires a formal
difference-in-difference model, using the form
!"#∆%&' = ) + +, -&' + +. /0' + 1, ∆-23' + 1. 4"56' + +7 8%&0'
where:
!"#∆%&' is the relative tree cover change with 10km of a project, measured as the log
difference of the local tree cover change and the tree cover change in all parts of
the country not within 10km of such a project.
-&' is a binary variable expressing the presence or absence of a prior consultation
mechanism.
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/0' is a binary variable expressing the presence or absence of a formal grievance
mechanism.
∆-23' is the annual rate of population growth in the state (or department) of the project,
in the five years prior to the project.
4"56' is the year in which the project was approved.
8%&0' is a binary variable indicating countries with zero initial tree cover within 10km in
2000.
Relative tree cover change is expressed as
%&<,.>,?
D%&
%&<,.>,?
%&~<,.>,?
<,.>>>
!"#∆%&' = #: ;
@ − #: ;
@ = #: C
E
%&~<,.>,?
%&<,.>>>
%&~<,.>>>
D%&
~<,.>>>
= #: ;

%&<,.>,?
%&<,.>>>
@ − #: ;
@
%&~<,.>,?
%&~<,.>>>

where P indicates areas within 10km of an international DFI-financed infrastructure
project and ~P indicates all national territory not within 10km of such a project. Using
log differences rather than simple ratios allows for a more straightforward interpretation
of results, as coefficients are expressed in positive or negative percent for tree cover
change that is more positive or negative than what was experienced in the surrounding
area. The second line of the expression above shows that defining !"#∆%& as the log
difference of tree cover change rates is arithmetically identical to defining it as a more
classic difference-in-difference model form: the change in the ratio of tree cover levels
between areas near projects and other areas.
Local population growth prior to project approval is included in order to
differentiate whether tree cover loss is due to an area growing in population regardless of
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the project, from the change related to the project itself. It is measured as the annual rate
of population increase at the state (or department) level during the five years prior to the
project’s approval. Project approval year is included because this model relies on endpoint estimates of tree cover, in 2000 and 2015, so it is important to distinguish projects
approved in 2000 (which show 15 years of tree cover change in this sample) from those
approved in 2014 (which show only 1 year), for example. The model also differentiates
projects with zero tree cover nearby in 2000, because these projects cannot possibly
experience tree cover loss, only gain.
Table 2.5 shows the results of this model for each safeguard considered separately
and for both together. While the presence of a prior consultation mechanism is
significantly associated with 13.5 percent less tree cover loss (the coefficient on prior
consultation in Model 1), there is no significant result for the presence of formal
grievance mechanisms.15 Furthermore, an F-test for over-specification shows that
including grievance mechanisms does not explain observed variation any better than
considering prior consultation mechanisms alone. Thus, for analytic purposes, Model 1
should be considered the primary model.
The significant correlation between prior consultation provisions and more
positive (less negative) relative tree cover change is not unexpected, given the history of
scholars in other contexts finding the importance of knowledge as a common-pool asset
(see for example Ostrom and Hess 2007), and the significant impact that information

15

These findings reinforce those of Buntaine (2016, 133-136), who finds that having a World Bank
Inspection Panel case lowers the environmental risk of a country’s future World Bank loan portfolio only
for countries that predominantly borrow from the Bank’s IDA concessional window – which applies to
none of the countries studied here.
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disclosure (“right to know”) requirements have had on firm behavior (see for example
Bennear and Olmstead 2007; Foulon, Lanoie, and Laplant 2002; Konar and Cohen 1995;
and Wolf 1996). It is worth noting that the lack of significant results for grievance
mechanisms may be misleading, because of possible survivor bias. If a filed grievance
results in the cancellation of funding for a project, that project will no longer be included
in the present dataset. For example, in 2011 the Bolivian environmental NGO Foro
Boliviano Sobre el Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo (FOBOMADE) filed a complaint with
the IADB’s Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanisms (ICIM), the bank’s
formal grievance office, about allegedly inadequate EIA and prior consultation processes
in the construction of a bridge over the Bení river, connecting the towns of San
Buenaventura and Rurrenabaque (IADB 2014, Molina Carpio 2014). Before the
complaint could be adjudicated, the government of Bolivia shifted the IADB funds from
that loan to another project. Thus, that project no longer appears in the present data.
Furthermore, Buntaine (2016) finds that MDBs are less likely to approve projects in
countries where grievances have been filed in the prior five years. Thus, formal grievance
mechanisms may impact outcomes through the exclusion of problematic projects from
the present dataset in one of two ways: projects may be cancelled, and future projects
may be denied in countries where complaints have been filed.
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Table 2.5: Regression results: association with net tree cover change (N=81)
Prior Consultation
(Model 1)
Coefficient
Safeguards:
Prior Consultation
Grievance Mech.
Controls:
Prior local D pop.
Year
Zero initial TC
Intercept
R2
F-Statistics:
This model
Compared to Model 1

0.135**

St.
Error

Grievance Mech.
(Model 2)
Coefficient

St.
Error

Coefficient

St.
Error

0.057

0.049

0.157*
-0.033

0.065
0.060

0.051

-1.026
2.477
-0.002
0.007
0.107*
0.052
4.732
13.699
0.1262
F (4,76) = 2.74*

Both
(Model 3)

-0.402
2.569
0.003
0.007
0.101
0.054
9.023
15.879
0.0627
F (4,76) = 1.27

-0.896
2.500
-0.005
0.008
0.108*
0.052
9.023
15.879
0.1296
F (5,75) = 2.23
F (1,75) = 0.29

Note: * indicates P£0.05 Standard errors are shown in italics. Model 1 is shaded because it explains the
observed variation best, based on the F-tests shown here.

The results discussed follow the pattern of Buchanan et al (2013) of measuring
tree cover change within 10km of infrastructure projects. However, that method is not
without its drawbacks. Most importantly, the choice of 10km is an arbitrary one, which in
some cases may include impacts from extraneous sources while in other cases it may not
encompass all of the source-related tree cover change. Thus, the resulting tree cover
change rates include substantial variation in tree cover change that cannot be explained
by any of the variables considered here, leading to low R2 values and mostly statistically
insignificant model F-statistics shown in Table 2.5.
This section explores a possible improvement over the traditional use of 10km
radii, by measuring tree cover change at site-specific radii, based on each project’s
surroundings. Site-specific radii apply the same rules for radius selection to each project,
to allow flexibility for variations in individual projects’ surroundings, without sacrificing
comparability among projects. These radii are defined as the point where the local
source-based tree cover change fades into the background rate of the change of
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surrounding area. It takes into account as much as possible of the source-based tree cover
change, while including as little as possible of the tree cover change from other,
unrelated, nearby sources.
Mathematically, a site-specific radius is defined using a third-degree polynomial
trend line for tree cover change as a function of an expanding radius, as measured at 1km,
2km and so on. The second derivative of this trend line yields an inflection point, after
which the tree cover change ceases to be dominated by source-related tree cover change
and begins to be dominated by the background rate of change. For most projects, the tree
cover change trend line reaches an inflection point at or before 10 km; in those cases,
there is no need to measure tree cover change beyond 10km. However, in cases where no
inflection point is forthcoming within 10km, further measurements are taken until an
inflection point emerges.
A few exceptions exist to this process. First, for projects with zero tree cover
change in the area immediately surrounding a project (which is only the case for very
small projects), then the site-specific radius is the largest radius with zero tree cover
change, before unrelated tree cover changes can be taken into account. Similarly, where
there is an obvious introduction of a new source of unrelated tree cover change, the sitespecific radius must be small enough to avoid taking it into account.
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Figure 2.4: Examples of site-specific radii and their definitions (red=loss, blue=gain)
2.4A: Puerto Bahía, Colombia
Tree Cover Change, Trendline, and Infl. Point.
Resulting radius: 3km

60%

Total Tree Cover Change

Atlantic
Ocean

Loss
Gain
Net

80%

40%
20%
0%
-20%
-40%
-60%
-80%
1

y = -0.0025x3 + 0.023x2 + 0.0716x - 0.6722
R² = 0.8115
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Radius (km)

2.4B: Corredor Vial Interoceánico Sur, Route 3, Peru
Tree Cover Change, Trendline, and Infl. Point.

Resulting radius: 7km
Brazil

40%

Total Tree Cover Change

30%

Loss
Gain
Net

Bolivia

20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
-30%
-40%

y = 0.0006x3 - 0.0124x2 + 0.0955x - 0.437
R² = 0.9947
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Radius (km)
Note: Maps are not to scale relative to each other, to preserve visibility given Puerto Bahía’s much smaller
size.

Figure 2.4 illustrates the process of choosing site-specific radii using two
examples: Puerto Bahía near Cartagena, Colombia, and Route 3 of the Corredor Vial
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Interoceánico Sur in southern Peru. As the included tree cover change maps show, the
choice of site-specific radii allows for the exclusion of extraneous tree cover change in
smaller projects, while still encompassing applicable tree cover change for larger
projects. It is useful in situations with extremely volatile tree cover changes within 10km
(like Puerto Bahía) as well as projects where the tree cover change simply slowly fades
out as the radius increases (as in Route 3).
Using site-specific radii has another important advantage compared to using 10km
radii, beyond measuring project-related tree cover change more accurately. It also allows
the inclusion of three projects for which tree cover change cannot be measured at 10km.
These observations all had zero tree cover near the projects sites in 2000, and extremely
low tree cover (less than 0.01 percent each) within 10km of the project sites.
Nevertheless, in each case, the few trees in the area disappeared by 2015, yielding -100
percent tree cover changes, making it impossible to measure tree cover change in the
form ln(1+D local TC) – ln(1+D nation TC excluding areas near projects). These three
observations are as follows.
•

Bolivia’s Tiquina-Copacabana road, on the desert shores of Lake Titicaca, had zero
tree cover within 3km of the road. However, the entire area within 10km of it had a
tree cover rate of 0.002 percent in 2000, which fell to zero by 2015, yielding a tree
cover change of -100 percent.

•

Bolivia’s Rio Seco-Huarina road had zero tree cover within 4km of the road in 2000.
However, the entire 10km area had 0.002 percent tree cover in 2000, which fell to
zero by 2015. Thus, using the 10km measure yields a tree cover change rate of -100
percent.
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•

Peru’s Cerro Mulato micro-dam is surrounded by farmland (outside of the town of
Chongoyape), and so had zero tree cover within several kilometers in 2000.
Nonetheless, the entire area within 10km of the dam had 0.009 percent tree cover in
2000, which fell to zero by 2015, yielding a tree cover change of -100 percent.

In each of these cases, small unrelated changes in tree cover within 10km of the project
sites yield extreme tree cover change percentages. Nonetheless, this factor alone does not
warrant excluding them entirely from the analysis, as they are otherwise unremarkable
projects. Using site-specific radii addresses the outlier problem without removing them
from the analysis.
Table 2.6 shows the tree cover change associated with projects when measured
with site-specific radii. As explained above and demonstrated statistically below, this
method is more accurate as it includes only tree cover change that is demonstrably
associated with the project sites. When measured with this higher standard, the tree cover
change associated with international DFI-financed projects is actually greater than when
it is measured conventionally within a 10km radius: 15.9 percent, four times the 3.9
percent rate in the remaining territories.
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Table 2.6: Tree cover loss associated with international DFI-financed infrastructure
projects, 2000-2015
Bolivia
Associated with projects:
Total tree cover change (km2)
Total initial tree cover (km2)
Tree cover change (%)
Emissions equiv. (MMT CO2)

-1,788.5
8,387.1
-21.3%
59.0

Country
Colombia
Ecuador
-63.5
2,116.3
-3.0%
3.2

-11.1
670.7
-1.7%
0.6

Total
Peru
-2,587.4
16,898.5
-15.3%
149.9

-4,450.5
28,072.6
-15.9%
212.7

Remaining territory:
Total tree cover change (km2)
511,702.2
676,909.7
149,459.5
713,360.7 2,051,432.1
Total initial tree cover (km2)
-36,331.4
-21,985.5
-3,666.0
-18,409.2
-80,392.1
Tree cover change (%)
-7.1%
-3.2%
-2.5%
-2.6%
-3.9%
Emissions equiv. (MMT CO2)
1,198.9
1,112.5
200.3
1,066.5
3,578.2
Note: Emissions are calculated using the average carbon intensity per km2 of forest in each country, using
median estimates in Saatchi et al (2011): 9.0 kT/km2 in Bolivia, 13.8 in Colombia, 14.9 in Ecuador, and
15.8 in Peru.

Figure 2.5 shows the distribution of relative tree cover change, when measured at
site-specific radii, by country. The outliers that dominate Figure 2.2 have been curtailed,
with the range of observations here stretching only from -60 percent to +10 percent,
rather than the -150 percent to +50 percent shown above. However, the standard
deviations are still strong enough to prevent the means from being statistically
significantly different from zero.
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Figure 2.5: Relative tree cover change measured within site-specific radii of
international DFI-financed infrastructure projects, 2000-2015

N
Mean
Median
St. Dev.

20
-0.6%
+7.4%
16.6pp

20
-1.7%
+2.4%
9.4pp

14
+1.1%
+2.5%
4.1pp

30
-1.3%
+2.6%
9.4pp

Overall
84
-0.8%
+2.6%
10.9pp

Note: Relative tree cover change is measured as the log difference between local and national treed cover
change percent rates, as explained in the following section.

Figure 2.6 shows the distribution of relative tree cover change rates over the two
safeguards examined here, when measured at site-specific radii (as Figure 2.3 does for
tree cover change measured within 10km). As in Figure 2.3, above, prior consultation
appears to be associated with less tree cover loss: having a prior consultation requirement
raises the average relative tree cover change from -5.2 percent to +0.4 percent. However,
these means are dominated by outliers; the standard deviations (while much smaller than
those in Figure 2.3) are still quite large, and the means are not significantly different from
zero. Also as above, grievance mechanisms show an ambiguous – at best – relationship
with tree cover change.
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N
Mean
Median
St. Dev.

FPIC Cons.
Not Required
Prior
Not Required

FPIC
Required
Prior
Cons.
Required

19
-5.2%
+2.4%
16.8pp

65
+0.4%
+2.6%
8.2pp
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of relative tree cover change (measured within site-specific
radii), by ESS, 2000-2015
Prior Consultation
Grievance mechanism

GM Not Present

N
Mean
Median
St. Dev.

38
-2.2%
+2.5%
14.0pp

GM Present

46
+0.3%
+2.6%
7.4pp

Table 2.7 shows the results of repeating regression Models 1 through 3 with tree
cover change measured at site-specific radii. Considered jointly, these models nearly
double the R2 values of Table 2.5 without losing degrees of freedom (or observations, as
noted above). Furthermore, they have highly-significant model F-statistics. Thus, these
models explain the variation in relative tree cover change among projects much better
than those shown above.
As above, prior consultation mechanisms are significantly related to tree cover
loss: projects with a prior consultation requirement have 5.6 percent less tree cover loss
than other projects, relative to the surrounding territory. Also as above, formal grievance
mechanisms are not significantly related to tree cover change, and including this variable
fails an F-test for over-specification, so it should be omitted. Thus, Model 4 is preferable
to Model 6. Finally, whether a project has zero initial tree cover is the most significant
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factor in relative tree cover change, which is to be expected given the impossibility of
tree cover loss at these sites.
Table 2.7: Regression results using site-specific radii: association with net tree cover
change

Safeguards:
Prior Consultation
Grievance Mech.
Controls:
Prior local D pop.
Year
Zero initial TC
Intercept
R2
F-Statistics:
This model
Compared to Model 4

Prior Consultation
(Model 4)

Grievance Mech.
(Model 5)

Coefficient

Coefficient

St. Error

0.056*

0.026
0.028

0.529
0.001
0.092***
-1.359
0.2100

St.
Error

1.361
0.003
0.024
6.833

0.758
0.003
0.092***
-6.251
0.1783

F (4,79) = 5.25***

0.025
1.396
0.004
0.025
7.358

F (4,79) = 4.29**

Both
(Model 6)
Coefficient

St. Error

0.060
-0.007

0.034
0.032

0.570
-0.000
0.093***
-0.455
0.2105

1.381
0.004
0.024
7.952

F (5,78) = 4.16**
F (1,78) = 0.05

Note: N=84. * indicates P£0.05; *** indicates P£0.001. Model 4 is highlighted because it offers the most
explanatory power of these three, based on the F-test shown.

2.5.1.1 The Role of Initial Tree Cover
It is worth exploring the impact of including projects with zero initial tree cover
on the results of the analysis. Among the 84 projects included in Table 2.7, only 49 had
non-zero tree cover in 2000. Theoretically, there is reason to include the projects with
zero initial tree cover. While the literature cited above has established a significant
relationship between road construction and tree cover loss in forested areas, at the time of
this writing no literature known to the author rules out the possibility of a relationship
between road construction in non-forested areas and tree cover gain, either through
reforestation or agro-forestry activities. Empirically, however, none of the observations
studied here with zero initial tree cover experienced any change in in that tree cover level
between 2000 and 2015. Figure 2.7 shows the relationship between tree cover change and
project ESS just among projects with non-zero levels of tree cover in 2000; the resulting
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relationships are essentially unchanged, though the resulting distributions are broader as
the universe of observations is smaller.

Rel. Tree Cover Change, 2000-2015: log diff. w. rest of co.
-.6
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1

Rel. Tree Cover Change, 2000-2015: log diff. w. rest of co.
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-.4
-.3
-.2
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0
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of relative tree cover change (measured within site-specific
radii) among projects with positive initial tree cover, by ESS, 2000-2015
Prior Consultation
Grievance mechanism

Prior Cons. Not Required

N
Mean
Median
St. Dev.

10
-12.5%
-0.6%
20.4pp

Prior Cons. Required

39
-2.2%
+2.1%
9.5pp

GM Not Present

N
Mean
Median
St. Dev.

22
-6.9%
+1.0%
16.6pp

GM Present

27
-2.1%
+2.1%
8.8pp

Furthermore, among projects with positive levels of initial tree cover, no obvious
relationship exists between the initial level of tree cover and subsequent tree cover loss,
as Figure 2.8 shows. The projects with the most severe tree cover loss between 2000 and
2015 had initial tree cover levels of 63.3, 73.8, 7.3, 85.0, and 53.6 percent, respectively.
Areas with low, mid-level, and heavy forestation rates are all represented in those five
observations. On the other end of the spectrum, observations with zero tree cover change
during the time period studied here have an initial tree cover levels ranging from zero to
90.9 percent – only five projects had higher initial tree cover rates than that level. For this
reason, the model shown in Table 2.7 does not include any references to differences
among non-zero levels of initial tree cover.
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Figure 2.8: Absolute tree cover change and initial tree cover level, 2000-2015

-0.5

Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Bolivia
0

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5
.6
Tree Cover, 2000

.7

.8

.9

1

2.5.1.2 The Role of Site Selection
In all of the models shown thus far, the one variable with consistently significant
results has been whether a project site had zero local tree cover in 2000. Thus, it is
important to distinguish whether projects with prior consultation mechanisms perform
better relative to tree cover change because of their initial conditions. In other words, this
raises the question of whether prior consultation requirements simply add a bureaucratic
hurdle that encourages countries to avoid using international DFIs with those
requirements for projects in heavily forested areas. Such a finding would be consistent
with the work of Buntaine (2016, 82), who interviewed 54 individual staff members at
four Washington, DC-based MDBs and found that it was common for World Bank staff
to report avoiding certain projects because of the added “hassle factor” of pursuing
safeguards in environmentally or socially risky loans. Furthermore, the World Bank’s
own Independent Evaluations Group reported in 2010 that most Latin American and
Caribbean team leaders “had encountered clients who wanted to avoid all or part of a
project because of safeguard policies” (46). If the results seen in Table 2.7 are simply a
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restatement of these observed tendencies, then they do not speak to the usefulness of
prior consultation in preventing deforestation so much as its impact on sending risky
projects to DFIs with looser safeguards – surely not the intention of safeguard designers.
Figure 2.9 shows the distribution of initial tree cover levels among projects with
and without prior consultation requirements. Projects with prior consultation safeguards
do appear to be more heavily concentrated in areas with zero or very low tree cover. (The
bi-modal distribution shown here is not unexpected, as the region is characterized by
dense tropical forest and open desert).
Figure 2.9: Distribution of initial tree cover levels among projects with and without
prior consultation safeguards (kernel density)
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8.7%
8.8%
8.7%

.8

St. Dev., ITC
31.1pp
36.1pp
32.2pp

1

% with zero ITC
40.0%
42.1%
40.5%

Based on Figure 2.9, it does appear to be the case that DFIs with stricter
safeguards are likely to choose less risky projects. However, this tendency alone does not
explain all of the difference seen in Table 2.7. A Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, shown
in Table 2.8, can more explicitly differentiate the importance of prior consultation
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safeguards in Model 4. The results show that almost all of the observed difference in
performance between projects with and without prior consultation requirements is due to
the coefficients, rather than the endowments. In other words, the difference is related to
how well projects with prior consultation safeguards performed given the initial
characteristics of the project, and not those characteristics themselves.
Table 2.8: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the observed differences in Model 4
(Table 2.7)
Absolute Difference

Share of total

Endowments

-0.002

4.0%

Coefficients

-0.059

105.8%

Interaction

0.005

-9.8%

Total difference in observed means

0.056

100.0%

2.5.2 Country and Type
Table 2.9 shows the result of including country and project type variables, both
individually and together. Even without including an explicit country control, the model
implicitly includes differences in national tree cover changes (in that the dependent
variable’s calculation includes national tree cover in 2000 near projects and elsewhere,
nationally). However, it is worth exploring whether the differences in the national
institutions that oversee project implementation have their own impact. This is especially
true given that, in the cases of Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, prior consultation
requirements were enacted by regimes that had come to power with the support of
indigenous and environmentalist groups, as mentioned above, and might be expected to
have important institution-specific mechanisms for improved performance under prior
consultation-requiring regimes.
It is also worthwhile to seek out any differences among project type, given the
extensive literature linking certain types of infrastructure projects (especially paved roads
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and dams with reservoirs) to deforestation in the Amazon basin, as mentioned above.
When differentiating by type, this model divides projects into seven categories: biofuel,
dams (divided into those with and without reservoirs), fossil fuel power plants, ports,
roads, and unconventional renewable energy (including solar and wind farms).
Table 2.9 shows the results of including country and project type controls into the
basic model. Every variation fails an F-test for over-specification when compared to
Model 4 in Table 2.7. Thus, even though Model 7 shows a significant result for Ecuador,
this result should be disregarded, as an extraneous artifact of over-specification. The lack
of significant differences among project type is a particularly striking given the existing
literature linking certain types of infrastructure projects (especially paved roads and
larger dams) with deforestation.
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Table 2.9: Regression results with country and type variables, using site-specific
radii: association with net tree cover change

Prior Consultation
Controls:
Prior local D pop.
Year
Zero Initial TC
Country:
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Type:
Dam: R.o.R.
Dam: w/ res.
Fossil fuel power
Port
Road
Unconv. R.E.
Intercept
R2
F-statistics:

Country (Model 7)
CoefSt.
ficient
Error
0.039
0.029
0.135
-0.001
0.118***

1.358
0.004
0.027

0.029
0.085*
0.003

0.035
0.040
0.030

2.730

7.126
0.2616

Type (Model 8)
CoefSt.
ficient
Error
0.050
0.029
0.440
-0.002
0.105***

0.088
0.007
0.034
0.004
0.026
0.073
3.261

1.422
0.004
0.025

0.105
0.106
0.116
0.108
0.102
0.117
7.644
0.2612

Both (Model 9)
CoefSt. Error
ficient
0.044
0.033
-0.033
-0.002
0.125***

1.469
0.004
0.029

0.042
0.078
0.011

0.039
0.057
0.034

0.058
0.002
0.005
-0.003
0.036
0.046
4.590

0.110
0.107
0.121
0.112
0.105
0.121
8.082
0.2840

This model
F (7,76) = 3.85**
F (10,73) = 2.58**
F (13,70) = 2.14*
Compared to Model 4
F (3, 76) = 1.77
F (6, 73) = 0.84
F (9, 70) = 0.80
Compared to Model 7
F (6, 70) = 0.36
Compared to Model 8
F (3,70) = 0.74
Note: N = 84. * indicates P£0.05; ** indicates P£0.01; *** indicates P£0.001. R.o.R. indicates “run of the
river” dams, without reservoirs.

Finally, even if institutional differences between countries are not significant,
differences in the institutional will and capacity across countries – and DFIs – may be
relevant. Table 2.10 shows the results of including considerations for the environmental
performance of the institutions related to each project, measured as the Environmental
Performance Index for each project’s international DFI and nation.16 As Table 2.10
shows, however, EPI scores do not help explain variations in tree cover. Not only are

16

The methodology for calculating country and international DFI EPI scores for each project is discussed
in Appendix B.2.
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their impacts insignificant, but F-tests show that these models have less explanatory
power than Model 4, which excludes EPI scores.
Table 2.10: Regression results with EPI scores for countries and international DFIs
at site-specific radii: association with net tree cover change

Prior Consultation
Controls:
Prior local D pop.
Year
Zero Initial TC
EPI:
Borrower
DFI
Intercept
R2
F-statistics:

Country (Model 10)
CoefSt. Error
ficient
0.046
0.030

Type (Model 11)
CoefSt. Error
ficient
0.053
0.027

0.581
-0.002
0.094***

1.369
0.006
0.024

0.366
0.001
0.094***

0.002

0.003

4.472

11.264
0.2143

-0.102
-2.114

1.404
0.004
0.024

0.197
7.018
0.2127

Both (Model 12)
CoefSt.
ficient
Error
0.041
0.031
0.374
-0.002
0.097***
0.002
-0.137
4.837

1.407
0.006
0.025

0.003
0.202
11.316
0.2190

This model
4.26**
4.22**
3.60**
Compared to Model 4
0.41
0.25
0.43
Compared to Model 10
0.46
Compared to Model 11
0.62
Note: N = 84. * indicates P£0.05; ** indicates P£0.01; *** indicates P£0.001. The methodology for
calculating environmental performance index (EPI) scores is discussed in Appendix B.1.

2.5.3 The Role of International DFIs
Beyond the enactment of prior consultation provisions, the implementation of
these requirements is a crucial element in project impacts. This is an intrinsically
institutional topic. This section explores the role of international DFIs by examining the
comparative performance of the different DFIs, the importance of international DFIs
prior consultation requirements compared to national prior consultation standards, and
the importance of DFI involvement with the prior consultation process.
Table 2.11 shows the results of comparing DFIs to each other within Model 4.
The DFIs shown in Table 2.11 are not mutually exclusive. Since projects are often cofinanced (and some road segments are financed under multiple different loans from
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different DFIs operating separately), this is a test of the participation of particular DFIs
in particular projects.
Table 2.11: Regression results, disaggregated by DFI: association with net tree cover
change
Simple (Model 13)
Coefficient
St. Error
0.051
0.035

With Countries (Model 14)
Coefficient
St. Error
0.032
0.045

Prior Consultation
DFI:
IBRD
-0.024
0.043
IFC
-0.064
0.039
IADB
-0.056
0.041
IIC
0.050
0.053
CAF
-0.055
0.039
BNDES
0.041
0.080
CDB
0.013
0.073
CHEXIM
0.005
0.084
Controls:
Prior Local Population Growth
0.630
1.485
Approval Year
0.001
0.005
Zero initial Tree Cover
0.110***
0.026
Country:
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Intercept
-2.135
9.449
Model:
R2
0.3036
F-statistics:
This model
F (12, 71) = 2.58**
Compared to Model 4
F (8, 71) = 0.53
Compared to Model 13
Note: N = 84. * indicates P£0.05; ** indicates P£0.01; *** indicates P£0.001.

-0.012
-0.068
-0.048
0.039
-0.053
0.003
-0.012
-0.017

0.051
0.042
0.044
0.055
0.039
0.089
0.079
0.090

0.329
0.001
0.126***
0.036
0.060
0.005
-1.565

1.516
0.005
0.029
0.040
0.050
0.034
10.780

0.3211
F (15, 68) = 2.14*
F (11,68) = 0.54
F (3, 68) = 0.58

None of the DFIs significantly out-perform any other and including them yields
an F-statistic that indicates over-specification when compared to Model 4. This is a useful
result because it indicates that the difference shown above is due to policy, rather than
other institutional aspects of the DFIs that have adopted them (mostly northern-based
MDBs).
Another relevant question is the importance of whether the DFI or the national
government provides the prior consultation protection. After all, as established above, in
many cases the DFIs here established their ESS only after civil society groups in affected
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countries complained of not being taken into account by the relevant authorities in their
national governments. With this in mind, it is worthwhile to disaggregate Model 4 by the
type of institution that requires prior consultation: the DFI, the host country, or both.
Table 2.12 shows the results of this analysis. It also includes country controls,
because of the institutional nature of the question asked in this section: Given an active or
passive DFI, do any countries perform better than others? While prior consultation
continues to show significant results, neither DFI leadership nor any particular country
makes a significant difference.
Table 2.12: Regression results, disaggregated by source of prior consultation
requirement: country, DFI, or both: association with net tree cover change
Simple (Model 15)
Coefficient
St. Error
Safeguards:
Country-only P.C.
DFI-only P.C.
Both
Controls:
Prior local population growth
Approval year
Zero initial tree cover
Country:
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Intercept

0.085*
0.028
0.076*
0.065
-0.004
0.097***

7.611

With Countries (Model 16)
Coefficient
St. Error

0.036
0.032
0.034

0.097*
0.019
0.150*

0.048
0.031
0.060

1.415
0.004
0.024

-0.960
-0.009
0.102***

8.946

-0.056
0.070
0.022
17.346

Model:
R2
0.2355
F-statistics:
This model
F (6,77) = 3.95**
Compared to Model 15
Note: N = 84. * indicates P£0.05; ** indicates P£0.01; *** indicates P£0.001.

1.443
0.005
0.028
0.054
0.040
0.033
10.701

0.3040
F (9,74) = 3.59***
F (3, 74) = 2.46

However, as above, before drawing conclusions from Table 2.12, it is important
to disaggregate the role of site selection from the role of policy. As Figure 2.10 shows,
projects with country prior consultation protections but without DFI prior consultation
protections are much likelier than other projects to be located in areas with low initial tree
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cover. The mean initial tree cover level for these projects is 21.1 percent, compared to
other groups with means between 27.0 percent and 31.6 percent.
Figure 2.10: Tree cover in 2000 at infrastructure project sites, by prior consultation
protection type
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Since the type of prior consultation enforcement is a categorical variable, to test
the importance of ITC as an interaction variable, a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is not
useful in this case. Thus, to eliminate the interference of differences in site selection,
Table 2.13 limits Models 12 and 13 to those observations with non-zero initial tree cover,
yielding Models 17 and 18. Of the resulting two models, only Model 18 (including
country controls) has a significant F-statistic (and also shows that adding country controls
significantly helps explain the variation in tree cover change). Model 18 shows that the
lack of significant impact of DFI prior consultation requirements seen in Table 2.12 is a
mere artifact caused by the “zero initial tree cover” variable. It also shows that projects in
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countries with national prior consultation requirements are expected to have 30.4 percent
better tree cover change around infrastructure projects, relative to the rest of the country,
than projects with no prior consultation protections. In cases with no national prior
consultation policy, a project’s related relative tree cover change can still improve by
10.6 percent from the associated DFI’s prior consultation policy. This rate rises to 32.4
percent if country and the DFI both have prior consultation policies.
Table 2.13: Regression results, disaggregated by source of prior consultation
requirement, where initial tree cover >0: association with net tree cover change
Simple (Model 17)
Coefficient
St. Error
Safeguards:
Country P.C.
DFI P.C.
Both
Controls:
Prior local population growth
Approval year
Country:
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Intercept

0.122*
0.063
0.129*

With Countries (Model 18)
Coefficient
St. Error

0.060
0.053
0.056

-0.430
-0.004

7.178

0.304**
0.106*
0.424***

0.096
0.051
0.116

2.018
0.007

-2.890
-0.021*

1.978
0.008

14.657

-0.144
0.080
0.169*
41.749*

0.092
0.061
0.064
16.623

Model:
R2
0.2484
F-statistics:
This model
F (5,43) = 1.390
Compared to Model 17
Note: N = 49. * indicates P£0.05; ** indicates P£0.01; *** indicates P£0.001.

0.3593
F (8, 40) = 2.87*
F (3, 40) = 7.29***

Table 2.14 tests the difference in strength of the associations shown in Table 2.13.
The only non-significant difference is between country-only prior consultation
requirements and double-source prior consultation requirements. In other words, while
the introduction of a prior consultation requirement into a context that previously did not
have one is significant, regardless of the source of this new safeguard, an additional DFI
requirement – in a context where the host government already requires prior consultation
– is useful mostly in that it prevents future projects from losing all prior consultation
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protections if the host country drops its protection. In this way, DFI and country systems
act in a form of productive redundancy. They serve as insurance policies that even if
partner institutions back out of their commitments, the vulnerable populations affected by
infrastructure projects will still have a place at the planning table.
Table 2.14: F-tests for significance of differences in coefficients shown in Table 2.10
No P.C. Requirement
Country-only P.C. Req.
Bank-only P.C. Req.
Note: All F-tests here are F (1,41).

Source of Prior Consultation Requirements
Country only
DFI only
Country and DFI
9.96**
4.21*
13.41***
5.42*
3.11
8.98**

Based on the results of Model 18, DFI safeguards appear to act as a form of
productive redundancy, or insurance against the possibility of countries rolling back their
protections. As row 1 shows, country and bank safeguards are associated with significant
improvements in outcomes compared to no safeguards at all. As row 2 shows, bank
safeguards are not associated with significant improvements in addition to country
safeguards but serve as an insurance policy against countries rescinding their protections.
Finally, as row 3 shows, country safeguards are associated with significant improvements
in addition to bank safeguards. These results suggest that in countries outside of this
region, which may not have similar legal protections, bank safeguards may fill the void
left by national governments in the protection of their most vulnerable communities.
2.6. Discussion
This chapter shows that within a limited scope of analysis, prior consultation
protections can have significant impact on deforestation related to infrastructure projects,
while the existence of development bank grievance mechanisms do not. The sections
below discuss these findings in more detail, extrapolate them to relevant policy
discussions and lays out a research agenda for continuing this work.
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2.6.1 Discussion of Findings
This analysis shows a significant relationship between reduced tree cover loss
during international DFI-financed infrastructure projects and prior consultation
safeguards, while it finds no such relationship for DFI grievance mechanisms. These
results may seem surprising, but likely simply reflect the difference in purpose and design
of the different safeguards. By definition, prior consultation safeguards slow down
project planning until the environmental and social risks posed by land use change to
vulnerable ethnic minority groups have been discussed thoroughly. Grievance
mechanisms, in contrast, are akin to other mediation or arbitration processes in that they
are post-hoc tools to halt or mitigate social or environmental damage that has already
occurred or compensate populations that have suffered from that damage. Stakeholders
may seek relief through grievance mechanisms for many different kinds of damages,
ranging from the type of environmental impacts studied here to unrelated impacts such as
labor disputes, gender or racial disparities in the distribution of project costs and benefits,
or inadequate progress on promised social compensation measures. Seen from this
perspective, then, grievance mechanisms may have significant but diffuse impacts across
many different aspects of project implications. For this reason, section 2.6.3 below
suggests that future work seek out possible impacts of grievance mechanisms on social
conflict surrounding projects, regardless of the type of perceived harm triggering such
conflict.
Another possible explanation for the significant relationship shown here between
prior consultation safeguards and reduced tree cover loss may be some institutional
characteristics not captured here. For example, DFIs and national governments may be
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more committed to project oversight in general after instituting safeguard reform, because
of the pressure from civil society that brought about those safeguards. However, the lack
of a significant result for grievance mechanisms makes this explanation unlikely. Similar
groundswells of civil society activity spurred both of these reforms, in rather rapid
succession, and yet only one shows a significant relationship with tree cover change. It is
more likely that the results shown here are attributable to the reforms themselves.
2.6.2 Policy Implications
Prior consultation is a relatively new protection in the countries studied here, but
unfortunately it is already under attack. Ballón and Molina (2017) document a significant
rollback in national prior consultation protections since the end of the commodities supercycle in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, as governments have prioritized expanding
extractive production quickly given falling prices.
Moreover, even before the end of the super-cycle, indigenous communities in
these countries have not always been ensured adequate inclusion in prior consultation
processes. Sanborn, Hurtado, and Ramírez (2016) and Pozo (2012) explain that prior
consultation has been unevenly applied in Perú, because the military government of the
1970s relabeled many indigenous communities as “peasant” communities as a rhetorical
push to unite disadvantaged groups around their shared economic challenges. These
“peasant” groups – many of whom speak Quechua and self-identify as such – have not
always been included in the prior consultation processes. Ray and Chimienti (2017) show
that, while that Ecuador’s 2010 Citizen Participation Law allows the government to push
forward with planned development projects in the face of majority opposition by local
communities only if higher environmental and employment standards are applied, the
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prior consultation process has not always kept a record of what percent of consulted
communities expressed favor or opposition, in order to determine which set of standards
applies.
Maintaining political will for the importance of prior consultation safeguards at
the national level, then, is a crucial area for policy implications of this work. As
Humphrey (2015) states, without the buy-in of governments seeking financing for
particular projects, they may avoid the “hassle factor” associated with international DFI
ESS and simply take their proposals to banks with fewer requirements. Humphrey and
Machaelowa (2013) show that MDB lending patterns in Latin America suggest that
borrower demand is an important factor in which projects receive financing from which
banks, so a situation with bank ESS but without country commitment to the process could
simply result in countries taking their proposals to less-strict banks.
Another possibility is for countries to self-finance projects that have failed
international DFI ESS processes. For example, in the example cited above in which
Bolivia shifted funding away from a project that had been challenged through the IADB’s
MICI grievance mechanism, the Bolivian government has continued to pursue that
project with its own financing. In 2014, the Bolivia Highway Administration
(Administradora Boliviana de Carreteras, or ABC) announced that it would self-finance
the bridge, having signed a contract with Chinese contractor Sinopec (Escóbar 2014).
Given the ability of governments to “shop around” for the most favorable terms
for an infrastructure loan, or even self-finance these projects, it is crucial for international
DFIs to maintain their commitments to prior consultation processes. After all, most bank
safeguards were enacted absent national standards. Furthermore, banks that have not yet
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adopted prior consultation protections, such as BNDES and the CDB when they operate
outside of their home countries, would be well-served to consider incorporating them.
Though these requirements are often conceptualized as social safeguards, this chapter
shows that they have significant environmental impacts.
2.6.3 Areas for Future Research
This chapter serves as an initial inquiry into the environmental impacts of ESS
reform. Nevertheless, it is important to interpret the results discussed above with a
healthy level of caution, as the total number of projects carried out in the region and time
period studied here is modest. Thus, ample space remains for this work to be continued
with added breadth and/or depth.
This line of research would be well served to be continued with greater breadth of
types of infrastructure projects and types of impacts. Other forms of hard infrastructure
undoubtedly contribute to countries’ fixed capital stock, including telecommunications,
water, sewer, and power distribution networks as well as oil and gas pipelines.
Unfortunately, however, it is not possible to trace the precise locations of every kilometer
of new power or phone lines, or water and sewer pipes, with the same level of detail as
for roads, dams, and power plants. However, they might reasonably be expected to have a
significant relationship with tree cover change, by opening up rural areas for new housing
developments and encourage in-migration from other areas, in addition to their stated
purposes of increasing local living standards and competitiveness. Furthermore, as Finer
and Jenkins (2012) find, some of the deforestation associated with dams happens not at
the site of dams, but along the associated power transmission lines. If precise information
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about the locations of these networks and pipelines becomes publicly available in the
future, it would be worthwhile to repeat the present analysis with these inclusions.
The breadth of the current study could be constructively expanded by including
infrastructure-related tree cover change in other tropical deforestation hotspots such as
Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as Brazil. Doing so may allow the model’s degrees
of freedom to expand sufficiently to support other contributing factors, such as the prices
of the major commodity exports supported by new roads and ports (metals, hydrocarbons,
soy, coffee, and palm oil) as well as exchange rate fluctuations (which might make
primary commodity exports more profitable). Many researchers have found significant
relationships between prices, exchange rates, and tropical deforestation (see for example
Fearnside, 2008; Gaveau et al, 2009; Richards et al, 2012; and Swensen et al, 2011); such
an expansion of the current model would allow for the incorporation of these impacts.
Furthermore, it may allow for the incorporation of variables identifying differences in the
social, economic and governance contexts, which are quite similar among the Andean
nations studied here but differ broadly across regions.
As crucial as deforestation may be as a social and environmental impact, it is
hardly the only one worth considering. For example, the line of research cited here would
be well served to incorporate environmentally-motivated social conflict. This is
especially true given the lack of significant relationship between international DFIs’
formal grievance mechanisms and deforestation shown here. It may be that the impact of
those mechanisms is better observed in preventing and mediating conflict rather than
preventing deforestation. CLACSO (2000-2012) list every social conflict and protest in
Latin America from 2000-2012. It would be highly useful for future research to pair
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individual protests listed in the CLACSO database with development projects to measure
projects’ tendency to inspire conflict, and the ability of national governments and
development banks to resolve these conflicts.
This essay examined projects before and after the enactment of free, prior,
informed consultation protections for indigenous communities. A further wave of reform
enshrined free, prior, informed consent of those communities for projects overseen by the
World Bank and IFC. As of year-end 2015, only two infrastructure projects in the
Andean region have incorporated this protection: the Callao Muelle Norte port in Lima,
Peru, and the Puerto Bahía port outside Cartagena, Colombia. Thus, FPI-consent could
not be incorporated into the present analysis. Nonetheless, if consultation mechanisms are
associated with better environmental outcomes, as the results of this essay suggest,
further benefits may be visible once sufficient projects have been approved with FPI
consent have been completed. It would be helpful to revisit the present analysis after this
practice has garnered a larger presence in the global infrastructure finance portfolio, to
test the potential environmental impact of this ambitious social protection.
There is also a significant need for future research of a deeper nature than this
study can provide. This analysis is limited to the de jure presence or absence of social
and environmental protections. It does not take into account the institutional factors
behind how – or how well – these are implemented. For example, it would be worthwhile
to examine whether banks without their own prior consultation requirements have better
environmental performance when they co-finance projects with banks that do have such
requirements. Unfortunately, this dataset is not large enough to explore these questions,
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as it contains just 10 projects that were co-financed by banks that do and do not oversee
prior consultation processes, and just 16 projects with co-financing of any type.
Finally, having a prior consultation requirement is not equivalent to ensuring
adequate community participation. For example, the universe size examined here does
not allow for the consideration of prior consent (FPIC), only consultation. A broader
array of projects may expand the dataset sufficiently to probe the impacts of full FPIC
rather that simple prior consultation shown here. Furthermore, institutions vary in their
ability and willingness to ensure that communities have truly been incorporated into prior
consultation processes. Laurance et al (2015) note that the level of compliance with ESS
can vary greatly. They urge, inter alia, a deeper commitment to stakeholder engagement,
one that goes beyond what they call “superficial box-ticking” (260) to true stakeholder
engagement. Unfortunately, while the differences in outcomes according to the
thoroughness of safeguard application continues to be an important area for future
exploration, it is well beyond the capabilities of the present work.
2.7. Conclusion
Though prior consultation is often conceptualized as a social safeguard, this
chapter shows that it can have significant environmental impact. Furthermore, its impact
is consistently positive, regardless of whether it is imposed by the national governments
that propose the projects or by the transnational development banks that finance them. In
this sense, governments and banks form a system of productive redundancy, in which
each serves as an insurance policy for affected communities, so that if one institution
rolls back its protections, prior consultation guarantees will be preserved. The same
impact was not observed for the other major new ESS reform, the establishment of
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formal avenues for communities to pursue grievances against projects in case of
damages. However, as these are traditionally considered social safeguards, it is likely that
this protection’s impact is felt in other avenues, such as the prevention of social conflict
or reputational damage.
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CHAPTER 3
3. CROSSROADS IN THE EQUATORIAL FORESTS:
CHINESE INVESTMENT AND “HIGH-ROAD EXTRACTIVISM” IN
ECUADOR
3.1 Introduction
Ecuador has been a predominantly oil-driven economy since crude was first
discovered in the country in the middle of the 20th century. However, instead of bringing
the country wealth and development, Ecuador’s time as an oil producer has been plagued
by economic instability, social conflicts, and environmental degradation. During the most
recent oil boom, Ecuador enacted a sweeping series of reforms aimed at mitigating the
worst aspects of the sector while ensuring that its benefits were shared broadly.
Simultaneously, it sought to limit its dependence on oil (through supporting nontraditional sectors and through seeking payment for environmental services) while
welcoming non-traditional oil investment partners, from China. Thus, Ecuador represents
an “all of the above” strategy to repairing the damage from commodity dependence, by
seeking to incorporate new industries, a new regulatory environment for oil production,
and new partners within a short period of time.
In this regard, Ecuador presents a uniquely apt test case for whether Latin
American commodity-dependent nations can successfully pursue an alternative to the
problems of commodity dependence, in what this essay will refer to as a “high-road
extractivism” model. Elements of this model include shifting away from reliance on the
United States and U.S.-based investors in favor of new partners, ones whose identity as
Chinese state-owned enterprises gives them incentives to cultivate long-term
relationships with the government of Ecuador rather than seeking short-term profits. The
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model also involves establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework – encompassing
new environmental protections, labor rights, human rights guarantees, and taxation and
devolution schema to ensure that the revenue from oil production benefits impacted
communities.
The oil boom from 2003 to 201317 provided an opportunity to evaluate the
viability of this new rubric of investment governance. A new investment partner, a new
regulatory environment, and oil exploration in new geographic areas gave Ecuador the
opportunity to restart and redefine the terms of its reliance on oil investment. This essay
explores the extent to which this re-initiation of Ecuador’s oil economy with new partners
enabled it to re-establish its identity as an oil economy on its own terms and pursue
“high-road extractivism.”
This essay is structured as follows. The first section reviews the various ways in
which reliance on oil production and export has hampered Ecuador’s ability to pursue
sustained and sustainable economic development, through terms of trade volatility,
anemic employment opportunities, environmental damage, and the history of relative
impunity with which traditional (U.S.-based) oil firms have operated in Ecuador. The
second section explores Ecuador’s institutional attempts to change the paradigm that has
governed its relationship with foreign petroleum investors: working towards less
dependence on the oil sector, building a regulatory framework to govern investors’
environmental and social performance in Ecuador, and seeking out new investment
partners in China. The third section examines the extent to which these efforts have lived

17

For the purposes of the present analysis, the most recent global oil boom is defined as lasting between the
years of 2003 and 2013 based on world oil prices, which tripled in real terms and more than tripled in
nominal terms over that decade, as shown in Figure 3.3 below.
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up to their potential, by evaluating the social and environmental performance of Chinese
oil companies’ operations in Ecuador as well as the Ecuadorian state’s performance in
overseeing new oil operations. Finally, a discussion section brings together the results
from the previous sections, inquires into institutional explanations for the observed
outcomes, and draws lessons for other Latin American countries seeking to improve the
economic, social, and environmental sustainability of their extractive sectors.
3.2 Ecuador: Oil as an Impediment to Sustainable Development
Oil has been paramount in Ecuador’s economy since its discovery in the 1970s. It
quickly displaced bananas as the country’s most important export, as Figure 3.1 shows,
and has dominated exports ever since. At their highest level, in 2008, oil exports reached
61.7 percent of all Ecuadorian exports, and 18.7 percent of national GDP.
Figure 3.1: Ecuador exports as a share of GDP, by commodity
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Source: Author’s analysis based on COMTRADE (SITC Rev.1). Note: seafood includes fish and
crustaceans; petroleum includes crude petroleum and petroleum products.

The government of Ecuador has recognized that basing the economy on
petroleum is not sustainable environmentally, socially, or economically, and it has made

109

diversification a major long-term policy priority. The 2013 National Development Plan
states that “the existence of oil fields brings opportunities to generate income …
However, the socio-environmental impacts of this extraction are very high, such as
settling protected lands, deforestation, and the resulting habitat degradation, loss of
biodiversity, contamination of soils and water sources, and others” (SENPLADES 2013,
460-461, author’s translation).
Specifically, the dominance of the oil industry hampers Ecuador’s prospects for
sustainable economic development in four ways. First, the price of petroleum is highly
volatile globally, leading to volatile terms of trade and potentially dampening inbound
FDI. Second, it supports few jobs per $1 million in exports, either directly or indirectly,
so an oil boom does not necessarily benefit many Ecuadorians. Third, the oil reserves
themselves are located in some of the most sensitive territory in the country: the Amazon
rainforest, often under traditional indigenous territory. Finally, oil production in Ecuador
has traditionally been carried out by large multinational corporations that have operated
with lower social and environmental performance than they utilized elsewhere, and done
so with relative impunity given Ecuador’s relatively weak institutional capacity for
setting and enforcing environmental standards.
3.2.1 Terms of Trade Disadvantages
The tendency of raw materials prices to fall relative to other prices in the long
term has been the basis of much writing over the last half-century, since Raúl Prebisch
(1950) and Hans Singer (1949) famously posited that countries relying on commodity
exports would suffer a long-term decline in their terms of trade. Attempts to test the
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis include Cuddington (1992), Harvey et al (2010) and Arezki et
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al (2013), which all use long-term price indices to determine which commodities fit the
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. Cuddingon and Arezki et al find a significant negative
downward trend in the price of oil, while Harvey et al find no significant long-term oil
price trend. These results suggest that while no consensus exists as to whether oil
producing countries are bound inexorably to declining terms of trade, neither will oil help
these countries catch up to countries that export manufactured goods.
Ecuador is an interesting test case for terms of trade trends in oil-exporting
countries because it began exporting in the 1970s, so trade statistics are readily available
for its entire oil-exporting period as well as the decade beforehand. Ecuador’s oil export
sector took off in earnest in the early 1970s, rising from just 38.8 metric tons and 0.0
percent of GDP in 1970, to 9,276.1 metric tons and 7.3 percent of GDP in 1973. So, it is
particularly noteworthy that Ecuador’s export price index experienced a decline during
those years, as Figure 3.2 shows. Its export price index recovered with 1974’s global
petroleum price spike, but the nation had already lost ground relative to its import price
index. This gap has persisted in the decades since, and Ecuador’s terms of trade have
never recovered to their pre-oil levels. The latest data available (2014) show that
Ecuador’s terms of trade index is still 17.3 percent below its 1970 level.

111

Figure 3.2: Ecuador’s terms of trade, 1960 - 2014
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Source: Author’s analysis of Penn World Table 9.0 data (Feenstra, Inkaar, and Timmer, 2015).

Beyond the importance of the declining terms of trade, terms of trade volatility is
another important link between the importance of oil in Ecuador’s economy and its
middle-income trap. Blattman et al (2007) find in their study of long-term trends in terms
of trade and GDP growth in periphery countries that terms of trade volatility was a
significant determinant of economic growth, while terms of trade growth was not.
Figure 3.3 shows the average world price of oil since 1960 in two ways:
nominally and deflated by the world export price deflator. The volatility is clear from a
prima facie visual analysis. During the oil boom of 2003 to 2013, its price tripled in real
terms and more than tripled in nominal terms, but since its peak it has lost nearly all of
that ground.
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Figure 3.3: World oil prices, nominal and real, 1960-2015
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world exports. Source: author’s calculation using world average prices, as listed in the World Bank GEM
Commodities database, and Penn World Table 9.0 data (Feenstra, Inkaar, and Timmer, 2015).

Moreover, oil price volatility is extreme even among raw commodities. Table 3.1
shows the volatility (measured as coefficient of variation) in prices for 50 commodities
with publicly available world price data between 1960 and 2016. In each case, crude oil
stands out as particularly volatile, occupying second and third places (depending on its
origin) for nominal prices, and first and second places for real prices.18

18

The ranking of goods changes significantly depending on whether commodity prices are measured
in nominal or real terms. The difference is related to whether a particular commodity’s prices tend
to move with other prices or not, which determines to what extent price volatility is dampened
when deflated by the overall prices index.
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Table 3.1: Price volatility (coefficient of variation) for commodities, 1960-2016
A. Nominal Prices
Good
1. Phosphate
2. Crude oil, Dubai
3. Crude oil, world
4. Potassium chloride
5. Iron
6. Gold
7. Silver
8. Natural gas, US
9. Natural gas, Europe
10. Platinum
11. Nickel
12. TSP
13. Lead
14. Copper
15. Rubber
16. Urea
17. Tin

CV
1.08
1.07
1.03
1.01
1.00
0.98
0.95
0.94
0.89
0.87
0.86
0.84
0.83
0.81
0.75
0.74
0.68

Good
18. Zinc
19. Barley
20. Sugar, world
21. Oranges
22. Logs
23. Bananas
24. Meat, chicken
25. Timber
26. Coffee, Robusto
27. Sawnwood
28. Groundnut oil
29. Copra
30. Cocoa
31. Tea, Colombo
32. Coconut
33. Coffee, Arabica
34. Soybean meal

CV
0.67
0.64
0.63
0.62
0.60
0.59
0.57
0.56
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.54
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.51
0.51

Good
35. Soybean oil
36. Maize
37. Sorghum
38. Sugar, EU
39. Palm oil
40. Wheat
41. Rice
42. Soybeans
43. Aluminum
44. Meat, beef
45. Sugar, US
46. Tobacco
47. Tea, world
48. Cotton
49. Tea, Mombasa
50. Tea, Kokata

CV
0.50
0.49
0.49
0.48
0.47
0.47
0.46
0.46
0.46
0.45
0.43
0.40
0.39
0.38
0.36
0.34

B. Real Prices
Good
CV
Good
CV
Good
1. Crude oil, Dubai
0.79
18. Lead
0.45 35. Soybeans
2. Crude oil, world
0.77
19. Rice
0.44 36. Tobacco
3. Natural gas, US
0.76
20. Coconut
0.43 37. Sorghum
4. Sugar, world
0.70
21. Tin
0.43 38. Groundnut oil
5. Gold
0.66
22. Rubber
0.42 39. Wheat
6. Phosphate
0.66
23. Copra
0.42 40. Sugar, US
7. Silver
0.61
24. Coffee, Arabica
0.40 41. Meat, beef
8. Potassium chloride
0.60
25. Tea, Mombasa
0.38 42. Barley
9. Natural gas, Europe 0.58
26. Palm oil
0.37 43. Oranges
10. Coffee, Robusto
0.57
27. Zinc
0.37 44. Logs
11. Iron
0.56
28. Soybean oil
0.37 45. Bananas
12. TSP
0.52
29. Tea, Kokata
0.35 46. Aluminum
13. Urea
0.52
30. Soybean meal
0.34 47. Meat, chicken
14. Platinum
0.49
31. Tea, Colombo
0.34 48. Sugar, EU
15. Nickel
0.49
32. Cotton
0.34 49. Sawnwood
16. Cocoa
0.47
33. Tea, world
0.34 50. Timber
17. Copper
0.45
34. Maize
0.32
Source: Author’s analysis of World Bank GEM Commodities database data.

CV
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.29
0.29
0.28
0.26
0.25
0.24
0.21
0.20
0.19
0.18
0.17
0.16

Given the extreme uncertainty presented by the volatility of oil prices, and the
long-term decline in Ecuador’s terms of trade, it is no surprise that since 1970, per the
Penn World Table, Ecuador’s terms of trade volatility has been above average, ranking in
place 60 out of 156 countries for which terms of trade information is available. The fact
that it does not rank higher may be due to the fact that its exports are concentrated in
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three relatively-uncorrelated categories of bananas, seafood, and petroleum, as Figure 3.1
shows.
Blattman et al (2007) find a mechanism for the connection between slow longterm growth and terms of trade volatility: a significant, negative relationship between
terms of trade volatility and capital inflows, suggesting that price uncertainty dampens
foreign investment. These findings echo Eichengreen (2008) who argues that terms of
trade volatility brings exchange rate volatility to periphery countries: another investment
disincentive as well as a source of financial market instability. Aiyar et al. (2013) find
similar results, using a probit model to show that sudden stops in capital inflows are a
strong predictor of growth slowdowns that can lead to countries succumbing to the
middle-income trap.19 Domínguez and Caria (2016) point to these connections when they
cite Ecuador’s “imperfect structural transformation” away from raw commodities
dependence as a key element in Ecuador’s experience with the middle-income trap.
Given these connections between terms of trade shocks, capital inflow shocks,
and long-term growth slowdowns, it comes as no surprise that scholars such as Wade
(2016) and Paus (2012) recommend that commodity-reliant countries employ strategic
uses of industrial policy as a path out of the middle-income trap, following the examples
of those successful “latecomers” chronicled by Amsden (2001).
3.2.2 Employment, or the Lack Thereof
Petroleum is significantly less labor-intensive than other tradable sectors, so every
$1 million in extractive exports supports far fewer jobs than the same amount of

19

The phrase “middle-income trap” is here used to indicate scenarios in which countries fail to transition
from middle to high-income status because of lagging export competitiveness, following Griffith (2011).
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agricultural or manufacturing exports. Figure 3.4 compares the labor intensity of
Ecuador’s exports, by major sector. Based on the Central Bank’s three input-output tables
from the oil-boom decade (2007, 2010, and 2012), it shows the average direct and
indirect employment (in upstream industries) supported by each $1 million in exports
across these years. Petroleum stands out as supporting by far the least number of jobs per
$1 million of exports of any major sector shown here: less than one direct job and fewer
than 20 indirect jobs.
Figure 3.4: Labor intensity of Ecuadorian exports, 2007-2012, by major sector

Source: Author’s analysis based on BCE and UN COMTRADE data. Note: Direct jobs are within a given
sector, and indirect jobs are in upstream sectors.

The government recognized the difficulty that this employment differential
creates for the national job market in the 2009-2013 Plan Nacional. Since petroleum
creates so few jobs, employment has to come from other sectors, and the Plan states that,
“slow growth in non-petroleum exports shows the scarcity of options for the creation of
good jobs, which has contributed to the deterioration of standards of living, via
unemployment, underemployment, precarious employment, and falling real wages
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(SENPLADES 2009, 76, author’s translation).” It specifically calls for diversifying
national production away from oil, by developing local value chains in other sectors such
as renewable energy, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, vehicles, transportation, and others
(Ibid. 393).
3.2.3 Environmentally and Socially Sensitive Territory
A final important obstacle to sustainable oil production in Ecuador is the location
of most oil deposits, shown in Figure 3.5: in the Amazon rainforest, and often under
traditional indigenous land. The Ecuadorian Amazon is one of the world’s most
biodiverse areas (more on this below), but the oil boom brought intensified threats. From
2005 to 2010, Ecuador’s forest cover shrank by 1.9 percent per year, the fastest rate of
deforestation in South America and the 12th highest rate worldwide. This represents an
acceleration of its previous deforestation rates: 1.7 percent per year from 2000 to 2005
and just 1.5 percent per year from 1990 to 2000 (FAO, 2010). Not all of the deforestation
has been due exclusively to oil fields, but ecological research by Fearnside et Al. (2013)
and Lovejoy (2014) have concluded that the construction of access roads and railways for
these extraction projects are among the most important causes of deforestation. These
road and rail projects interrupt animal migration patterns and open the forest to human
settlement, large-scale agriculture, and logging.
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Figure 3.5: Sensitive territory and active oil blocks in Ecuador, 2003-2013
Biodiversity
Indigenous territory

Note: Very high biodiversity is defined as being within the highest 6.4 percent of all South American land.
Source: Compiled from Bass et Al. (2010), LandMark (no date), ARCH (2011-2013, 2017), Ministerio de
Hidrocarburos (2014), and MRNNR (2012).

While the environmental impacts of Amazonian oil production are well known,
the social impact on Amazonian communities is equally severe. According to the 2009
Plan Nacional, indigenous communities comprise a large share of the population in the
Amazonian provinces, including half of all children in those provinces (SENPLADES
2009, 143). Oil drilling threatens their access to their traditional hunting, fishing, and
gathering grounds (usually village-adjacent forests, which are not deeded to them and
therefore open to exploration). Moreover, contamination from oil spills can make these
traditional livelihoods unsafe, poisoning aquifers and downstream waterways. The
consequences can be dire even for the oil companies themselves, which have often faced
large-scale protests. The case study below explores these issues in more detail. As the
Plan Nacional states, “the growing problems from environmental degradation – the
accelerated loss of natural spaces, constant occupation of indigenous land, and the
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unequal distribution of the benefits of economic development – have been accompanied
by socio-environmental conflicts since the 1970s” (221).
3.2.4 Relative Impunity of Foreign Investors
Over the course of the most recent few business cycles, scholars have noted that
foreign investments have not necessarily contributed to long-term growth, domestic
investment, or human development in their host countries, particularly among developing
nations. This phenomenon is particularly acute among extractive industries in
ecologically and socially sensitive territory such as oil investment in Ecuador.
Rodrik (1998) shows no relationship between capital account liberalization in
developing countries and GDP growth or domestic investment. Mody and Murshid
(2005) examine capital flows into 60 developing countries over 20 years (from 1979 to
1999) and discover that over this time period, inflows were dominated by portfolio
investment or FDI “with characteristics of portfolio capital” – in other words, highlyliquid FDI that was not associated with appreciable domestic investment. They attribute
their findings to the incentives driving FDI: investors are seeking diversification in their
own portfolios, not responding to long-term unmet needs in host countries. These
findings are reinforced by later work showing that FDI responds strongly to changing
conditions in developed-economy markets. For example, Blanchard and Acalin (2016)
show that FDI inflows to emerging markets rise during times of low US interest rates.
These findings imply that FDI investors are motivated by the same incentives usually
associated with portfolio investment: an interest rate differential between source and
target markets. Rey (2015) finds that FDI inflows into LAC are positively correlated with
the VIX (an index of US financial-market volatility), while portfolio investment is
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negatively correlated with the VIX. She concludes that FDI should not be considered
separately from portfolio investment, but that together, these correlations form one cycle
of global capital flows, all “dancing to the same tune.” It is noteworthy that, while the
FDI-VIX correlations she finds are positive for every region of the world, they are
stronger by far in LAC (0.35) than for any other region (ranging from 0.06 in Western
Europe to 0.16 in Asia).
Given these well-documented incentives of foreign investors in developing
countries to portfolio diversification and shorter-term returns over long-term production
goals, the environmental and social performance of foreign oil investors in Ecuador
should not be surprising. Rather than investing in long-term prospects, they have
frequently endangered their ability to continue operating in the country through poorlymanaged environmental and social risk management. Most notable are the records of the
largest two US-based multinational corporations (MNCs) to develop Ecuadorian oil:
Texaco (now part of Chevron) and Occidental Petroleum.
As mentioned above, Ecuador’s oil production and exports began in the early
1970s, while Ecuador was ruled under dictatorship. Thus, the conditions under which
early oil development occurred were not subject to democratic approval or popular
oversight. The 1978 Hydrocarbons Law set the terms for exploration contracts, but
significant flexibility remained in the details of specific contracts into the 1980s.
Institutional capacity for oversight and enforcement of environmental, human rights, and
labor law continued to be developed through the most recent oil boom, as ministries
worked to catch up to a booming sector. As a result, a few large multinational
corporations (MNCs) were able to operate with relative impunity.
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Two landmark examples stand out as examples of the extent of impunity,
involving the US-based oil MNCs Occidental Petroleum and Texaco (now owned by
Chevron). Texaco’s case has become known as “trial of the century” (ECLAC, 2004;
Valdivia, 2007) for the world-famous lawsuit brought by multiple groups seeking
economic redress for environmental damages. Though less infamous, Occidental’s case
involves specifying in its contract with the Ecuadorian state a lower level of
environmental standards than would be applicable elsewhere.
Texaco was the first oil MNC to discover, produce, and export Ecuadorian oil. It
began operations in Ecuador in 1967, and produced oil there from 1972 to 1990, when it
handed operations over to Ecuadorian SOE PetroEcuador, leaving the country completely
in 1992. In 1993, a group of 30,000 indigenous filed a class-action suit against Texaco in
New York, claiming it had failed to sufficiently remediate the environmental damage it
had caused before leaving (“Indians sue Texaco,” 1993).
Texaco was a minority partner in its Ecuadorian operations, but responsible for
technology and oversaw daily operations with “complete autonomy,” according to Gen.
René Vargas Pazzos, PetroEcuador executive during the 1970s (Schemo, 1998). Texaco
spent $40 million on remediation before leaving Ecuador, including cleaning out 268
waste lagoons. However, 400 similar lagoons remain were not covered under its
remediation agreement with the government before leaving. Paola Carrera,
Undersecretary for Environmental Quality at the Ministry of Environment, claimed in an
interview that the exclusion of these waste pools from the initial agreement was due to
Texaco’s intentionally hiding them by covering them with organic debris so they would
not be found during the audit that established the agreement’s parameters (Carrera, 2013).
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According to Carrera, these pools continue to be discovered by PetroEcuador during its
operations in the same oil blocks. For its part, Texaco maintains that the Ecuadorian
government bears responsibility for its institutional inability to set and enforce its own
environmental standards, as the alleged actions were not explicitly prohibited by
Ecuadorian law before 1990 (Brooke, 1994; Schemo, 1998). Nonetheless, Texaco’s
environmental performance in Ecuador was well below that permitted in its home
country. A 1994 independent water analysis by the Center for Economic and Social
Rights found polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon concentrations between 28 and 2,793
nanograms per liter in drinking and bathing water of affected communities; at that time
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency had set a maximum recommended level of
zero (Brooke, 1994). Though the case was originally brought by private citizens,
President Rafael Correa weighed in publicly, stating that “the techniques they used here
were against the law in their own country. They weren’t interested in the human beings
who lived in the Amazon region.” (North, 2015).
Though the lawsuit was filed in 1993, it played out throughout the most recent oil
boom. The plaintiffs filed their original lawsuit in New York because of perceived
corruption and bias toward oil MNCs in the Ecuadorian judiciary as well as the lack of a
class-action lawsuit option (“Agunida v. Texaco,” 2002). Nonetheless, Texaco (by then
having merged with Chevron to become ChevronTexaco, later known simply as
“Chevron”) successfully argued for a dismissal of the case, claiming that Ecuador was the
appropriate venue given the fact that several cases against MNCs were currently ongoing
in the Ecuadorian courts (Strong, 2013). Though the plaintiffs appealed, the U.S. Second
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ruling in 2002, moving the forum to Ecuador
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(Whytock, 2013). The plaintiffs filed suit in Ecuador in 2003, and a judgement was
finally declared in 2011, ordering Chevron to pay $18 billion toward remediation.
However, that award would not be forthcoming. Chevron sought relief via arbitration,
through the US-Ecuador bilateral investment treaty, and won a 2012 injunction against
enforcement of the Ecuador judgment (Erichson, 2013). Chevron then sued the original
plaintiffs, alleging racketeering and corruption during the Ecuadorian phase of the trial,
and in 2014 a US district court ruled that corruption did in fact take place (Krauss, 2014).
Finally, in 2017, citing the 2014 ruling, a U.S. federal court voided the award, freeing
Chevron from the obligation (Hurley, 2017).
Chevron’s gamble on the Ecuadorian courts, which all parties seem to agree was
nearly universally plagued with corruption in the 1990s and 2000s, may seem brilliant in
retrospect. Any judgment not in their favor could effectively be voided, as occurred.
However, the case also had the effect of souring the relationship between the Ecuadorian
government and US-based oil MNCs. In a 2011 speech, President Correa noted this by
stating that Ecuadorian shipments of oil to the U.S. had traditionally been sent with
“nothing in return” – signifying that this relationship yielded only private gains for oil
MNCs instead of spurring development in Ecuador (“Presidente Destaca”, 2011). As is
discussed in detail below, this interpretation of the Ecuador-U.S. relationship created an
incentive for Ecuador to seek out new investment partners to develop its oil reserves
under new conditions.
The other major US-based oil MNC active in Ecuador, Occidental Petroleum,
signed its exploration and development contract with Ecuador in 1985 and renewed it in
1999. This contract established that its environmental performance would be based on the
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methods with widespread use across the global petroleum industry, rather than accepted
best practices (Kimerling, 2001). This omission importantly opened the door to effective
self-regulation in Occidental’s operations. In subsequent years Occidental was associated
with several instances of social and environmental misconduct, which gained national
notoriety.
Occidental’s main conflict during its operations was with the Secoya people, who
resisted acculturate and settlement well into the 20th century. Occidental signed an
agreement with the Secoya people in 1996, permitting unspecified oil activities in
exchange for a package of compensation including outboard motors, water pumps, metal
tanks, cooking stoves, and medicines (Fontaine, 2003). The agreement led to several
months of intra-Secoya conflict, after which Occidental agreed to a series of renegotiations, which led to a final agreement in 1998 in which Occidental agreed to
postpone operations until the completion of a social and environmental impact
assessment. Notably, the latter of these requirements (an environmental impact
assessment) had long since been required for its operations in the United States and
particularly so in its home state of California, under the National Environmental Policy
Act California Environmental Quality Act, both enacted in 1969 (Ibid; CNRA, 2016;
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011).
Occidental also came into conflict with members of the Kichwa people a few
years later regarding careless environmental management.20 In 2000, Occidental built a
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The Kichwa people and language are also commonly referred to as “Quichua,” following traditional
Spanish grammar rules. However, the Kichwa people have chosen the name “Kichwa” for themselves
(Limerick, 2014). Furthermore, their choice has been recognized by Ecuador’s Ministry of Education,
which offers officially-sanctioned “Kichwa” language courses (Ministerio de Educación, 2016). For those
reasons, this essay refers to them as such.
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road into the buffer zone on the periphery of the Yasuní National Park, spurring a legal
complaint in which local Kichwa community members noted 12 examples of
Occidental’s alleged contamination of their territory but did not receive compensation or
recognition of wrongdoing (Finer and Huta, 2005). While Occidental successfully argued
that the road was not illegal because it was not an access road but an in-road between
production facilities (and therefore unlikely to contribute to deforestation), subsequent
GIS-based research has revealed that these facilities are also within the buffer zone,
leading to a total of 60 hectares of illegal deforestation (Pappalardo and De Marchi,
2009).
3.3 Ecuador’s Moves Toward a New Paradigm
During the most recent oil boom, and especially during the tenure of President
Rafael Correa (who took office in early 2007), Ecuador took several important steps to
move away from the model of oil-based economic development that left the country
vulnerable to misconduct by U.S.-based oil MNCs. Three possible approaches exist to
challenge that scenario: moving away from reliance on oil, reforming the regulatory
environment in which oil-based FDI occurs, and moving away from reliance on the US as
a partner for investment. Ecuador has pursued all three paths, with varying degrees of
success. Each is discussed in turn below.
3.3.1 Challenging the Reliance on Oil
Ecuador’s attempts at diversification away from reliance on petroleum exports
have proven difficult for several reasons. First, Ecuador’s use of the US dollar as its
national currency means that in practice, its currency faces long-term pressure to become
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overvalued.21 As a result, Ecuador’s exports are more expensive on the world market than
they would otherwise be, which hurts the competitiveness of non-petroleum industries.
The Plan Nacional (66) calls the deterioration of competitiveness the “Achilles Heel” of
dollarization. Compounding this problem is the “Dutch disease” phenomenon: nations
that primarily export raw commodities tend to have overvalued currencies because their
exports’ prices are determined by the world market rather than by manufacturing costs.
The resulting fall in competitiveness in other industries makes it difficult to escape
dependence on those commodities, creating a vicious cycle. As the 2009 Plan Nacional
states, in an economy “based on … extraction and export of commodities, long-term
economic growth revolves around external market dynamics, especially the price of oil,
and neglects internal demand … to the detriment of national production and
employment” (SENPLADES 2009, 331, author’s translation). Any effort Ecuador makes
to spur investment in non-petroleum sectors is at a significant disadvantage because of
this context.
Divestment efforts to date have included microloans with preferential terms, with
special attention to the non-petroleum sectors that the government committed to boosting
in the Development Plan. From 2007 to 2012, the National Development Bank and the
Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion issued more than a million small loans
totaling nearly $3 billion (about 0.4 percent of GDP) to individuals and small businesses.
(BNF 2010-2012). Furthermore, the infrastructure and education projects mentioned
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Dollarization raises the risk of an overvalued exchange rate because the value of the US dollar is based
on the US economy, not the Ecuadorian economy. Currency overvaluation, in turn, can undermine the
manufacturing sector and prevent growth or recovery, as had occurred in the US in the 2000s and Japan
in the 1990s. For more on dollarization and an overvalued exchange rate, see Vernengo and Bradbury
2011. For more on the effects of an overvalued currency on the manufacturing sector, see Palley 2003.
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above provide support for businesses of all sectors and can help support competitiveness
in non-traditional industries. As beneficial as these programs may prove to be in the long
term, however, they have not proven to be a sufficiently large push to reduce Ecuador’s
dependence on oil.
Another obstacle to diversification is that oil represents a significant portion of
public revenue. As Figure 3.6 shows, petroleum revenues have represented
approximately 30 percent of central government revenues for most of the past decade.
One major attempt to diminish this public dependence on oil revenue, the so-called
Yasuní ITT initiative, is discussed in detail below.
Figure 3.6: Ecuador central government revenue by source, 2003-2013 (percent of
GDP)
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Shortly after his election, President Correa sought to mitigate the Ecuadorian
state’s dependence on oil production for revenue through the 2007 Yasuní IshpingoTambococha-Tiputini (ITT) Initiative. The ITT oil deposits lie within or bordering
Ecuador’s Yasuní National Park, one of the most biodiverse sections of the entire
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Amazon basin but could add substantially to Ecuador’s oil horizon. Estimates of the size
of the deposit range from 412 to 960 million barrels of oil, or between 10 and 25 percent
of the nation’s proven oil reserves (Álvarez, 2013; Bass et al., 2010; Finer, Moncel, and
Jenkins, 2010; OEM, 2018; OPEC, 2017). Correa launched the Yasuní ITT Initiative at
the 2007 United Nations General Assembly, offering to commit to never extracting that
oil if world governments pledged to donate $360 million per year for 10 years to Ecuador
in exchange. This value represents approximately half of the opportunity cost of leaving
that oil block untouched, and about 60 percent of Correa’s estimate of the cost of
purchasing carbon credits for the amount of carbon emissions that oil would be expected
to produce (Larrea and Warnars, 2009; Rival, 2010).
In proposing the Yasuní ITT initiative, Correa initiated a shift in the international
dialog surrounding payments for environmental services, in which wealthy, industrialized
countries that benefit from mitigating climate change pay developing countries to
preserve the forests that are key to climate change mitigation (Rival, 2010). Whereas
traditionally payments for environmental services had been initiated by multilateral
groups, this proposal set a precedent for the way in which it was unilaterally proposed by
a developing country (Pellegrini et al, 2014). Whether despite – or because– of this new
approach to negotiations, less than 10 percent of the proposed amount was raised, and the
proposal was scrapped (Pellegrini et al, 2014). In 2016, Ecuadorian oil SOE
Petroamazonas began production in the ITT oil block (ARCH, 2017).
3.3.2 Enhancing the Regulatory Environment of Oil FDI
In addition to Ecuador’s – admittedly limited – movements away from oil reliance
discussed above, it has also enacted several important reforms to mitigate damages from
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particularly unstainable aspects of the sector. These reforms fall into three categories:
those aimed at taming the impacts of volatile prices, those aimed at broadening social
inclusion, and those aimed at limiting environmental degradation. In doing so, Ecuador
adopted what may be termed a “high-road extractivism” approach to an oil-driven
economy, aimed at limiting the social and environmental cost of oil production while
ensuring that its benefits were shared as broadly as possible.
3.3.2.1 Regulation and Terms of Trade
As Figure 3.2 shows, above, periods of rising oil prices have not necessarily
improved Ecuador’s terms of trade. In part, this is due to the fact that oil prices impact
both exports and imports for Ecuador. A lack of local refining capacity means that
Ecuador exports crude oil and imports refined petroleum products such as gasoline, as
Figure 3.7 shows. This imbalance grew during the most recent oil boom, partially due to
fuel subsidies, discussed below.
Figure 3.7: Ecuador’s net petroleum exports by type, 1994-2013 (percent of GDP)
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2009-2013

The Ecuadorian government uses some of its petroleum revenue to subsidize the
consumer price of gasoline, diesel, and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), to cushion the
impacts of price volatility on final consumers. In general, oil revenue and subsidy
expenditure should rise and fall with the price of petroleum, acting as an automatic
stabilizer of sorts. Table 3.2 shows the relationship between public oil revenue and public
fuel subsidies between 2006 and 2013. The relationship varies, with subsidies
representing between 4.8 and 30.2 percent of public oil revenues, because some public oil
revenue is constant, as is explained below.
Table 3.2: Public oil revenue and fuel subsidies, Ecuador
Public Fuel Subsidies
Public Oil Revenue
(share of GDP)
Share of GDP
Share of Public Oil Revenue
2003
16.6%
0.8%
4.8%
2004
16.7%
2.1%
12.3%
2005
16.8%
4.1%
24.2%
2006
16.8%
4.4%
26.4%
2007
18.4%
4.9%
26.6%
2008
25.9%
5.9%
22.9%
2009
17.9%
3.3%
18.4%
2010
19.1%
4.4%
22.9%
2011
22.1%
6.6%
29.8%
2012
21.7%
6.6%
30.2%
2013
22.2%
5.9%
26.8%
Source: Author’s calculations using Espinoza Echeverría and Guayanlema (2017) and BCE (2014) data.

Nonetheless, these subsidy programs shielded Ecuadorian consumers and
producers from the fuel price impacts of the oil boom. Espinoza Echeverría and
Guayanlema (2017) find that most of the benefit of the LPG subsidy benefitted the
residential sector, while most of the gasoline and diesel subsidies unsurprisingly
benefitted the transport sector.
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Table 3.3: Ecuadorian fuel subsidies by type, 2003-2013
LPG
Gasoline
Diesel
Consumer Import Discount Consumer Import Discount Consumer Import Discount
Price
Price
(%)
Price
Price
(%)
Price
Price
(%)
2003
$0.09
$0.36
75%
$1.12
$1.03
-9%
$0.78
$0.91
14%
2004
$0.09
$0.44
80%
$1.15
$1.31
12%
$0.79
$1.27
38%
2005
$0.09
$0.53
83%
$1.15
$1.78
35%
$0.79
$1.90
58%
2006
$0.09
$0.65
86%
$1.15
$2.02
43%
$0.79
$2.00
61%
2007
$0.09
$0.74
88%
$1.15
$2.19
47%
$0.79
$2.18
64%
2008
$0.09
$0.82
89%
$1.15
$2.59
56%
$0.79
$3.00
74%
2009
$0.09
$0.51
82%
$1.15
$1.91
40%
$0.79
$1.87
58%
2010
$0.09
$0.63
86%
$1.15
$2.34
51%
$0.79
$2.30
66%
2011
$0.09
$0.90
90%
$1.15
$3.14
63%
$0.79
$3.11
75%
2012
$0.09
$0.81
89%
$1.15
$3.43
66%
$0.79
$3.24
76%
2013
$0.09
$0.78
88%
$1.15
$3.14
63%
$0.79
$3.14
75%
Source: Author’s calculation using Espinoza Echeverría and Guayanlema (2017).

Additional reforms during the oil boom were oriented toward increasing the
government share of private oil company profits, helping to support the subsidies
discussed above as well as the social spending discussed below. Ecuador’s 1978
Hydrocarbons Law, dating to the years of military rule, established that private oil
companies could explore marginal oil fields (those where production yielded less than
one percent of the national total, and where production costs were expected to be higher
than average) through contracts with the Ecuadorian state (or – after their creation –
Ecuadorian state-owned oil companies), setting a fixed price per barrel of oil produced
(Dirección Nacional, 1978). These fixed prices were to be set above market rates, in such
a way as to incentivize exploration in fields not already in production, taking into account
“greater investment levels to be realized in the area, guaranteed minimum production
levels, and production costs” (Ibid., Art. 2, author’s translation). In 2006, as oil prices
began to rise rapidly, President Alfredo Palacio signed an executive decree instituting a
99 percent windfall tax on the difference between the market prices and the world prices
anticipated in these exploration contracts (Palacio, 2006).
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The 2010 Hydrocarbons Reform Law extended this arrangement to all oil
producers in the country other than Ecuadorian state-owned firms, in order to establish
that “the entirety of production within the contracted area of is property of the State”
(Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador 2010b, Art. 8, author’s translation). However, it also
determined that these producers should pay at least a 25 percent tax on their income from
these sales, and at least a 44 percent tax on resulting profits (Ibid, Introduction). Taken
together, the reforms of 2006 and 2010 gave the Ecuadorian state greater control over,
predictability regarding, and revenue from its oil resources in the face of volatile
international oil prices.
Another approach to addressing the terms of trade problem is downstream
refinery investment. The Refinería del Pacífico (RdP), a major refinery project near the
Port of Manta, promises to be the largest infrastructure undertaking in the country’s
history. This project was originally planned as a joint project between Ecuador and
Venezuela’s oil SOE PDVSA. It gained new life after PDVSA sold 30 percent of its stake
to China’s CNPC in 2013 (DeaLogic, n.d.) but has languished again since oil prices fell
in 2014. The extent to which domestic refining can be increased enough to offset volatile
costs of imported refined petroleum products remains to be seen and may have to wait
until prices rise again.
3.3.2.2 Environmental Protection
Ecuador’s most ambitious environmental protection reform has come through its
2008 Constitution, which recognizes the rights of Mother Nature (Pachamama) herself
(Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador 2008, Arts. 71-74). Article 71 explicitly states that “any
person, community, town, or nationality” may bring legal action on behalf of Pacha
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Mama against anyone suspected of causing environmental damage. In practice, this
reform has the potential to be a powerful tool for environmental justice, in that plaintiffs
do not need to prove that their private property was damaged by the alleged action.
Furthermore, Article 72 states that Pacha Mama has a right to restoration: judges may
order not only an end to specific acts of environmental damage but also remedial action.
The application of this reform has been tentative, but not without successes. For
example, the first judgement using the rights of nature did not occur until March 2011. In
that case, Wheeler v Director de la Procuraduría General del Estado de Loja, the judge
ordered a municipality to pay for restoration of a river whose path it had modified for a
new road (Daly, 2012). The next year, a group brought a case against the municipal
government of Santa Cruz, Galápagos, regarding a road construction project that had not
gone through the necessary environmental licensing or public information processes
(Bedón Garzón, 2017). Finally, in a more recent case, communities along the Chiquita
River brought a complaint against the Los Andes and Palesma palm oil plantations citing
waste dumping into the river. After six years of trial, the 2017 judgement ordered the
plantations to plant an eight-meter bamboo periphery buffer between their plantations and
the river, to help mitigate runoff (Hazelwood et al 2017). This case presents a possible
precedent for oil companies, in that it is the first time the rights of nature have been
applied to productive investors rather than local government agencies.
3.3.2.3 Social Inclusion
During the oil boom, Ecuador enacted reforms aimed at broadening the social
inclusion of the economic benefits of oil, while limiting its social cost. These reforms
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centered on three thematic areas: labor protections, public revenue devolution to local
governments, and prior consultation for indigenous communities.
Labor conflict is common in Latin America’s extractive sectors, as chronicled by
the “Observatorio Social de América Latina” (OSAL) initiative (CLACSO, 2000-2012).
A common trigger of this conflict is the use of subcontracted workers to evade national
labor standards.22 President Correa addressed this issue in 2008, with an executive decree
limiting subcontracting to “complementary” work such as janitorial and security services
(Correa, 2008). Furthermore, Ecuadorian employers must now engage in profit-sharing
with all employees, including subcontractors. Employers must distribute 10 percent of
their profits to all workers equally and must distribute an additional 5 percent of profits to
workers based on their family dependents (Congreso Nacional, 2005).
Another touchstone for labor conflict in the Latin American extractive sector is
the use of foreign workers by foreign investors. Ecuador has largely eliminated this
trigger, through the Hydrocarbon Reform of 2010, which requires petroleum companies
to hire Ecuadorian staff for 95 percent of unskilled positions and 90 percent of
administrative and technical positions (Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador, 2010b). This
standard can be quite powerful in preventing social conflict: Zach Chen, commercial
attaché for the Chinese embassy in Quito, expressed in an interview that meeting these
staffing goals has been key to the ability of Chinese oil companies to prevent labor
disputes in their oil fields (Chen, 2014).

22

For more on the role of subcontracting in extractive industry labor disputes in Latin America, see Cook
and Bazler (2013); González Serna, Canstañeda Gómez, and Giraldo Ramírez (2017); Marshall (2000);
Pont Vidal (2008); and Sanborn and Chonn Ching (2017).
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These labor reforms may have helped ensure that oil workers shared in the
benefits of oil boom, but as mentioned above, the oil sector employs very few workers
per million dollars of output. To broaden the group who benefit from oil profits beyond
those employed by the sector, Ecuador has enacted a series of devolution reforms. These
policies channel public oil revenue to sub-national governments, the Gobiernos
Autónomos Decentralizados (GADs) at the province, canton, and parish level. In 2003,
the Fondo para el Ecodesarrollo was established, which dedicates $1 per barrel of oil for
public investment in the Amazon, under the care of the GADs and the Instituto para el
Ecodesarrollo Regional Amazónico (ECORAE). From 2003 to 2013, Ecuador produced
nearly 2 billion barrels of oil, distributing the resulting funds to municipalities (58
percent), provinces (28 percent), parishes (5 percent), and the ECORAE (9 percent). The
funds come with restrictions: at least 80 percent must be spent on conservation and
transportation projects, and the rest is to be spent on public investments approved by the
Secretary of Hydrocarbons. More recently, the 2010 oil reform law re-directed 12
percent of oil profits (which previously went to the central government) to the GADs in
the regions where the drilling takes place, to be used for health and education projects as
approved by the appropriate ministry (Asemblea Nacional del Ecuador 2010b, Art. 94).
Finally, Ecuador has recognized the right of indigenous communities to have a
meaningful voice in oil exploration plans in their traditional territory. In 1998, it ratified
the International Labour Organisation Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples,
enshrining the rights of indigenous communities to determine the extent to which they
assimilate into the society around them, and requiring their consultation for any projects
that might impact their lands, water, air, or livelihoods (ILO 1989).
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In 2010, Ecuador enacted national legislation to formalize the commitments it
made through ILO 169. The 2010 Citizen Participation Law requires the government to
seek communities’ free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) before allowing new oil and
mining projects. Projects are not completely prohibited if they do not win local
community approval, but in the case of majority opposition, they must meet higher
environmental and social standards, including offering employment to affected
indigenous communities (Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador, 2010a).
These reforms are perhaps the most ambitious in scope of all “high-road
extractivism” efforts listed here. Rather than simply setting the terms of oil investment,
they have the potential to determine if projects will happen at all. If adequately enforced,
they could successfully address the intrinsic conflict of oil reserves below indigenous
territory and ensure that exploration and drilling happen in a way that respects indigenous
communities and shares benefits with them. However, these FPIC protections are also the
most difficult to enforce, because they pit contradictory governmental incentives and
even ministries against one another, setting up a conflict between the goals of expediting
FDI and protecting human rights. Section four of the chapter looks more closely at this
institutional conflict and its results in the application of FPIC protections.
3.3.3 Shifting away from Reliance on the US
Since his election in 2007, President Rafael Correa has facilitated a new type of
international engagement for the country. Throughout its history, Ecuador’s economy
was primarily dependent on the United States as a source of exports and imports, as well
as a primary destination for migrants whose remittances made up a significant portion of
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GDP. After assuming power, Correa employed several strategies to buffer Ecuador
against the volatility of depending on one external partner.
Part of Correa’s strategy has involved moving his country away from the US and
toward China. The Ecuadorian leader explained the shift in a speech delivered in 2011
about the two nations’ complementarity: "In 2006, 75 percent of our oil was going to the
United States …this year, 50 percent has been committed to China, in exchange for
billions of dollars" (“Presidente Destaca,” 2011, author’s translation). In another
example, when Correa’s government refused to extend the controversial lease of an
Ecuadorian Air Force base to the US military, it turned to China as a potential partner for
re-developing the site. The government made attempts, which ultimately proved
unsuccessful, to lease the base to a Chinese firm and to revamp a series of projects related
to a transport corridor from Manta to the Brazilian Amazonas capital city of Manaus,
with Chinese financing (Narins, 2012). In light of that project’s ultimate infeasibility,
Chinese interests became more focused in the oil and mining sectors (Bonilla, 2010). In
addition, Correa’s administration signed three major treaties with China, including:
•

Treaty on Economic and Technological Cooperation, including a RMB 20 million
(about $3 million USD) in Chinese aid to Ecuador,

•

Executive Plan of Cooperation in Science and Technology;

•

Cooperation document on oil trade finance between PRC Export-Import Bank and
PetroEcuador.
(For more on these deals, see ADB, IADB, and ADBI, 2012).
In many ways, China has become an invaluable economic ally for Ecuador.

Ecuador’s burgeoning relationship with China has guaranteed it access to financial
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markets, an investor willing to develop oil fields in a way that benefits Ecuador as well as
China, and a partner in generating value added through the Pacífico Refinery.
3.3.3.1 China as a Source of Investment
China’s involvement in Ecuador’s oil sector has been largely led by investment,
which in turn has driven exports to China. From 2013 to 2013, China was Ecuador’s
most important source of oil investment, for both greenfield investment (GFDI) and
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals, as Table 3.4 shows.
Table 3.4: Sources of oil FDI into Ecuador by type, 2003-2013
Source
Greenfield FDI
Country
Millions of USD
Share of Total
Brazil
316.0
26.4%
Canada
337.0
28.1%
China
408.2
34.1%
Other
136.4
11.4%
Total
1,197.6
100.0%
Source: Author’s analysis of DeaLogic and FDIMarkets data.

Mergers and Acquisitions
Millions of USD
Share of Total
141.7
1,905.0
222.0
2,268.7

6.2%
84.0%
9.8%
100.0%

China’s importance in the Ecuadorian oil sector came through three large deals
carried out by China’s largest two state-owned oil companies: the China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Sinopec. First, in 2003, CNPC acquired the oil
interests of Block 11 on the northwestern border with Colombia. While Block 11 has
never been shown to have significant oil reserves, it is conveniently located on Ecuador’s
main oil pipeline, the Sistema Oleoducto Transecuatoriano (Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline
System, or SOTE) so any oil discovered there would be easily transported (Chi, 2016).
China’s biggest investment came in 2006 with the $1.42 billion purchase of the
Ecuadorian oil interests of the Canadian firm Encana, including production in three
important oil blocks (14, 17, and 62) For this deal, CNPC and Sinopec created two joint
ventures. CNPC owns a majority stake (55 percent) in each of the resulting firms, Andes
Petroleum and PetroOriental, with Sinopec owning the remaining 45 percent in each.
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Andes Petroleum took over production in the northwestern block 62 while PetroOriental
took operations in blocks 14 and 17, further south. Separately, PetroOriental bought a 36
percent stake in Ecuador’s second major pipeline, the Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados
(Heavy Crude Pipeline, or OCP) for $385 million.
These oil investments are a major part of China’s overall relationship with
Ecuador. As Table 3.5 shows, the oil and gas sector comprised 41.5 percent of all
Chinese GFDI and 98.4 percent of Chinese M&As in Ecuador between 2003 and 2013.
This heavy concentration stands in stark contrast to other FDI in Ecuador, in which the
oil and gas sector represented only 11.8 percent and 9.2 percent, respectively.
Table 3.5: Greenfield and M&A FDI deals in Ecuador, by source and sector, 20032013
Greenfield FDI
From China
($0.9b)
USD
Pct.
Agr., food, bev.

Mergers & Acquisitions

From R.o.W.
($6.4b)
USD
Pct.

0.0

0.0%

102.5

1.5%

408.2

41.5%

789.4

11.8%

Mining & metals

0.0

0.0%

1,668.5

Other mfg.

4.3

0.4%

Communications

20.0

Transp., storage

Oil & gas

Other services
TOTAL

From China
($1.9b)
USD
Pct.
0.0

From R.o.W.
($2.4b)
USD
Pct.

0.0%

823.2

34.2%

1,905.0

98.4%

222.0

9.2%

25.0%

28.0

1.4%

160.1

6.6%

1,392.6

20.9%

0.0

0.0%

14.0

0.6%

2.0%

732.9

11.0%

0.0

0.0%

833.0

34.6%

523.0

53.2%

233.7

3.5%

0.0

0.0%

210.0

8.7%

28.3

2.9%

1,758.1

26.3%

2.8

0.1%

146.6

6.1%

983.8

100.0%

6,677.7

100.0%

100.0%

2,408.8

100.0%

1,935.8

Source: Author’s analysis of FDIMarkets and DeaLogic data.

Notably, both Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental are SOEs and as such, may be
expected to display different firm behavior than that of private MNCs. For example,
DeWenter and Malesta (2001) shows that SOEs tend to operate longer-term decision
horizons than private firms: that over longer-term time spans of 20 years, the commonlyaccepted SOE efficiency disadvantage disappears. This is particularly so in China, where
policy strategies are famously determined along the lines of five-year plans. Putterman
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and Dong (2000) show that firm behavior by Chinese SOEs has largely followed Chinese
government policy prescriptions as they shifted from employment creation (during the
Mao period) to efficiency (in the reform period). Thereafter, beginning with in 1999,
China’s “going global” policy promoted outbound FDI in strategic sectors and through
strategic partnerships. Buckley et al. (2007) and Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet (2012)
examine the determinants of Chinese SOEs’ outbound FDI and conclude that, inter alia,
institutional factors are crucial in explaining investment decisions. For example, Chinese
SOEs established their presence overseas through an investment pattern that was
simultaneously more geographically diversified (including countries seen as politically
risky) and more sectorally concentrated (especially in raw materials) than would be
predicted by traditional theories of MNC behavior. Given these differing incentives for
Chinese SOEs and western MNC investors in Ecuador, it should not be surprising that
these new partners have acted in such a way as to protect their long-term relationship
with Ecuador to a greater than the MNCs profiled above.
China has differed from most other sources of oil investment in two important
ways. First, Chinese petroleum companies have remained in the country through major
oil reforms in 2007 and 2010, each of which increased the state’s revenue from oil
production. After each round of reforms several other foreign oil companies left the
country, including the Brazilian firm Petrobras, the French firm Perenco, and City
Oriente, which was registered in Panama. Zach Chen, Chinese Embassy Attaché,
attributes the perseverance of the Chinese oil companies to a long-term company
strategy. The Chinese oil companies in Ecuador, CNPC and Sinopec, are both stateowned enterprises (SOEs), and serve the Chinese government’s diplomatic as well as
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financial interests. Diplomatic relationships take time to build and must be stronger than
short-term profit motives (Chen, 2014).
China has also distinguished itself as an investment partner in its willingness to
support downstream industry linkages in Ecuador, rather than solely producing crude
petroleum and refining it once it reaches China. As mentioned above, it is now a major
partner in the Refinería del Pacífico project, though progress is stalled as of this writing.
The RdP project also shows the limits of China’s goodwill in meeting
The RdP project is an example of how Chinese investment and finance are
interwoven in Ecuador. When CNPC joined as an RdP partner, it brought access to
Chinese financing, as well as an expectation of the use of Chinese labor and equipment.
This situation stands in contrast with Chinese oil production in Ecuador, which has used
local labor following the Ecuadorian labor laws mentioned above. Thus, although
China’s SOEs have shown themselves capable and willing to take steps to prevent labor
disputes when required by law, they have not done so on their own accord.
3.3.3.2 China as an Export Market
Following the oil investments described above, China’s importance as a market
for Ecuadorian oil also rose dramatically. The importance of China for Ecuadorian oil is
understated in trade data because of the use of refineries in intermediary countries. Public
records do not exist connecting oil fields in originating countries, through refineries in
second countries, and on to consumers in third countries. Even so, as Figure 3.8 shows,
China’s market share of Ecuadorian exports rose quickly Ecuador throughout the oil
boom period, especially in the extractive sector. China’s share of petroleum exports
themselves peaked at 10.9 percent of Ecuador’s exports in 2009.
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Figure 3.8: China’s share of Ecuadorian exports, by major sector
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Source: Author’s analysis using COMTRADE data.

Concerning imports, Figure 3.9 shows that by the end of the oil boom, the United
States still led in shipments to Ecuador—25.2 percent in 2013—but China was the second
most important source of imports, at 16.7 percent. Notably, China’s gains in the
Ecuadorian market do not appear to have taken market share from the US but from
smaller, regional partners like Colombia. China unseated Colombia as the second most
important import source, while the US continued to grow in importance.
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Figure 3.9: Ecuador’s imports (top three sources, in percent of total)
United States

China

Colombia

Source: Author’s analysis of UN COMTRADE data.

3.3.3.3 China as a Source of Bilateral Credit
In 2008, after reviewing all of its international debt, Ecuador declared two bonds
(totalling $3.2 billion) to be odious debt and defaulted on them. These bonds were singled
out due to irregularities in their initial contracts: one was issued under a dictatorship and
the other lacked a competitive bidding process in selecting investment-banking (CAIC,
2008). Both situations make embezzlement, corruption, and capital flight more likely,
although the funds themselves were not definitively shown to have been misappropriated.
These two bonds amounted to less than half of all national public debt, and only
about five percent of GDP (IMF, 2014). Nonetheless, the default was unusual in the
government did not cite financial hardship but irregularities in the debt itself. Many
international analysts and pundits vociferously opposed it, and Ecuador subsequently lost
access to its traditional Western creditors (Porzecanski, 2010). This signalled an
opportunity for Chinese leaders and investors to diversify their economy’s sources of
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primary commodities through the oil loans described below. Ecuador, for its part, became
unable to seek funding elsewhere; China’s innovative arrangements involving pre-sales
of crude oil provided much-needed immediate funds.
Figure 3.10: Total Ecuadorian debt compared with debt to China (percent of GDP)

Source: Author’s analysis of Banco Central del Ecuador (n.d.) and IMF World Economic Outlook (April
2014) data.

As Figure 3.10 shows, China became Ecuador’s most important creditor during
these years (accounting for over one-third of the nation’s total public debt in 2013). From
2009 to 2013, external public debt to China rose by five percent of GDP while total
external public debt rose by just two percent of GDP: in other words, non-China debt fell
during these years. Gallagher, et al. (2012) explain that China’s loans to Ecuador (about
8.5 percent of Chinese loans to LAC from 2005-2011), constitute a disproportional
amount based on Ecuador’s population (2.5 percent of LAC in 2011) and GDP (1.3
percent of the region). Moreover, during this time China signed a series of oil deals with
Ecuador in which it prepaid for oil shipments, giving both parties predictability in their
trade and providing Ecuador with frontloaded income (Benítez, 2014).
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Most loans from China during this time were directed at the extraction and
hydroelectric sectors, as Table 3.6 shows. Ecuador did not receive significant Chinese
finance until 2009, after the default. Thereafter, China backed both the Coca-Codo
Sinclair Dam and the Sopladora Dam. These loans boosted the government’s goal of
producing some 93.5 percent of its energy needs by the year 2021 via hydroelectric
sources (see MEER, n.d., 1, 2 for more), but they also carried conditions to use Chinese
equipment and contractors.23 The loans for the hydroelectric projects have the added
benefit of providing power for the large-scale Chinese extraction projects in Ecuador.
Table 3.6: Oil-boom era loans to Ecuador from Chinese banks and SOEs
Year

Lender

Oil-Backed:
2010
China Dev’t Bank
2011
China Dev’t. Bank
2011
PetroChina
Other:
2010
China Ex-Im Bank
2010
China Ex-Im Bank
2012
China Dev’t Bank
2013
China Ex-Im Bank
2013
China Ex-Im Bank
TOTAL
Source: IAD (2017).

Partner

Quantity
(USD, b)

Purpose

PetroEcuador
Government
PetroEcuador

1.0
2.0
1.0

80% discretionary, 20% oil-backed
70% discretionary, 30% oil-backed
Pre-payment for oil purchase

Government
Government
Government
Government
Government

1.7
0.6
2.0
0.3
0.1
8.7

Coca-Codo Sinclair hydroelectric dam
Sopladora hydroelectric dam
Financed budget deficit
Minas-San Francisco hydro. dam
Highway construction

Loans for oil involve Chinese public banks, Ecuador, and Chinese oil companies.
When the loans are made by the China Development Bank (CDB), they proceeded as
follows: the CDB lent money to Ecuador, which in return shipped a prescribed amount of
oil to Chinese oil companies. Those companies paid for the oil at current market rates;
part of the payment goes to CDB account to repay the loan, and the remained was paid to
Ecuador (Gallagher et Al, 2012; Sanderson and Forsyth, 2013).

23

As Gallagher, Irwin, and Koleski (2012) have highlighted, most of China’s loans to Ecuador do not
have policy conditions but do have conditions on using the funds to purchase Chinese goods or services.
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These loans’ complicated structure makes them difficult to compare to traditional
loans. However, given Ecuador’s constraints during those years, they posed an important
advantage in terms of risk management for both China and Ecuador. Most international
loans depend on the borrower’s continued access to the lender’s currency for repayment,
which can trigger complications for countries with “soft” currencies or with no currency
of their own at all, like Ecuador. In this case China and Ecuador avoid that risk, but face
two others: the possibility of an unexpected drop in the world oil price (meaning that
more barrels of oil would be required to repay the loan) or an unexpected drop in
Ecuador’s oil output. The short-term nature of these arrangements (usually fewer than 8
years, according to Bräutigam and Gallagher, 2014) reduced the risk of a drop in world
oil prices (Ecuavisa, 2013). However, the oil boom itself ended after 2013, so it is likely
that the 2010 and 2011 arrangements remained on Ecuador’s books much longer than
originally anticipated.
It is worth noting that seven years after Ecuador’s default, it re-entered
international bond markets. By early 2017, international sovereign bonds had regained
their position as Ecuador’s most important source of credit. By year-end 2017, Ecuador’s
total external debt stood at 31.6 percent of GDP: 13.5 percent in sovereign bonds, 8.4
percent in multilaterals loans, 7.5 percent in bilateral loans from China, and 2.2 percent in
other bilateral debt (Ministry of Finance, 2018). Thus, China effectively saw Ecuador
through a particularly difficult seven-year period without access to traditional credit
market. For a small country such as Ecuador, with very few exports (most of which are
subject to wide global price swings) and no currency of its own, such assistance was
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economically crucial to avoid a ballooning debt crisis, and laid the groundwork for a
strategic relationship between the two countries.
3.4. Case Study: CNPC and Sinopec in Ecuador
The 2003-2013 oil boom provided a test case for Ecuador’s new model of “highroad extractivism,” in two phases: in 2006 and again in 2014, in the form of the arrival
and expansion of Chinese oil investment. This new relationship gave Ecuador the
opportunity to begin an investment partnership under its new framework. The Chinese oil
companies mentioned above, Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental, entered Ecuador in
2006 by acquiring concessions in oil blocks already in operations. In 2014, Andes
Petroleum acquired two new oil blocks, in a section of the Amazon where oil production
has never occurred before.
This section examines the social and environmental performance of Andes
Petroleum and PetroOriental in their existing blocks, as well as the regulatory
performance of the Ecuadorian state in overseeing the expansion of their operations into
new territory. It seeks to determine the extent to which this new diplomatic and
investment relationship allowed Ecuador to pursue its new approach to “high-road
extractivism.” It addresses this question through a mixed-methods approach, utilizing
both quantitative and qualitative measures. Section 3.1 quantitatively evaluates the
performance of these Chinese oil companies in their existing concessions on the basis of
social conflict (measured as the relative frequency and intensity of protests and other
mobilizations targeting Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental operations compared to other
oil companies in Ecuador) and environmental degradation (measured as relative
deforestation in Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental oil blocks compared to other oil
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blocks in Ecuador). Section 3.2 qualitatively evaluates Ecuador’s oversight of Andes
Petroleum’s new concession, the first such expansion under the new regulatory regime
for oil investors. This latter evaluation uses legal research and targeted, semi-structured
interviews with key stakeholders and experts. Those sources, and their titles at the time of
the new concession awards, are as follows:
•

Kléver Ruiz, President of the Sápara Nation of Ecuador

•

Gloria Ushigua, President of the Association of Sápara Women

•

Paola Carrera, Undersecretary for Environmental Quality, Ecuadorian Ministry of
Environment

•

Anonymous representative of the Ecuadorian Ministry for the Coordination of
Strategic Sectors

•

Kelly Swing, director of the Boston University Tiputini Biodiversity Station within
the Yasuní National Park and renown expert on the Ecuadorian Amazon
In addition to these five sources, the evaluation draws from a site visit to an oil

well operated first by Texaco and now by PetroEcuador, and an accompanying
presentation by Michel Boufadel, director of the Center for Natural Resources
Development and Protection at the New Jersey Institute of Technology and expert on oil
spill effects and remediation.
3.4.1 CNPC and Sinopec in Ecuador, to Date
As mentioned above, in 2006 CNPC and Sinopec jointly purchased the Ecuadorian
assets of Canadian firm Encana, including three oil concessions in the country’s eastern
provinces of Sucumbios, Pastaza and Orellana, as well as a lead stake (32.3 percent) of
the Heavy Crude Pipeline (Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados, or OCP) project, which was
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built in 2003 and operated by several MNCs, including Repsol, Perenco and Petrobras.
CNPC and Sinopec formed Andes Petroleum to manage Block 62 in the northeastern
province of Sucumbíos, and PetroOriental to manage Blocks 14 and 17 in Orellana and
Pastaza, further to the south. Figure 3.11 shows the locations of these blocks, along with
Andes Petroleum’s new concessions (discussed below).
Figure 3.11: Map of Ecuador, with Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental holdings
shaded

Note: Solid blocks indicate Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental concessions. Mottling indicates parks, and
hash marks indicate the off-limits “zona intangible.” Source: Adapted from Secretaría de Hidrocarburos.

Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental are among the most important oil producers
in Ecuador. At the peak of the oil boom, they collectively accounted for about one-fourth
of Ecuador’s total production (ARCH, 2011-2013). Andes alone produced more than any
other external producer except for Repsol and including PetroOriental raises the level
even higher than Repsol’s.
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3.4.1.1 Social Performance of Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental
When CNPC and Sinopec arrived in Ecuador, they inherited Encana’s uneasy
relationship with community leaders and environmentalists, mostly centered on the OCP
pipeline. According to the Paola Carrera, Undersecretary for Environmental Quality at
the Ministry of Environment, the government does not keep databases of firms’
environmental or labor performance, but it is possible to track the instances that were
severe enough to spur public protest, though CLACSO’s “Observatorio Social de
América Latina” (OSAL) initiative (Carrera, 2014; CLACSO, 2000-2012). OSAL has
documented at least four large-scale strikes during the OCP’s construction in 2001 and
2002: two by environmental activists seeking to block the project entirely, one by
workers seeking better pay, and one by community leaders seeking local jobs and a fund
for projects to offset the economic effects of expected environmental damages.
Since arriving in Ecuador, Andes and PetroOriental have maintained more
positive relationships with the government and civil society than Encana had. In fact,
despite the large scale of their operations, OSAL archives show that these two oil
companies have maintained better community relations than any of their major
competitors, including Ecuadorian SOEs. OSAL archives contain zero records of
environmental protests that specifically targeted Andes or PetroOriental. In contrast,
Repsol was targeted by a weeklong road blockade in 2006 over environmental concerns,
and PetroEcuador was the target of large-scale environmental protests in 2006, 2007,
2008, and 2010.
The comparatively peaceful company-community relationship enjoyed by the
Chinese oil firms may be partially due to the fact that Andes Petroleum (which produces
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about three times as much oil as PetroOriental) is located in Sucumbíos, which has been
home to large scale agricultural and oil development for decades, including Texaco’s
original oil fields. Interviews with Undersecretary Carrera and remediation expert Michel
Boufadel made it clear that the local aquifer is still so heavily polluted from the
remaining Texaco pits that fishing and small-scale agriculture are no longer healthy
options for local communities. In a site visit to Texaco's nearby Aquarico 4 well,
Boufadel explained that the most toxic components of oil spills are compounds like
benzene, which are invisible and quick to dissolve in water and spread throughout the
aquifer and downstream waterways. Thus, even after remediation efforts have removed
some of the visible effects of these decades-old oil spills, the water used by surrounding
communities can still carry powerful toxins, making traditional livelihoods unsafe. New
spills are unlikely to pose a significant marginal impact on communities that have been
unable to hunt, fish, or farm for decades.
However, Andes and PetroOriental have had their share of labor disputes. Early in
their presence, they both faced community conflict over local job opportunities. In
November 2006, 300 local residents entered, occupied, and stopped production for
Andes, demanding 400 local jobs. In July 2007 community members, transit workers, and
municipal staff from the nearby town of Nueva Loja blocked a major road to demand
more local jobs and other local investment. More serious conflicts involved
PetroOriental, in the parish of Dayuma, Orellana. Dayuma crosses several oil blocks,
including two major ones: Block 14, operated by PetroOriental, and Block 61, operated
by Ecuadorian SOE PetroEcuador. Most of the protests focused on PetroEcuador
(CLACSO documents 15 different protests, strikes, and blockades against PetroEcuador
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in 2006 and 2007), but PetroOriental also received some attention. In the summer of 2006
and again in 2007, local residents blockaded the road into the PetroOriental facilities
twice, demanding more local jobs and the patronage of local transportation providers.
After extensive negotiations, an agreement was reached on the provision of a Social Fund
tasked with local job creation and credit programs.
Furthermore, Chinese Embassy Attaché Zach Chen states that Andes and
PetroOriental have established English as the primary working language in their
Ecuadorian facilities, and only hire workers who speak it fluently. This requirement
dramatically limits the pool of potential workers, raising their salaries, reducing turnover
and improving morale. However, this policy also has a strong downside: it limits hires
from the immediate vicinity, where schools are not able to teach students sufficient
English. So, while this problem has been addressed at the national level, it may continue
to cause friction with local communities in the future.
Another area of labor relations continued to plague Andes and PetroOriental until
recently: profit sharing with subcontract workers. As mentioned above, subcontracting is
strictly limited in Ecuador and subcontracted employees must be included in profit
sharing. Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental participated in the 15 percent profit sharing
as required but neglected to include subcontracted employees in the distribution of those
profits. At issue was not the companies’ willingness to pay – they had originally
distributed the correct amount of their profits – but the fact that the original amount was
shared among too few workers. As a result, the companies were required to pay an
additional $16 million to the originally excluded workers (CLACSO, n.d.; “Ex
Trabajadores” 2009). Since the oil companies did not benefit financially from skirting
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the law initially, and since they suffered extensive financial costs to address the problem
later, it is unlikely that their oversight was intentional or that the problem will occur
again.
3.4.1.2 Environmental Performance
As mentioned above, the government of Ecuador does not keep a centralized
database of environmental misconduct. However, it is possible to independently estimate
one aspect of environmental management across Ecuador’s active oil blocks:
deforestation. The location of most of these blocks within the Amazon rainforest means
that any new expansion of operations is likely to be associated with deforestation in one
of the most biodiverse areas on the planet.
In order to estimate deforestation, Figure 3.12 is based on geospatial data from
Hansen et al. (2013), who offer satellite data on tree cover change between 2000 and
2016, using a 30-meter grid.24 Figure 3.12 shows the total net tree cover change within
the boundaries of each oil block that was actively producing during the oil boom years of
2003 and 2013, weighted by the initial tree cover of each oil block (which ranges from
zero to 100 percent). This initial tree cover is strongly related to the levels of biodiversity
shown in Figure 3.5, with a correlation of 0.67 (p=0.008). Thus, deforestation in the
richest sections of the Amazon basin appear more heavily weighted than the same levels
of deforestation in less densely-forested areas. Unfortunately, it is impossible to limit the

24

The level of granularity used in Hansen et al. (2013) is sufficient to capture all but the smallest
encroachments into the forest, but is unable to differentiate between true deforestation and tree cover loss
(defined as the loss of any tree cover, be it forest or plantation). For this reason, this section refers to these
calculations as estimates of deforestation, and measures of net tree cover change.
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measurements to the boom period, but the entirety of the 2003 to 2013 decade is
encapsulated in this analysis.
Figure 3.12: Net tree cover loss in oil blocks active during the oil boom, 2000-2016,
weighted by initial tree cover
Oil Block Number
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Source: Author’s analysis of Hansen et al (2013) data. Note: For oil blocks with joint nationalities or
which changed nationalities during this time period, the nationality for the greatest time period is shown.

Figure 3.12 shows net tree cover change between 2000 and 2016. With only 17
countries represented across 34 blocks during the oil boom, the sample size is too small
to support statistical analysis. However, it is clear from these figures that the Chinese oil
companies have avoided the worst outcomes. PetroOriental (blocks 14 and 17) and Andes
Petroleum (block 62) concessions experienced one and four percent tree cover loss,
respectively. These levels are far better than the mean (7.2 percent tree cover loss) and
substantially better than the median (5.1 percent tree cover loss) outcome for all oil
blocks.
Figure 3.12 shows oil blocks by the nationality or region of each block’s plurality
concessionaire for the oil boom years. For example, as of this writing, Block 7 is
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associated with Petroamazonas (an Ecuadorian oil SOE) but for most of the oil boom, its
concessionaire was Perenco (an Anglo-French oil firm), and so it is shown as European.
Similarly, Block 16 is managed by a joint venture between companies based in the US,
Spain, and China, with Spain’s Repsol having the plurality stake (35 percent), so it is also
shown as European. It is possible to further estimate deforestation associated with each
country of concessionaire, by averaging across oil blocks and using concessionaire
ownership stakes and block sizes as weights. For example, the deforestation associated
with Chinese concessions is estimated in Table 3.7. Chinese oil companies had majority
stakes in blocks 14, 17, and 62 (the blocks profiled in the current case study), as well as
minority stakes in blocks 16 and 67. These blocks vary widely in their size and initial
tree cover as well as the net tree cover change they experienced from 2000 to 2016. Table
3.7 combines these experiences to estimate the weighted average of overall deforestation
under Chinese concessions: -1.6%.
Table 3.7: Calculation of average weighted tree cover change under Chinese
concessions in Ecuador, 2000-2016

Block
14
16
17
62
67
Sum

China’s
stake (%
of 16 yrs.)
A
61.5%
19.3%
61.5%
61.5%
10.8%

Calculation of weights
Block
China’s
Share of
size
presence
China’s
(km2)
(km2-yrs.) presence (%)
B
C=A*B
D=C/sum(C)
1,936.6
1,190.8
37.7%
1,256.8
242.9
7.7%
1,779.4
1,094.2
34.7%
1,007.9
619.7
19.6%
68.1
7.4
0.2%
3,155.0
100.0%

Calculation of avg. TC change
TC,
Net TC
Weighted
2000
change
TC change
(%)
(%)
(%)
E
F
G=E*F
97.5%
-1.0%
-1.0%
99.8%
-0.1%
-0.1%
98.9%
-1.3%
-1.2%
92.6%
-4.2%
-3.9%
99.7%
-0.1%
-0.1%

Contrib. to TC
change, Chinese
concessions
(pctg.. pts.)
H=D*G
-0.4%
0.0%
-0.4%
-0.8%
0.0%
-1.6%

Source: Author’s analysis of Hansen et al (2013) data. Notes: The weighted tree cover change shown in
Column F is identical to the weighting used in Figure 3.12. TC: tree cover.

Figure 3.13 shows the results of repeating the calculations in Table 3.7 for each
country represented in Ecuadorian oil production from 2000 to 2016. No obvious trend
emerges regarding regions with better or worse outcomes regarding deforestation.
However, it is clear that Chinese oil companies have out-performed most of their peers.
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Chinese oil companies’ performance (-1.6 percent) is much better than a simple average
of the 17 countries shown in Figure 3.13 (-5.3 percent) or their median (-3.9 percent).
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Figure 3.13: Weighted average tree cover change by concessionaire nationality in
Ecuador, 2000-2016
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3.4.1.3 Analysis
The social and environmental performance of Andes Petroleum and PetroOriental
during Ecuador’s oil boom appears to be on par or above average among all oil producers
in Ecuador. However, as mentioned above, they may have had an advantage in this
regard, by inheriting oil blocks where environmental damage had long since rendered
traditional livelihoods impossible. A much more challenging test arose toward the end of
the oil boom, when Andes Petroleum won an auction for two new oil blocks in an area
where oil had never been developed. These were the first new oil blocks to be awarded
after the environmental and social reforms of 2007 and 2010, and thus the first true test of
Ecuador’s high-road extractivism model. The performance of Andes Petroleum and the
Ecuadorian government regarding this new test is discussed below.
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3.4.2 New Concessions in the Southeastern Ecuadorian Amazon
In 2014, Andes Petroleum bid for and won two additional oil concessions, in
Blocks 79 and 83 shown in Figure 3.14.25 These blocks border the southern end of
PetroOriental’s current concessions, but they are farther away from Andes’ current
concession in the northern region of Tarapoa, Sucumbíos. The economy and ecology of
the new concessions are quite different from Tarapoa. Moreover, unlike the Tarapoa
concession, the new blocks will be greenfield projects. Because of these differences, it
seems very unlikely that Andes will be able to expand its operations with the same
positive community and government relations it has enjoyed in the past.
3.4.2.1 New Challenges in the Physical and Social Landscape of Blocks 79 and 83
The new sites will be greenfield projects just outside of the Yasuní National Park.
As Figure 3.13 shows, they are located in an extremely biodiverse area of the Ecuadorian
Amazon, richer even than the more famous Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) block
on the eastern border. The prospect of new oil exploration in the Amazon has brought
intense criticism from environmental and indigenous groups, including Amazon Watch,
the Pachamama Alliance, Acción Ecológica, and others (Zuckerman 2014). Experts on
the Ecuadorian Amazon, such as biologist Santiago Espinosa of the Pontífica Universidad
Católica de Ecuador and conservationist Kelly Swing of Boston University and the
Universidad San Francisco de Quito, believe that the government currently lacks the
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Andes Petroleum won these concessions through auction, though it was the only bidder for these two
blocks. Two additional bids were registered and accepted for their respective blocks: Repsol Cuba, in
Block 29; and a consortium comprised of Ecuadorian SOE PetroAmazonas, ENAP-Chile, and
Belorosneft in Block 28.
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institutional capacity to successfully manage the ecosystems near the planned extraction
sites (Espinosa, 2014; Swing, 2013).
Figure 3.14: Sensitive territory and Andes Petroleum’s new oil blocks, Ecuador
Biodiversity
Indigenous Territory

Note: Very high biodiversity is defined as being within the highest 6.4 percent of all South American land.
Source: Compiled from Bass et Al. (2010), LandMark (no date), and ARCH (2017).

Furthermore, the social landscape in blocks 79 and 83 is quite different from the
one Andes Petroleum has known in its current concession. First, unlike the northern
Tarapoa block, the new southern concessions are entirely covered by indigenous territory,
as Figure 3.14 shows. A majority is Sápara territory, with the remainder covered by
Kichwa territory.26 Of the two indigenous nations, the Sápara are a much smaller group
and have smaller territory: the new oil concessions will cover 52 percent of total
recognized Sápara lands (Castillo et al, 2016). Both groups are classified by UNESCO as

26

The Sápara people were also commonly known as “Zápara” before 2009. Documents from before 2009
may refer to them using either spelling (see for example UNESCO, 2008). Newer official statements from
the group exclusively use the spelling “Sápara” (see for example Association of Sápara Women, 2016;
Ushigua and Ushigua, 2017).” For the sake of consistency, this essay uses the current name of the group:
the Sápara Nation of Ecuador.

158

having endangered languages; the Sápara language is “critically endangered,” with only
nine speakers (Moseley 2010). Although the Sápara nation is small (numbering less than
300), its language is one of just two Ecuadorian cultural practices included by UNESCO
in the Representative List of Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity. In including the
language, UNESCO highlighted their “oral culture that is particularly rich as regards their
understanding of the natural environment … demonstrated by the abundance of their
vocabulary for the flora and fauna and by their medicinal practices and knowledge of the
medicinal plants of the forest” (UNESCO 2008). Respecting the rights of this indigenous
group, recognized internationally for its vulnerability as well as its cultural importance,
will be paramount in any attempt at socially responsible extraction on the part of Andes
Petroleum.
In addition, residents in the southern concessions have very different living
standards from the communities in Andes’ northern territory. The new concessions lie
within the parish of Montalvo, Pastaza, among the poorest in the country. As Figure 3.15
shows, in 2013, at the time of the oil block auction, very few households in Montalvo had
even the most basic services.
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Figure 3.15: Basic service coverage, Ecuador and regions of Ecuador where Andes
Petroleum (AP) and PetroOriental (PO) operate, 2013
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As of 2013, during the concession auction, fewer than 10 percent of residents in
the blocks won by Andes Petroleum had electricity in their homes, fewer than five
percent had indoor running water, and only one percent had wastewater treatment
through a sewer hookup or septic tank. These figures place Montalvo in the bottom three
percent of Ecuador’s parishes for running water and the bottom one percent for the other
two services. The educational situation was equally grim. Only about three-fourths of
children attended primary school, and fewer than one in three attended secondary school,
putting Montalvo in the bottom one percent and two percent of parishes nationwide,
respectively.
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3.4.2.2 (Mis)Management of New Challenges Posed by New Landscapes
PetroOriental already has experience working in a delicate ecosystem: block 14 is
located in and around the Yasuní National Park (shown in Figure 3.11). However,
PetroOriental inherited that concession from Encana. This will be the first time either
Andes Petroleum or PetroOriental has established new concessions anywhere in Ecuador,
much less in the Amazon.
Unfortunately, problems with the prior informed consultation process have
already begun to jeopardize Andes’ prospects for positive community relations.
Ecuador’s constitution and international agreements set high standards for community
consultation and participation, but they seem to have been circumvented in this case.
Ecuador is one of just 20 signatories to ILO Convention 169, which calls for
nations to consult with indigenous groups prior to developing subterranean mineral
deposits below tribal hunting, fishing, or otherwise traditional territory (ILO, 1989).
Article 57 of Ecuador’s new constitution also enshrines this requirement, with the added
note that if the affected community does not agree to the proposal, the government must
follow additional steps detailed in the 2010 Citizen Participation Law, which states that
“if … a majority opposition emerges in the respective community, the decision to
undertake the project or not will be made through a resolution, adequately debated …,
which, in cases where it is decided that the project will be undertaken, must establish
parameters that minimize the impact on communities and ecosystems; moreover, it must
plan for mitigation, compensation, and damage repair; and where possible, it must
include the members of the community in the labor force for the respective projects, in
conditions that guarantee human dignity” (Article 83, author’s translation). In sum, the
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prior consultation process must seek the community’s majority approval; if the majority
of the community opposes the project, a resolution to proceed in a limited-impact way
must be drafted, debated, and approved.
Members of the Sápara nation claim that majority approval was never sought.
Indeed, the Secretaría de Hidrocarburos (SHE), which conducted the consultation, does
not claim to have sought it. Instead, SHE reports that the Sápara President at the time,
Basilio Mucushigua, signed an agreement on November 21, 2012, allowing oil
exploration in exchange for $5.95 million in local public investment (SHE, 2012). This
neglect of majority opinion is not surprising, given its omission in Executive Decree
1247, which directed this particular consultation process (Correa, 2012). The Decree
allows for comments to be submitted either through community meetings or individually
at local consultation offices, provided that the offices are extensively advertised through
local press, government, or community leaders. SHE reports that 16,469 people
participated in this consultation process, throughout the 16 blocks that the government
hoped to develop. However, Mazabanda (2013) estimates that the indigenous nations
whose territories overlap with the oil blocks include 69,114 adults, and that the total adult
population of the oil blocks is 141,397. Even if Mazabanda’s estimates are significantly
overstated, SHE consulted with only a small minority of the affected population. It is
worth noting that it is equally likely that SHE’s estimates are overstated. SHE include
10,469 people who participated directly in the consultation process, as well as 6,000 who
participated in “socio-environmental management model” workshops, which are outside
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the scope of Executive Decree 1247; nor does SHE claim to have taken any precautions
to avoid double-counting those who may be in both groups.27
It may still be argued that those who did not participate were voluntarily
abstaining from the consultation. However, current Sápara President Kléver Ruiz and
President of the Association of Sápara Women Gloria Ushigua said in interviews that
they never saw or heard any of the advertisements required by Executive Decree 1247
(Ruiz 2014; Ushigua; 2014). Neither Ruiz nor Ushigua doubts that former Sápara
President Mucushigua signed an agreement with the SHE. But both insisted that SHE
never sought approval from the majority of the Sápara nation, in violation of the 2008
Constitution and the 2010 Citizen Participation Law, or even held a widely-advertised
public comment period, as required by Executive Decree 1247.
Beyond the consultation process, evidence suggests that Pres. Mucushigua was no
longer president at the time of the agreement, rendering it void. A Sápara resolution from
August of 2012 – three months prior to the agreement – reports that in a national congress
over three days, the Sápara nation sanctioned Pres. Mucushigua for allowing SHE
representatives to enter Sápara territory, by relieving him of office and replacing him
with Luis Armas (NASE, 2012). A joint report by Ecuador’s national and Amazonspecific indigenous confederations states that Pres. Armas was recognized as the legal
representative of the Sápara nation by the Ecuadorian government’s Council on the
Development of Nationalities and Peoples in Ecuador (Consejo de Desarrollo de las
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Representatives of the Ecuadorian government asked not to be quoted on this matter. In an anonymous
interview, a government source reiterated the government’s confidence in the process and asserted that
there was full backing of indigenous communities for the current oil expansion, while acknowledging that
no vote or poll was taken to determine majority support or opposition.
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Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador – CODENPE) on September 21 (Ordoñez,
Rivadeneira, and Mazabanda, 2016).
The internal conflict over oil continued to intensify over the coming months.
Ordoñez, Rivadeneira, and Mazabanda (2016) report that in January of 2013 (two months
after the agreement with SHE), former president Mucushigua met separately with those
who favored the agreement, who re-named him to the post, an act that was registered
with CODENPE, prompting the remainder of the nation to meet and name Kléver Ruiz as
president, which was not recognized by CODENPE. Both Ruiz and Ushigua indicate that
the community is deeply divided between ethnic Sápara, opposed to the drilling, and
other residents (including Mr. Mucushigua) who are in the minority but who welcome the
oil exploration.
It is unlikely that Andes will be able to win over the indigenous communities in
their oil blocks easily. When asked what she would like to say to Andes Petroleum,
Ushigua replied “The indigenous Sápara say to the hydrocarbon companies that we do
not want oil exploitation; we want to be left alone …. We ask the big countries to please
respect our rights and our life that comes from nature” (Ushigha, 2014, author’s
translation). The national and Amazonian indigenous confederations have sided with
Ruiz, Ushigua, and the other Sápara and Kichwa opposed to drilling, issuing a declaration
directed to oil companies in 2013 (after the Mucushigua-SHE agreement but before the
concession auction bidding period was closed) stating that:
“Our nationalities and peoples have not given their consent to the realization of
petroleum activities in our territories. The few agreements that the government
claims to have signed with indigenous communities are the result of coopting
leaders and of the division created in our organizations. None of these agreements
was signed with the knowledge and approval of legitimately called assemblies”
(CONAIE and CONFENIAE, 2013, author’s translation).
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The statement ends with a stark warning: “we declare ourselves to be in
permanent mobilization for the defense of our territories” (Ibid).
3.4.2.3 Further Developments: Moving Forward After an Unsuccessful Consultation
Andes Petroleum signed a contract for the exploration and development of blocks
79 and 83 in January 2016, two years after winning the oil block auction. This contract
establishes a sales price to the Ecuadorian government of $47 per barrel and gives the
company four years to explore, with a possible two-year extension (Araujo, 2016). Since
that time, the affected Sápara community has not given up its demands. Two weeks after
the contract was signed, the Association of Sápara Women issued a statement denouncing
the government for moving forward with contract despite indigenous opposition and
demanding, inter alia “respect for our rights as an indigenous nation, conservation of our
territory, our forests, and the Ecuadorian Amazon [and] the nullification of the contract
with Andes Petroleum Ecuador” (Association of Sápara Women, 2016).
The Sápara and Kichwa nations have developed a resistance strategy that
incorporates two approaches: making international demands while building relationships
with non-indigenous allies. Through the first strategy, they have requested action from
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as well as
Andes Petroleum itself. Simultaneously, they have reached out to potential allies among
environmentalists, ecotourists, and medical tourists worldwide.
The Sápara began their international campaign the same year the oil auction
closed: 2014. Ruiz and Ushigua wrote to Vicky Tauli-Corpuz, then incoming Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples at the United Nations, explaining the
situation from their perspective and requesting that she carry out a fact-finding mission in
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Ecuador (Ruiz and Ushigua, 2014). While Ms. Tauli-Corpuz did eventually come to
Ecuador for a conference on indigenous Amazonian peoples in Ecuador in 2016, the topic
was limited to voluntarily isolated tribes, which does not include the Sápara (TauliCorpuz, 2016; UASB, 2016).
In May of 2017, Sápara representatives delivered a letter to the offices of the
Chinese representatives to the United Nations in New York, explaining the Sápara
people’s recognition by UNESCO and requesting “that the Chinese delegation to the
United Nations protect ancient cultures such as ours, urging Chinese state-owned
company Andes Petroleum to refrain from entering our territories, since our country has
not respected or protected human rights” (Ushigua and Ushigua, 2017). As of this
writing, no answer has been forthcoming.
Another aspect of the indigenous response to Andes Petroleum’s expansion, on
the part of both the Kichwa and Sápara peoples, has been that of strengthening
relationships with potential allies outside of the Amazon. Both indigenous nations sent
representatives to the People’s Climate March in New York in September 2014. At
preparations for the March, Ushigua stated publicly: “We are ready to fight with all the
strength of our ancestors against the companies and governments to protect the land from
which we came, a land that must remain free from oil exploration" (Zuckerman, 2014).
They returned for subsequent years’ marches, and their presence gained star power when
famed actor and activist Leonardo DiCaprio joined hands with them literally as well as
figuratively in 2017, posting photos of them together to his social medial accounts
(Bruner, 2017).
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The Sápara Nation, with the assistance of national environmental organizations
such as the Pachamama Alliance and Terra Mater, has also launched an outreach effort
called Naku (taken from the Sápara word for “forest”). Naku involves two arms: a
“Sápara immersion” ecotourism program and educational experience, and a “healing
center” where chronic illness sufferers can come for traditional Sápara treatments
(Castillo et al., 2016).
It is no exaggeration to say that civil society around the country and around the
world is paying attention to what happens next. At this writing, Andes Petroleum and the
Sápara people appear to be headed toward inevitable conflict, in a pattern reminiscent of
Ecuadorian oil conflicts of decades past. Rather than establishing a new “high-road”
approach to extractivism, the nation appears to have retraced its steps on the same road it
has taken many times.
3.5. Discussion
This essay seeks to evaluate Ecuador’s turn toward “high-road extractivism,” and
the extent to which a new relationship with Chinese oil companies gave the regulatory
space necessary to carry out its new investment regulations and establish a less
destructive form of existing as an oil-based economy. The results show that Andes
Petroleum and PetroOriental have generally complied with this new legal framework,
avoiding environmental or social misconduct that would engender conflict or
deforestation. However, by the end of the oil boom, Ecuador’s new oil paradigm broke
down – not because of the performance of Chinese oil companies, but despite it.
The failure of Ecuador to successfully carry out its own commitments to human
rights may be due in part to Executive Decree 1247’s assignation of FPIC duties to SHE,
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rather than to a ministry or agency dedicated to indigenous affairs, such as CODENPE.
SHE’s mission is explicitly oriented toward expediting production: “To study, measure,
and evaluate hydrocarbon assets, promote them, seek out national and/or international
investment, oversee and administer, in a sovereign manner, hydrocarbon areas and
contracts, legally and ethically, so that they may contribute in a sustained fashion to good
living for Ecuadorians” (SHE, n.d., author’s translation). By tasking SHE with a
precedent-setting first attempt at operationalizing Ecuador’s new FPIC requirements,
Correa gave the process to staff without the institutional incentives or independence
necessary to ensure that indigenous concerns were taken into account.
The importance of regulatory independence in Latin America for the success of
private investment has been well established, especially in the sector of infrastructure.
Pargal (2003) shows that the existence of government regulatory bodies was associated
with greater private infrastructure investment in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s,
but that the location of regulatory bodies within sectoral ministries was also positively
associated with greater investment. In other words, regulatory independence may slow
private infrastructure investment in the region. However, Guasch, Laffont, and Straub
(2003) show that concessions awarded in context with regulatory independence were less
likely to be renegotiated later, indicating that infrastructure contracts established in such
an environment are likely to encounter fewer problems during their lifespans. Guasch,
Laffot and Straub (2007) revisit the subject with a deeper analysis and find that
regulatory independence is especially important in contract success in Latin American
contexts characterized by weak governance; it may provide a counterweight to political
pressure to move forward with symbolic but poorly-considered “white elephant” projects.
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As Foster (2005) points out, obstacles to regulatory independence in Latin America go
beyond whether the regulators are housed within their own agencies or within sectoral
ministries, and can also entail the extent to which they have financial and personnel
autonomy or risk budgetary or operational interference by the executive branch or other
government entity with a vested interest in expediting projects. While the challenge of
establishing and empowering truly independent regulatory bodies is an ongoing concern
throughout Latin America, the case examined here appears to be a “perfect storm” of
political interference in a safeguard process. The prior consultation was carried out by the
sectoral ministry, acting under an executive decree that did not meet the standards
stipulated in the Citizen Participation Law. It is no surprise, then, that the resulting
consultation process failed to live up to Ecuadorian’s much vaunted vision of a more
sustainable and inclusive form of oil extraction.
Beyond Ecuador, the topic of conflicting incentives within ministries tasked with
regulating the extractive sector has been the source of political controversy throughout
Andean nations over the course of this commodity boom. Particularly, toward the end of
the boom, as falling prices reduced public hydrocarbon and mining revenue, Ballón et al.
(2017) and Ray et al. (2017) find that governments were likely to curtail social and
environmental protections or weaken their applications. While these counter-reforms
were often enacted in the name of expediting new investments, they frequently have had
the opposite results. Protracted social conflict, stemming from the rolling back of rights
already in existence, can jeopardize the ability of those new investments to move forward
on any timeline, as the example of weakened prior consultation explored in this chapter
shows. The question for other governments considering weakening social and
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environmental regulations surrounding extractive sectors, then, may not be whether they
can afford to maintain their system of protections, but whether they can afford not to.
3.6. Conclusion
After 30 years of environmental degradation, social conflict, and economic
instability stemming from its identity as an oil producer, Ecuador sought to change this
paradigm, welcoming new investment partners to operate under a new regulatory
framework in the amenable economic context of a global oil boom. This scenario created
a natural experiment for the viability of this new model of “high-road extractivism.”
Chinese SOEs appear to have acted as good faith partners in supporting Ecuador’s
new approach, establishing relatively peaceful relations with neighboring communities
and preventing major deforestation in the oil blocks under their management. However,
the Ecuadorian state has missed its own standard for social inclusion in new oil
investment decisions. The involvement of state hydrocarbons agency in overseeing
human rights safeguards created an intrinsic, though implicit, conflict of interest, one that
translated into explicit conflict among communities. It also created a very familiar
scenario for Ecuador, in which the state was unwilling or unable to protect human rights
in the face of a foreign oil company’s interest in exploring and developing oil reserves.
Rather than putting oil development on a new, more sustainable footing, Ecuador’s
institutional missteps seem to have reinforced the old model. It remains to be seen if the
damage can be undone. Nonetheless, lessons abound for other nations considering reorienting their commodities sector by starting again with new relationships and new
rules. As difficult as it may be for governments to regulate and oversee the performance

170

of foreign investors, it can prove even more difficult, in less obvious ways, to regulate
and oversee themselves.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation crosses many policy areas and sectors, but centers on one
perennial challenge: shifting away from old, commodity-driven economic activity in
LAC and toward more economically diversified, socially inclusive, and environmentally
sustainable models. In doing so, it makes the case for interconnectedness among several
areas of policy making. First, the results of this work show that structuralist and
environmental approaches to economic management can benefit each other. Second, the
challenge of diversification is intrinsically multidisciplinary and requires collaboration
between economists, political scientists, and ecologists, among other experts.
C.1 Interconnectedness of Structuralist and Ecological Approaches in LAC
Structuralist and environmental economists have not always seen each other as
allies or collaborators working toward similar ends. For example, Seguino (2014) claims
that Alice Amsden, when asked about integrating concerns about livelihoods and the
environmental during a visit to the University of Vermont’s Gund Institute for Ecological
Economics and Sustainability, explained candidly that in her view livelihoods must
always take priority and that environmental concerns must be secondary. For another
example, the author attended a 2014 event, on the invitation of the Ecuadorian
Environment Ministry, on “Achieving Equilibrium in the Amazon,” positing
environmental and livelihoods issues as conflicting goals, rather than reinforcing
approaches. The findings of this dissertation, however, suggest that structuralist and
environmental approaches to economic policies in LAC are complementary in nature and
that collaboration across these approaches can help each field approach its goals.
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C.1.1 LAC Structuralist Economics as Complementary to Ecological Economics
Essay 1 shows that primary commodity production in LAC is intrinsically more
carbon- and water- intensive than manufacturing. The water use disparity is global in
nature: no region or income level of countries has limited the water use or contamination
from primary commodity production to the levels of manufacturing output. But even if
“high-road” reforms are enacted to limit the water use and contamination, the carbon
intensity remains. So, in order to limit the environmental impacts of production in LAC,
either on the global (climate) or local (water) scale, it will be necessary to shift up the
value chain.
Essay 3 profiles Ecuador, a country famous for having the “greenest constitution
in the world,” and also for the outsized importance of oil as an export, making it an apt
case study of “high-road extractivism” in practice in LAC. The small, open, and
dollarized nature of Ecuador’s economy makes it particularly exposed to trends in global
commodity prices and foreign investor preferences. Its results show that the Ecuadorian
government, caught between conflicting incentives of attracting foreign investment for
oil exploration and development and upholding its highly ambitious social and
environmental protections, failed to uphold those protections. Ironically, the inadequacy
of the prior consultation process helped create such a conflictive situation that it may
jeopardize the ability of Andes Petroleum to carry out oil exploration in its new
concessions. In favoring oil expansion over social and environmental protections,
Ecuador may have ended up with neither. Furthermore, given that the Sápara nation
removed President Mucushigua from office for having allowed SHE personnel to enter
Sápara territory, it is doubtful that a prior consultation – even if it had met the
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requirements of the Citizen Participation Law – would have resulted in majority support
for new oil exploration. Thus, even if Ecuador had been able to establish sufficient
regulatory independence to guarantee the fulfillment of its “high-road” commitments,
those commitments would have stood in conflict with the expansion of oil production. If
Ecuador jeopardizes oil expansion either by honoring or by not honoring its social and
environmental protections, the only way forward for the country is to diversify away
from oil as a driver of economic activity.
C.1.2 LAC Ecological Economics as Complementary to Structuralist Economics
Infrastructure is a core part of the structuralist approach to economic
management, as a primary public good together with scientific research and education.
Furthermore, it facilitates the establishment of value chains and can enhance clustering
effects discussed in Amsden (2001). In South America, specifically, the IIRSA and later
COSIPLAN initiatives were established to foster regional integration with the ultimate
goal of creating new regional value chains with a greater regional participation in value
added and employment, and less vulnerability to global commodity price swings
(Estevadeordal and Blyde, 2016). Ideally, such regional infrastructure plans might be able
to help with the structural transformation of the regional economy away from dependence
on extraction of raw materials from the Amazon basin and the myriad environmental and
social problems that have accompanied it (Samaniego et al, 2016). But without careful
planning, South American infrastructure can simply facilitate more (or more efficient)
extraction of those raw materials from the Amazon basin, reinforcing old trading patterns
rather than feeding new ones. In other words, one major challenge facing policy makers
is to enable new foci of economic activity and transportation between those foci without
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opening up new sections of the Amazon for additional natural resource exploitation.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation shows that one effective way to plan infrastructure projects
without opening up the Amazon rainforest and reinforcing old extractivist patterns is to
incorporate the voices of indigenous communities who currently rely on the forest for
their livelihoods. Expanding the agricultural and extractive frontiers into the Amazon
rainforest puts their traditional livelihoods at risk, through competition for land and clean
water. So, it is not surprising that projects requiring formal prior consultation with those
communities are associated with significantly less tree cover loss than those projects
without such protections.
C.2 Interconnectedness Across Disciplines: Areas for Future Research
This dissertation attempts to establish the interconnectedness of the agendas of
structuralist and environmental economists in LAC. Further work into the ways in which
economic planners and environmental regulators can support each other’s goals will be
crucial in forming and pursuing a common vision of diversified, sustainable economic
growth.
For example, further research into institutional design and management may help
resolve a potential paradox between the results of chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 shows that
in general, incorporating formal stakeholder engagement into infrastructure planning can
help prevent deforestation. However, Chapter 3 shows that formal stakeholder
engagement is not always carried out in a meaningful way. The difference between these
two results is not simply attributable to the presence of DFIs in Chapter 2. As Table 2.14
shows, there is no statistically significant difference in impact between prior consultation
processes mandated only by national government and those mandated by both national
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governments and DFIs. Nor is the difference solely a product of the setting of the failed
prior consultation process in Chapter: Ecuador. Table 2.11 shows no significant
difference among countries in the importance of prior consultation.
It is likely that the difference in these results is related to institutional factors in
the hydrocarbons and infrastructure ministries involved in consultation processes. The
Ecuadorian consultation process highlighted in Chapter 3 was in many ways doomed to
failure. It was carried out by Hydrocarbons Ministry, which had never before carried out
such a process, under an executive decree that did not require the process to meet the
requirements of the Citizen Participation Law. To date, it is the only prior consultation
process every carried out by Ecuador’s Hydrocarbons Ministry. In contrast, infrastructure
ministries oversee many more projects and one would hope that their staff have more
experience, expertise, and commitment to procedure. For example, the agency within
Peru’s Transportation and Communications Ministry that oversees social and
environmental safeguards (the Dirección General de Asuntos Socio Ambientales), was
established in through concessional assistance from CAF. It was established to be a
permanent oversight body capable of regulating all transportation and communications
projects, not simply to facilitate one project as in the case of the Ecuadorian oil
consultation (Dammert Bello, 2018).
It is clear from the political interference in Ecuador’s prior consultation process
that regulatory independence is an important factor in regulators’ ability to fulfil their
mandates. Unfortunately, Gilardi, Jordana, and Levi-Faur (2006) find social and
environmental protections are less likely to have politically autonomous regulators than
other areas of government oversight such as economic competition. However, even
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bureaucratic independence is insufficient for establishing and comparing the de facto
autonomy of social and environmental regulators. For example, Guasch and Spiller
(1999), in their treatise on regulation in Latin America, enumerate five requirements for
effective regulatory institutions: managerial freedom, political autonomy, accountability
to the public as well as to elected officials, checks and balances to prevent arbitrary
decisions, and incentives to prevent capture of individual regulators. Clearly, the findings
of chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation show a need for more research in the area of
institutional design and effective environmental regulation in LAC, especially with
regard to the thorny policy challenges of economic diversification. Unfortunately, such
research is well beyond the scope of this dissertation.
If structuralist economics is to be relevant in the 21st Century, it will need to
incorporate pressing environmental concerns that are now inseparable from issues of
livelihoods and economic sustainability, especially in such socially and environmentally
sensitive regions such as the Amazon basin. Achieving that relevance will require taking
into account the interconnectedness of the “three pillars” of sustainability: economic
stability, environmental conservation, and social inclusion. Furthermore, the importance
of regulatory independence for government infrastructure plans shows that the goal of
working toward more diversified, inclusive, and sustainable economic models is an
intrinsically interdisciplinary endeavor, requiring research beyond the bounds of
economics. To face this challenge effectively, economists, ecologists, and social
scientists of all stripes will be well served by more collaborative, interdisciplinary, and
mixed-methods research.
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APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 1
A.1 Combining Data from Lall with Data from Peters and WaterStat
This essay uses trade data from the UN Comtrade database. For a few country/year
combinations, UN Comtrade has no data, and so imputations were taken instead,
substituting imports reported by the rest of the world in place of exports reported by the
missing country. These include:
•

Anguilla: 2005, 2009-2013

•

Antigua and Barbuda: 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008

•

Bermuda: 2003-2011

•

Cuba: 2007-2013

•

Dominica: 2011, 2013

•

Haiti (all years)

•

Honduras: 2008, 2013

•

Macao: 2013

•

Montserrat: 2011

•

Netherlands Antilles: 2004, 2009-2013

•

Saint Kitts and Nevis: 2012, 2013

•

Saint Lucia: 2009-2013

•

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines: 2013

•

Trinidad and Tobago: 2011-2013

•

Turks and Caicos: 2010, 2013

•

Venezuela: 2007
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Sanjaya Lall’s technology classification system assigns a category for almost all 3digit SITC codes. The remaining codes, such as 999 (miscellaneous, not otherwise
classified), are listed separately as “other,” but these make up a miniscule share of
exports and are largely excluded from this analysis.
Glen Peters’ GHG intensity calculations estimate an emissions level per dollar for
each GTAP category. Unfortunately, UN Comtrade data is not available in GTAP
categories, but a translation between the two systems is relatively simple, as GTAP
categories tend to be umbrella categories covering several SITC categories each.
WaterStat water footprint estimates are available for 6-digit HS codes (for
agricultural products) and for industrial products on average for each country. No
translation was necessary, as Comtrade offers HS disaggregation. Unfortunately,
WaterStat has several gaps, which were imputed following the method below.
•

Where WaterStat has an intensity value listed for an umbrella category but not the
sub-categories, the category average intensity is applied to the subcategories.

•

Similarly, where WaterStat has an intensity value for all subcategories but not the
aggregated category, a simple average is used for category-level trade flows.

•

Where WaterStat is missing a value for the last in a series of sub-categories, usually a
miscellaneous sub-category, a simple average of other sub-categories is used.

•

Processed foodstuffs not included in WaterStat are considered industrial.

•

WaterStat excludes seafood (category 03, 1504, 1603, 1604, and 1605) because it
considers it to be a “low or non-water consumptive product.” (For more, see Hoekstra
2003). Those categories are excluded here.
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•

Category 50 (silk) is not included in WaterStat but it is an important element of
Chinese exports (China exported 417 million USD of silk in 2013). To avoid omitting
it altogether, this study uses the estimate of 54,000 m3/metric ton established in
Indian production, by Astudillo et al. (2014). Astudillo et al. estimate that this water
footprint could be reduced to 26,700 with production process reforms. The authors
state that Chinese silk has a lower water footprint because the production methods are
more efficient. Thus, this study uses the low estimate of 26,700 m3/MT for Chinese
silk, the higher value for Indian silk, and omits it for LAC countries, which do not
export significant levels of silk.

•

Several uncommon items are omitted altogether from this analysis, such as human
hair, live primates, pet food, and miscellaneous animal products not for human
consumption.

•

Other calculations, which vary by line item, are available upon request.
WaterStat has data for more countries for agricultural products than for industrial

products. A few assumptions for industrial water intensity levels were necessary:
•

Hong Kong and Macao are assumed to have the same intensities as mainland China
(as many exports from those territories originate in the mainland).

•

WaterStat contains industrial water intensity levels for only two Caribbean nations:
Barbados and the Dominican Republic. A simple average of these two intensities is
applied to other Caribbean nations included in WaterStat for agricultural but not
industrial purposes: the Bahamas, Dominica, Montserrat, and Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines.
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A.2 Deflation
For most specific raw commodities, including most agricultural, extractive, and
chemical goods, this study uses the deflators found in the World Bank GEM
Commodities database:
•

Aluminum

•

Iron

•

Rice

•

Ammonia

•

Lead

•

Rubber

•

Bananas

•

Liquid natural
gas

•

Sheep

•

Barley

•

•

Shrimp

Maize

•

•

Silver

Misc. energy
products

•

Sorghum

•

Soybean meal

•

Soybean oil

•

Soybeans

•

Beef

•

Beverages

•

Chicken

•

Coal

•

Cocoa

•

Coconut oil

•

Natural gas

•

Sugar

•

Coffee

•

Nickel

•

Superphosphate

•

Copper

•

Oranges

•

Tea

•

Cotton

•

Palm kernel oil

•

Timber

•

Crude petroleum
oil

•

Palm oil

•

Tin

•

Phosphate

•

Tobacco

•

Phosphate

•

Urea

•

Platinum

•

Wheat

•

Potassium

•

Woodpulp

•

Zinc

•

Fertilizers

•

Fishmeal

•
•

Gold

•

Misc. metals,
minerals

•

Misc. raw agric.
prods.

Groundnut oil
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Simple averages of existing related commodities were used for miscellaneous
seafood, oilseeds, precious metals, and hydrocarbons.
For food commodities not found in the GEM Commodities database, this exercise
uses the broader categories of deflators found in the FAO Food Price Index (FPI)
database: meat, dairy, cereals, vegetable oils, sugars, and miscellaneous food products.
For example, pork is not included in the GEM database, so it is deflated using the FPI
deflator for meat. For manufactured and miscellaneous goods, this exercise uses the
country of origin’s export price deflator, calculated by UN ECLAC (CEPALStat).
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A.3 Statistical Analysis of GHG Intensity Levels of Exports
By definition, an export basket contains a range of products, each with their own
environmental intensity. This section examines the distribution of those products across
GHG intensity levels and compares the distribution of LAC exports to China with LAC
exports to the rest of the world.
Figure A.3.1 shows the cumulative distribution of exports from LAC to China and
to the rest of the world, measured against the GHG intensity of each commodity and
weighted by the real (2004) dollars of exports of each commodity. The red line
(representing exports to China) is mostly to the right of the gold line (representing other
LAC exports). This position indicates that overall, LAC exports to China have a higher
GHG intensity than other LAC exports.
Figure A.3.1: Cumulative distribution of exports across GHG intensity levels, by
destination

Figure A.3.2 shows that exports to China appear more GHG-intensive in the
Caribbean and in Mexico and Central America, but less intense in South America.
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Mexico alone accounts for roughly 40 percent of all LAC exports, which explains the
region-wide difference in Figure A.3.1.
Figure A.3.2: Cumulative distribution functions of export basket GHG intensity, by
sub-region
Caribbean

Mexico, Cent. Am.

South America

Figure A.3.3 shows the cumulative distribution functions of exports across GHG
intensity levels for each LAC country. Exports to China appear significantly more GHG
intense than other exports in most Caribbean countries, Mexico, Ecuador, Honduras,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. In contrast, exports to China appear significantly less GHG
intense in most other South American countries.
Figure A.3.3: Cumulative distribution functions of export basket GHG intensity, by
country
Anguilla

Argentina

Aruba

Bahamas

Barbados

Belize
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Figure A.3.3, continued: Cumulative distribution functions of export basket GHG
intensity, by country
Bermuda

Bolivia

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Costa Rica

Cuba

Dominica

Dominican Rep.

Ecuador

El Salvador

Guatemala

Guyana

Haiti

185

Honduras

Figure A.3.3, continued: Cumulative distribution functions of export basket GHG
intensity, by country
Jamaica

Mexico

Montserrat

Nicaragua

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

St. Kitts & Nevis

St. Lucia

Trinidad & Tobago

Turks & Caicos

St. Vincent & Grenadines

Uruguay

Venezuela

Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2 show two different statistical tests for the impact of China
on the water intensity of LAC exports. First, a two-sample t-test is conduction to establish
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whether the means of the distributions shown in Figures A.3.1 through A.3.3 above are
statistically significant. Second, regression analysis is conducted to distinguish the impact
of China and the impact of time (in other words, the progression of the commodity boom
in general) on the changing average GHG intensity of these exports over the decade
studied here.
The regression analysis is repeated separately for each sub-region and country
rather than incorporating them all into one analysis with interaction variables. This choice
prevents the unnecessary introduction of additional heteroskedasticity. It takes the form
G

/H/
L = ) + +, &ℎN:5' + 1, 4"56'
IJK '

Where:
PQP

•

O RST U represents the mean GHG intensity of a given export basket.

•

i corresponds to each of 20 export baskets: to China and the rest of the world over a
10-year period from 2004 to 2013, weighted by their value in millions of real (2004)
US dollars, so that years with higher exports are weighted more heavily.

•

Year is the calendar year less 2008 (the midpoint of the sample)

•

China is a binary variable (1= exports to China, 0 = exports to elsewhere).
Eleven countries and territories had insufficient exports to China during the study

period to calculate country-level coefficients: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba,
Dominica, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. However, their exports
are included in overall LAC and Caribbean exports in Table A.3.2.
Venezuela is an outlier, because not all of Venezuela’s exports to China are
registered as such in the UN Comtrade database. Venezuela’s oil exports (which account
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for the overwhelming majority of the country’s total exports) go to refineries in countries
that are often not the final destination. Many of Venezuela’s trading partners use their
own refineries, but China’s imports of Venezuelan oil go through intermediary countries.
So, UN Comtrade reports only non-oil exports from Venezuelan to China, which is
hardly an accurate representation of the whole. With this in mind, it is worth repeating
the regressions for South America and for LAC overall without Venezuela. The
relationship holds, because Venezuela accounts for only 6.8 percent of the region’s total
exports during the decade studied.
Finally, Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2 list the ratio of average emission intensities of
exports to China compared to other exports. For example, the region-wide value of 1.16
indicates that overall, LAC exports to China cause 16 percent more net GHG emissions
per dollar than other LAC exports.
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Table A.3.1: Mean GHG intensities and regressions results for LAC region and sub-regions
Average GHG Intensity of Exports
. To R.o.W.
. To China .
China/
.
R.o.W.1
Mean
SE
Mean
SE

Two-sample t-test
.

T-statistic

N

China
.

Coeff.

LAC Overall
W
/ Venezuela
W
/O Venezuela

1.96
1.93

0.00
0.00

1.69
1.65

0.00
0.00

1.16
1.17

58.2***
60.5***

5,273,434
4,912,485

Sub-Regions
Caribbean
Mex., Cent. Amer.
South America
S. Amer. W/O Venez.

2.26
1.03
2.08
2.05

0.03
0.00
0.01
0.01

1.30
0.96
2.36
2.38

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

1.74
1.08
0.88
0.86

29.8***
15.4***
-51.8***
-61.2***

69,006
2,354,278
2,850,150
2,489,201

1

SE

0.28*** 0.05
0.28*** 0.04
0.94***
0.08
-0.29***
-0.35***

0.18
0.05
0.05
0.04

Regression Results
. Intercept
Year
.
.
Coeff.
SE
Coeff.
SE
.

0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00

-0.01
0.01
0.00* 0.00
0.01
0.01
0.02*** 0.00

R2

1.69*** 0.01
1.65*** 0.01

0.6893
0.7691

1.31***
0.96***
2.36***
2.37***

0.6344
0.3597
0.6388
0.8605

0.03
0.01
0.02
0.01

This column shows the ratio of average intensity of LAC-China exports to the average intensity of other LAC exports. A value greater than 1.0 indicates that
exports to China are more GHG intensive than other exports, and a value less than 1.0 represents the opposite.
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Table A.3.2: Mean GHG intensities and regressions results for LAC countries
Average GHG Intensity of Exports
To China .
. To R.o.W. .
China/
Mean
SE
Mean
SE
R.o.W.1
2.08 0.02
2.99 0.01
0.69
2.78 0.26
1.46 0.01
1.90
1.29 0.10
1.52 0.02
0.84
1.57 0.23
0.69 0.01
2.29
1.05 0.03
0.85 0.01
1.24
3.03 0.16
4.07 0.01
0.74
2.50 0.01
2.83 0.00
0.89
1.14 0.00
1.26 0.00
0.90
1.23 0.01
1.38 0.00
0.90
0.57 0.00
0.80 0.00
0.71
1.81 0.01
1.23 0.01
1.47
2.31 0.05
1.14 0.00
2.02
1.17 0.03
1.04 0.00
1.13
1.11 0.14
0.73 0.01
1.52
0.92 0.06
1.19 0.00
0.78
0.47 0.02
1.88 0.40
0.25
1.34 0.10
0.68 0.00
1.98
3.91 0.23
1.92 0.02
2.03
2.20 0.04
1.91 0.01
1.15
1.15 0.00
0.91 0.00
1.26
2.00 0.17
3.60 0.04
0.56
1.80 0.06
1.64 0.01
1.10
2.38 0.11
3.20 0.07
0.74
1.47 0.02
1.55 0.01
0.95
1.25 0.03
1.75 0.00
0.71
7.50 0.14
6.96 0.06
1.08
4.90 0.06
2.21 0.00
2.21
.

Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bermuda
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Trinidad, Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela

Two-sample t-test
T-statistic
N
-55.5***
5.0***
-2.4*
3.8***
5.7**
-6.6***
-39.5***
-45.5***
-18.4***
-81.3***
64.6***
24.5***
5.0***
2.7**
-4.6***
-32.8***
6.8***
8.5***
7.9***
47.0***
-9.1***
2.5*
-6.1***
-5.0***
-15.4***
3.6***
45.1***

403,735
4,911
3,064
1,784
4,103
35,122
1,022,431
342,229
225,467
75,141
21,034
49,671
90,499
34,806
47,570
4,782
6,649
23,946
10,663
2,100,911
13,462
56,658
31,544
159,906
91,941
39,867
360,949

1

China
.
Coeff.
SE
-0.93*** 0.11
1.13*
0.42
-0.19
0.52
0.84*
0.30
0.19
1.25
-0.91*** 0.19
-0.41*** 0.08
-0.13*** 0.01
-0.1
0.11
-0.23*** 0.04
0.59** 0.14
1.18*** 0.20
0.13*
0.06
1.12
0.54
-0.22
0.20
-1.34*** 0.19
0.64*** 0.08
1.96
1.43
0.33*
0.15
0.25*** 0.03
-1.54
1.84
0.17
0.22
-0.81
0.84
-0.13
0.10
-0.43
0.45
0.69
0.45
2.61*
1.05

.

Regression Results
Year
.
. Intercept .
Coeff.
SE
Coeff.
SE
-0.07*** 0.01 3.04*** 0.03
0.03** 0.01
1.43*** 0.03
-0.01
0.02
1.53*** 0.06
0
0.01
0.69*** 0.03
0
0.02
0.86*** 0.05
0.02*
0.01
4.04*** 0.03
0.07*** 0.01
2.8*** 0.03
0.01*** 0.00
1.26*** 0.00
-0.03** 0.01
1.4*** 0.02
0
0.00
0.8*** 0.01
-0.02
0.02
1.24*** 0.05
-0.02
0.01
1.15*** 0.03
0
0.00
1.04*** 0.01
-0.01
0.01
0.74*** 0.02
0
0.01
1.18*** 0.02
0.05*** 0.01
1.84*** 0.03
0
0.00
0.69*** 0.01
0
0.06
1.93*** 0.19
0.02
0.01
1.91*** 0.03
-0.01*** 0.00
0.92*** 0.00
-0.17** 0.05
3.96*** 0.16
0.07*** 0.01
1.59*** 0.02
-0.01
0.04
3.22*** 0.13
0.08*** 0.01
1.49*** 0.04
-0.04** 0.01
1.79*** 0.03
-0.08
0.04
7.03*** 0.12
-0.07*
0.03
2.24*** 0.09

.

R2
0.8720
0.5226
0.0253
0.4285
0.0069
0.6183
0.7969
0.9496
0.4904
0.6746
0.5114
0.6831
0.2480
0.2820
0.0789
0.8229
0.8061
0.0989
0.2790
0.8740
0.4557
0.7818
0.0521
0.7489
0.4425
0.2394
0.4010

This column shows the ratio of average intensity of LAC-China exports to the average intensity of other LAC exports. A value greater than 1.0 indicates that
exports to China are more GHG intensive than other exports, and a value less than 1.0 represents the opposite.
Note on representation: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Dominica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, and Turks and Caicos are omitted due to small sample sizes, but their exports are included in overall and Caribbean exports in Table A.3.2, above.
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A.4 Statistical Analysis of Water Intensity Levels of Exports
Figure A.4.1 shows the cumulative distribution of exports from LAC to China and
to the rest of the world, measured against the water intensity of each good and weighted
by the real (2004) dollars of exports of each good. The results show that LAC exports to
China fall roughly into two categories: about 60 percent have extremely low water
intensity, and an additional share (over 20 percent) have intensity levels between 6 and 8
cubic meters per dollar. In contrast, over 80 percent of exports to the rest of the world
have very low intensity.
Figure A.4.1: Cumulative distribution of exports across water intensity levels, by
destination

Figure A.4.2, disaggregated by sub-region, shows that the results for LAC overall are due
primarily the experiences of South America.
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Figure A.4.2: Cumulative distribution functions of export basket water intensity, by
sub-region
Caribbean

Mexico, Cent. Am.

South America

Among countries (below) it is clear that exports to China are more water intense
in Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, and Uruguay, and less intense in several smaller
countries.
Figure A.4.3: Cumulative distribution functions of export basket water intensity, by
country
Argentina

Bahamas

Barbados

Belize

Bolivia

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Costa Rica
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Figure A.4.3, continued: Cumulative distribution functions of export basket water
intensity, by country
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Figure A.4.3, continued: Cumulative distribution functions of export basket water
intensity, by country
St. Kitts and Nevis

St. Lucia

St. Vincent, Grenadines

Trinidad and Tobago

Uruguay

Venezuela

Tables A.4.1 and A.4.2 show two different statistical tests for the impact of China
on the water intensity of LAC exports. First, a two-sample t-test is conduction to establish
whether the means of the distributions shown in Figures A.4.1 through A.4.3 above are
statistically significant. Second, regression analysis is conducted to distinguish the impact
of China and the impact of time (in other words, the progression of the commodity boom
in general) on the changing average water intensity of these exports over the decade
studied here.
The regression analysis is repeated separately for each sub-region and country
rather than incorporating them all into one analysis with interaction variables. This choice
prevents the unnecessary introduction of additional heteroskedasticity. It takes the form
!

"# $
( = + + -. /ℎ123) + 4. 5637)
%&' )

Where:
•

: <

;
9=>?
@ represents the mean water intensity of a given export basket.
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•

i corresponds to each of 20 export baskets: to China and the rest of the world over a
10-year period from 2004 to 2013, weighted by their value in millions of real (2004)
US dollars, so that years with higher exports are weighted more heavily.

•

Year is the calendar year less 2008 (the midpoint of the sample)

•

China is a binary variable (1= exports to China, 0 = exports to elsewhere).
Five countries and territories had insufficient exports to China during the study

period to calculate country-level coefficients: Dominica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis,
St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. However, their exports are included in
overall LAC and Caribbean exports in Table A.4.2. In addition, Anguilla, Antigua and
Barbuda, Bermuda, Cuba, Grenada, Haiti, and the Netherlands Antilles are omitted from
the analysis entirely because water intensity estimates for their national production are
unavailable.
As with Appendix A.3, the tables here show the LAC region and South America
both with and without Venezuela in order to address this country’s outlier status. Finally,
Tables A.4.1 and A.4.2 list the ratio of average emission intensities of exports to China
compared to other exports. For example, the region-wide value of 2.80 indicates that
overall, LAC exports to China can be expected to use or contaminate 180 percent more
net GHG emissions per dollar than other LAC exports.
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Table A.4.1: Mean water intensities and regressions results for LAC region and sub-regions
Average Water Intensity of Exports
To China .
. To R.o.W. .
China/
Mean
SE
Mean
SE
R.o.W.
.

Two-sample t-test
T-statistic

N

LAC Overall
W/ Venezuela
W/ Venezuela
O

2.70
2.72

0.01
0.01

0.97
1.03

2.80
2.60

225.1***
218.7***

4,792,095
4,513,788

Sub-Regions
Caribbean
Mex., Cent. Amer.
South America
S. Amer. W/O Venez.

0.05
0.25
2.96
2.98

0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01

0.23
0.24
1.74
1.98

0.20
1.03
1.71
1.50

-7.7***
0.9
143.7***
115.8***

117,296
2,234,613
2,440,186
2,161,879

.

China
.
Coeff.
SE
1.64*** 0.07
1.60*** 0.08

-0.09
0.01
1.16***
0.96***

0.05
0.14
0.09
0.10

.

Regression Results
Year
.
. Intercept .
Coeff.
SE
Coeff.
SE

R2

0.00
0.00

0.01
0.01

0.94*** 0.02
1.00*** 0.02

0.9622
0.0620

-0.01*
-0.01
0.01
0.01

0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01

0.23***
0.25***
1.65***
1.87***

0.3975
0.0861
0.9036
0.8562

0.01
0.02
0.03
0.03

Note on sample sizes and weights: For the two-sample t-test, the unit of analysis is millions of real (2004) dollars of exports during the decade studied here. The
sample sizes are the corresponding number of millions of dollars of exports during that time. Since the two-sample test statistic eliminates any possibility that the
differing means could be the result of chance, it is possible to conduct regression analysis on just the mean intensity level of the whole basket of exports from
each reporter to China or to the rest of the world. For these regression functions, the sample size is 20 (two exports markets and 10 years). The regression
analysis uses analytic weights of the dollar value of each year’s exports (in millions), which allows years with more exports (in real terms) to be counted more
heavily.
Note on country representation: Antigua and Barbuda, Bermuda, Cuba, Haiti, and the Netherlands Antilles are omitted from the analysis because water intensity
estimates for their national production are unavailable.
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Table A.4.2: Mean water intensities and regressions results, by countries
Avg. Intensity of Exports
To China .
. To R.o.W. .
China/
Mean
SE
Mean
SE
R.o.W.
6.36 0.02
3.50 0.01
1.8
0.06 0.00
0.06 0.00
1.0
0.11 0.00
0.50 0.06
0.2
0.68 0.00
2.71 0.11
0.3
1.85 0.29
1.98 0.03
0.9
3.81 0.01
2.07 0.00
1.8
0.05 0.00
0.18 0.00
0.3
0.23 0.02
0.69 0.01
0.3
0.21 0.02
0.70 0.01
0.3
0.06 0.05
0.39 0.01
0.1
0.63 0.10
1.42 0.02
0.4
0.47 0.29
0.72 0.01
0.7
5.07 0.24
2.12 0.02
2.4
0.07 0.00
2.38 0.06
0.0
0.30 0.09
2.26 0.03
0.1
0.03 0.00
0.63 0.03
0.0
0.18 0.01
0.15 0.00
1.2
2.55 0.46
3.03 0.05
0.8
0.84 0.18
0.14 0.01
5.9
9.08 0.34
8.71 0.09
1.0
0.05 0.00
0.50 0.01
0.1
0.05 0.00
0.07 0.00
0.7
5.75 0.10
4.07 0.02
1.4
0.83 0.13
0.03 0.00
25.6
.

Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Trinidad & Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela

Two-sample t-test
T-statistic
143.0***
-0.9
-6.5***
-18.2***
-0.6
142.4***
-77.1***
-29.0***
-25.0***
-7.2***
-7.7***
-1.7
10.7***
-37.6***
-23.1***
-19.6***
4.2***
-1.8
3.8***
0.7
-63.2***
-15.0***
16.3***
6.1***

N
379,925
3,442
2,079
1,594
36,542
1,003,350
292,376
196,367
56,119
43,108
69,790
30,874
42,715
4,126
20,969
9,216
2,024,608
11,440
52,152
28,485
123,484
59,946
35,713
278,829

China
Coeff.
2.88***
0.01
-0.27
-1.89
0.01
1.66***
-0.12***
-0.32**
-0.44**
-0.15
-0.62**
-0.29
2.39*
-1.94*
-1.57
-0.67***
0.04
-0.39
0.41
-0.69
-0.43***
-0.01
1.24**
0.83**

.

.

SE
0.28
0.01
0.58
1.78
0.39
0.10
0.01
0.10
0.11
0.13
0.19
0.31
1.02
0.73
1.60
0.14
0.15
2.58
0.71
1.94
0.03
0.01
0.42
0.25

.

Regression Results
Year
.
. Intercept .
Coeff.
SE
Coeff.
SE
-0.06*
0.03 3.39*** 0.09
0.00*** 0.00 0.05*** 0.00
-0.02
0.02 0.41*** 0.06
0.05
0.06 2.27*** 0.17
-0.16*** 0.02 2.18*** 0.06
0.04**
0.01 2.01*** 0.03
0.01*** 0.00 0.16*** 0.00
-0.06*** 0.01 0.72*** 0.02
0.00
0.01 0.66*** 0.02
0.01
0.01 0.35*** 0.02
0.02*
0.01 1.13*** 0.02
-0.01
0.00 0.68*** 0.01
-0.02
0.03 2.01*** 0.09
-0.04
0.03 2.01*** 0.10
-0.10
0.07 2.22*** 0.21
-0.07*** 0.01 0.56*** 0.03
-0.01
0.01 0.16*** 0.02
-0.21**
0.07 3.03*** 0.23
-0.02
0.03
0.15*
0.06
-0.61*** 0.09 9.43*** 0.29
0.02*** 0.00 0.44*** 0.01
0.00*** 0.00 0.07*** 0.00
0.12**
0.04 3.55*** 0.12
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.02

R2
0.8671
0.7979
0.0804
0.0872
0.7942
0.9522
0.9676
0.8670
0.4910
0.2231
0.5003
0.1832
0.2603
0.3283
0.1710
0.7652
0.1338
0.3621
0.0360
0.7241
0.9401
0.8007
0.5387
0.3996

See the note on sample sizes and weights on Table A.3.2, above.
Note on country representation: Dominica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines are omitted from this step due to small
sample sizes, but their exports are included in the “Caribbean” category in Table A.3.1, above.
Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bermuda, Cuba, Grenada, Haiti, and the Netherlands Antilles are omitted from the analysis entirely because water intensity
estimates for their national production are unavailable
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APPENDIX B
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2
B.1 Completed, International DFI-Financed Infrastructure Projects Included in This
Analysis, and the Corresponding Site-Specific Radii used in Models 4-13
The following tables give a timeline of project approvals by country, bank, and
type of project. These tables show the choice of each project’s site-specific radius, used
in Models 4 through 13. Where applicable, those choices entail tree cover change as a
function of the radius chosen for measurement, and the resulting site-specific radius,
defined as the x-intercept of the second derivative of these functions. In other cases, an
explanation is provided for an alternate choice in site-specific radius.
Table B.1.1: Projects in Bolivia
Approval
Year

2002

Type

DFI(s)

Project Name

Tree Cover Change as a Function of
Radius

Radius
(km)

CAF/
IADB

Santa Cruz – Puerto Suárez

y=0.0006x3-0.0131x2+0.0891x-0.4544

7

La Paz – Oruro 1
Rio Seco – Huarina 1
Tiquina – Copacabana 1
Yacuiba – Boyuibe 1
Yamparáez – Sucre 1
Puerto Aguirre
La Paz – Caranavi
Huachacalla – Pisiga
Integración Sur, Phase 2
Riberalta – Guayamerín
Uyuni – Potosi
Quiquibe – Yucumo 2
Yucumo – Rurrenbaque 2
La “Y” de Integración
Uyuni – Cruce Condo K
Chacapuco – Ravelo
Quillacollo – Suticollo
Uyuni – Tupiza

N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
N/A (zero tree cover within 4km)
N/A (zero tree cover within 3km)
y=0.0003x3-0.006x2+0.0484x-0.2821
N/A (zero tree cover within 6km)
N/A (zero tree cover change nearby)
y=-0.00004x3+0.0007x2-0.0031x-0.0082
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
y=-0.00006x3+0.0002x2+0.017x-0.3844
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
y=0.0002x3-0.0046x2+0.0273x-0.1707
y=0.0006x3-0.0126x2+0.1076x-0.6697
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
N/A (zero tree cover change within 10km)
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)

Road
IBRD

2004

Port
Road

2006

Road

IFC
IADB
CAF
IADB

2011

Road

CAF

2012

Road

CAF

10
4
3
7
6
1
6
10
10
1
10
8
7
10
10
10
10
10

Notes:
1
These roads were jointly financed through the “Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance” program.
2
These roads were jointly financed through the “Santa Bárbara-Rurrenabaque Northern Corridor Highway
Improvement” program.
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Table B.1.2: Projects in Colombia
App.
Year
2005

Type

DFI(s)

Project Name

Dam,
w/ res.

IADB

Porce III

Tree Cover Change as a Function of
Radius
N/A (unrelated TC loss at 7km)
3

3

Andes – Jardin
Angelópolis – Caldas 3
Bolombolo – Venecia 3
3

2006

2007

2009

2010
2011
2014

Radius
(km)

2

y=-0.00006x +0.0005x +0.004x-0.0658
y=0.0002x3-0.0054x2+0.052x-0.2259
N/A (zero tree cover change within
1km)
y=-0.0001x3+0.0013x2+0.0023x-0.0971
y=0.0001x3-0.0029x2+0.0204x-0.0583
y=-0.0001x3+0.0006x2+0.0157x-0.1205

6
3
9
1

Port

IFC

Road
Dam,
w/ res.
Fossil
fuel
power

CAF

Entrerrios – San Pedro
La Fabiana – Valparaiso 3
Marinilla – Guatape 3
Montenegro – La
Fabiana-El LíbanoTamesis 3
Puerto Triunfo –
Autopista 3
Titiribi – Albania 3
Terminal Maritimo
Muelles el Bosque S.A.
Buga – Buenaventura

CAF

Sogamoso

N/A (unrelated TC loss at 5km)

4

CAF/IFC

Termoflores

N/A (zero tree cover within 2km)

2

CAF/IFC/IIC

Termo Rubiales

N/A (zero tree cover within 2km)

2

CAF/IFC

Puerto Santa Marta

2

IFC/IIC

Puerto Buenaventura

IIC

Patico – La Cabrera

CAF/IFC

Puerto Bahía

IIC

Los Molinos

N/A (zero tree cover within 2km)
N/A (zero tree cover change within
1km)
N/A (zero tree cover change within
2km)
y=-0.0025x3+0.023x2+0.0716x-0.6722
N/A (zero tree cover change within
2km)

Road

Port
Dam,
RoR
Port
Dam,
RoR

IADB

4
10
2

N/A (unrelated TC gain at 6km)

5

N/A (unrelated TC loss at 7km)

6

N/A (unrelated TC loss at 4km)
N/A (zero tree cover change within
2km)
y=-0.0001x3+0.0031x2-0.0201x+0.0097

3

Notes:
3
These roads were jointly financed through the “Roads for Integration and Social Equality” program.
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2
10

1
2
3
2

Table B.1.3: Projects in Ecuador
App.
Year

Type

Bank(s)

Project Name

2000

Dam, RoR

BNDES

San Francisco
Abanico 4

2004

Dam, RoR

IBRD
Sabanilla 4

2007

Dam, w/ res.

IADB

2010

Dam, RoR

CHEXIM

2011

Fossil fuel
power
Unconv.
renewables

Baba
Coca-Codo Sinclair
Sopladora

CDB

Termoesmeraldas

CDB

Villonaco Norte (wind)

BNDES

Manduriacu

CAF

San José de Minas

CAF/IFC

San Bartolo

Road

CAF

Ruta Viva

2013

Dam, RoR

CDB

Minas San Francisco

2014

Unconv.
renewables

CAF

Gran Solar

Dam, RoR
2012

Tree Cover Change as a Function
of Radius
y=0.00005x3-0.0009x2+0.0055x0.0105
N/A (zero tree cover change within
2km)
N/A (zero tree cover change within
2km)
y=-0.0016x3+0.0308x20.1851x+0.1812
y=0.0001x3-0.0024x2+0.0129x0.0242
N/A (zero tree cover within 6km)
N/A (zero tree cover change within
2km)
N/A (zero tree cover change within
1km)
y=0.0037x3-0.0721x2+0.4322x0.7892
N/A (zero tree cover change within
1km)
N/A (zero tree cover change within
1km)
y = 0.0002x3 - 0.0019x2 + 0.0025x 0.0176
N/A (zero tree cover change within
1km)
y=0.005x3-0.1128x2+0.8056x1.8256

Notes:
4
These dams were jointly financed through the “SIBIMBE” program, with the Netherlands Clean
Development Facility.
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Radius
(km)
6
2
2
6
8
6
2
1
6
1
1
3
3
8

Table B.1.4: Projects in Peru
Year
2003
2004

2005

2006
2009

2010

2011
2012
2013
2014

Type

Bank(s)

Project Name

Tree Cover Change as a Function of
Radius
Radius
(km)
Road
IADB/IFC Red Vial 5 Toll Road Ancón N/A (zero tree cover change within 10km)
10
– Pativilca
Dam, w/res. IBRD
Cerro Mulato 5
N/A (zero tree cover change within 3km)
3
El Sauce 5
N/A (unrelated tree cover loss at 2km)
1
Moche I & II 5
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
10
Tanguche I & II 5
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
10
Tunnel Graton 5
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
10
Road
CAF
Corredor Vial Interoceánico y=0.0001x3-0.0022x2+0.0123x-0.0318
7
Sur, Rte. 2 6
Corredor Vial Interoceánico y=0.0006x3-0.0124x2+0.0955x-0.437
7
Sur, Rte. 3 6
Corredor Vial Interoceánico y=0.00003x3-0.0009x2+0.0091x-0.0684
10
Sur, Rte. 4 6
Road
IADB
Canta – Huayllay
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
10
Sullana – El Alamor
y=0.0004x3-0.0054x2+0.0348x+0.0978
5
Biofuel
IADB
Maple, Inc. sugar ethanol
N/A (zero tree cover within 7km)
7
project
Road
CAF
Red Vial4: Pativilca – CasmaN/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
10
– Chimbote – Trujillo
Dam, w/ res. IFC
Hydro Cheves
N/A (zero tree cover within 8km)
8
Road
CAF
Camaná – Dv. Quilca –
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
10
Matarani – Ilo – Tacna 7
Casma – Yaután – Huaraz 7 N/A (zero tree cover within 2km)
2
Churín – Oyón 7
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
10
Lunahuaná – DV. Yauyos- N/A (zero tree cover within 1km)
1
Chupaca 7
Reposo – Saramiriza 7
y=0.00003x3-0.0012x2+0.015x-0.1027
13
7
Tingo María – Aguaytía
y=-0.00004x3+0.0004x2+0.001x-0.1077
3
Aguaytía – Pucallpa 7
y=-0.0003x3+0.0087x2-0.0796x-0.356
10
Tocache – DV. Tocache 7
y=-0.0002x3+0.0045x2-0.0212x-0.2788
8
7
Trujillo-Sirán-Huamachuco y=-0.0003x3+0.0053x2-0.0396x+0.0699
6
CAF/ IBRD Chongoyape – Cochabamba y=-0.0004x3+0.008x2-0.0494x+0.0583
7
– Cajamarca 8
Ollantaytambo –
y=-0.00001x3+0.0001x2-0.0004x-0.0006
3
8
Quillabamba
Lima – Canta 8
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
10
Dam, RoR CAF
Las Pizarras
N/A (zero tree cover within 11km)
1
Dam, RoR CAF
Canchayllo
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
10
Port
IFC
Callao Muelle Norte
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
10
Unconv.
CAF/ IADB Marcona/Tres Hermanas
N/A (zero tree cover within 10km)
10
renewables
(wind)

Notes: 5 These dams were jointly financed through the “Poechos” program.
6
These dams were jointly financed.
7
These roads were jointly financed through the “Infraestructura Vial de Perú” program.
8
These roads were jointly financed through the IBRD’s “Peru Safe and Sustainable Transport” program
and CAF’s “Infraestructura Vial de Perú” program.
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B.2 Methodology: Environmental Performance Index
EPI scores used here are derived from the Environmental Performance Index project
managed by Yale University and the Columbia University Earth Institute, with a few
adjustments as noted below:
1. As EPI methodology changes over time, in order to calculated scores that are
comparable across years, scores are normalized across countries for each year. Two
versions of these scores are available: one series from 2000 to 2010 (Yale and
CIESIN, 2012), and another from 2007 to 2015 (Hsu, 2016). For the years 2007
through 2010, averages are taken for each country across the two indices, and those
results are then normalized.
2. For multilateral development banks, weighted averages are calculated using
countries’ representation on bank boards for each year.
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